Sangin: Afghanistan's poppy town that became deathtrap for British army

Area of Helmand province has been scene of nearly a third of the 300 British soldiers' deaths since 2001
Medics in Sangin
Medics from the emergency response team transport a battle casualty in Sangin. Photograph: MoD/Getty Images

Of the 300 British soldiers who have died in Afghanistan since 2001, 96 have been in Sangin, the most dangerous place in the country for Nato soldiers. The 300th victim is the seventh marine commando to have been killed or fatally wounded there in as many weeks. At least 16 British troops have died after being shot in the Sangin area in that time.

Four years after UK troops deployed there, the Taliban continue to aggressively contest control of the Helmand town, which has become infamous for the vast number of improvised explosive devices used by insurgents, which have been responsible for most British deaths. The town is also responsible for more than 10% of the daily casualties of the entire Nato mission.

Sangin has a long history of being troublesome for foreign troops. It was the scene of the first major military engagement in the south during the second Anglo-Afghan war of 1878, when the British fought a cavalry battle against 1,500 fighters. But today it is the drugs trade and tribal politics that have helped to make it a particularly lethal place to operate.

The town is close to tracts of well-irrigated land for growing poppies, and its proximity to the country's main highway makes it an important smuggling centre for opium and other goods. Analysts and diplomats familiar with the area say the high level of violence is in part due to drug smugglers keen to maintain a level of mayhem that allows their trade to flourish.

Weak and corrupt local government – a nationwide problem – also plays its part in fuelling local support for insurgents. That is further complicated by infighting between communities, a problem largely made possible by the decline of the tribal system, which was damaged by factional fighting during the civil war of the 1990s.

Scores of British troops have been killed in Sangin since Tony Blair, egged on by overconfident British generals, dispatched more than 3,000 service men and women to Helmand in 2006.

Ever since, they have been vulnerable to attacks, first by small arms fire and mortars, then roadside bombs, now by both, as they established isolated patrol bases to search for a hidden enemy and tried to give assurance to local Afghans frightened of the Taliban but distrustful of British troops.

They set up more and more forward bases and checkpoints in the area between Sangin and their supply base at Camp Bastion near the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah. Their vulnerability was compounded by a shortage of helicopters.

British troops in Helmand were spread too thinly, yet Gordon Brown blocked requests for more troops.

The last big British push was Operation Panther's Claw, which began in late June 2009 and was wrapping up in August when Simon Valentine became the 200th soldier to die since the invasion in 2001. That was a campaign designed to make an area of central Helmand safe for people to vote in the Afghan presidential elections.

The operation was concentrated in an area roughly along a line running north-east to south-west from Sangin to Gereshk to Lashkar Gah – part of what is called the green zone of the Helmand river valley. The map of Helmand has changed little in the 11 months that it has taken for 100 soldiers to be killed and many more to suffer life-changing injuries.

Instead of mounting grand offensives designed to seize more territory from insurgent control, the British mission was focused on the long, slow slog of counterinsurgency – holding on to areas they already had.

British commanders said they hoped it would be a turning point in the eight-year conflict. It was not. The operation took nearly 3,000 British troops, many engaged in heavy gunfights, to capture an area the size of the Isle of Wight. Security is said to be better now for the local population but the operation did not achieve the breakthrough hoped for. Ten British soldiers were killed in the operation, including Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, commander of 1st Battalion the Welsh Guards. Many more were wounded.

By the turn of the year, the US was sending thousands more troops. They now total about 20,000 in Helmand, more than double the number of British soldiers in the province, and more are on their way.

The US took over the key town of Musa Qala, won, lost, and then recaptured by British troops after fierce gun battles. But British troops were left to patrol Sangin.

Senior British military officials are still smarting over suggestions that the US had to take responsibility for southern Iraq three years ago – let alone Musa Qala now – because the British could not cope. While the US marines launched a much bigger operation to the south of Lashkar Gah, British commanders argued at the time that they had responsibility for most of the areas where the majority of Helmandis live.

In February this year British troops took part in Operation Moshtarak, an effort to further strengthen government control around Helmand's provincial capital of Lashkar Gah. However, UK troops focused on Nad-e-Ali, where there was already some British presence, while the US marines mounted an offensive against Marjah, a predominantly rural area where the Taliban were in complete control and where fighting has been more intense.

But even without taking part in major offensives, the attempt to continuously guarantee the security of areas that have previously been "cleared" of insurgents is dangerous work for the British. The necessary "presence patrols", usually on foot, are vulnerable to ambushes and ever-more sophisticated homemade bombs. This year troops have seen an increasing number of landmines with no metal content, rendering metal detectors useless.

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