Instruct: Given a question, retrieve relevant passages that answer the question.
Query: What caused The Battle of Kyongju?
From the outbreak of the Korean War and the invasion of South Korea (also known as the Republic of Korea) by the North, the North Korean People's Army had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over both the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and the United Nations forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from collapsing.[1] The North Korean strategy was to aggressively pursue UN and South Korean forces on all avenues of approach south and to engage them aggressively, attacking from the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the unit, which allowed the North Koreans to surround and cut off the opposing force, which would then be forced to retreat in disarray, often leaving behind much of its equipment.[2] From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the North Koreans used this strategy to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south.[3] However, when the UN forces, under the Eighth United States Army, established the Pusan Perimeter in August, the UN troops held a continuous line along the peninsula which North Korean troops could not flank, and their advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN army.[4]
September 12 is considered as the day when the North Korean offensive in the east ended.[23] By that date, the NK 12th Division had been virtually destroyed and the NK 5th Division was trying to consolidate its survivors near P'ohang-dong. Aerial observers reported sighting many North Korean groups moving north and east.[41]
UN forces began their final counteroffensive against the stalled North Koreans on 15 August. Intense fighting around P'ohang-dong ensued for several days, as each side suffered extensive casualties in back-and-forth battles. By 17 August UN forces were able to push North Korean troops out of the Kyongju corridor and An'gang-ni, putting the supply road to Taegu out of immediate danger. The NK 766th Independent Regiment—now down to 1,500 men—was forced to withdraw north to prevent being surrounded.
When he arrived at Kyongju that day, Coulter found the ROK I Corps disintegrating rapidly and in low morale.[26] Walker had instructed him to issue his orders to the ROK I Corps commander as advice, which Coulter did. Coulter had the mission of eliminating the North Korean penetration in the Kigye area and of seizing and organizing the high ground extending from north of Yongch'on to the coast at Wolp'o-ri, about 12 miles (19km) north of P'ohang-dong. This line passed 10 miles (16km) north of Kigye.[27] Coulter was to attack as soon as possible with Task Force Jackson to gain the first high ground north of Kigye. The US 21st Infantry Regiment was moving to a position north of Taegu on the morning of August 27, when Walker revoked its orders and instructed it to turn around and proceed as rapidly as possible to Kyongju and report to Coulter.[25] The regiment departed Taegu at 10:00 and arrived at Kyongju that afternoon. Coulter immediately sent the 3rd Battalion north to An'gang-ni where it went into a position behind the ROK Capital Division.[28]
In the eastern battles during the first two weeks of September, the South Korean troops, demoralized though they were, did most of the ground fighting. American tanks, artillery, and ground units supported them.[44] Uncontested UN aerial supremacy and naval gunfire from offshore also supported the South Korean troops, and probably were the factors that tipped the scales in their favor. After the initial phase of their September offensive, the North Koreans labored under what proved to be insurmountable difficulties in supplying their forward units. The North Korean system of supply could not resolve the problems of logistics and communication necessary to support and exploit an offensive operation in this sector of the front.[41] Nevertheless, the breakthrough was severe enough that the Eighth Army considered pulling back for several days, eventually deciding to stand its ground.[45]
The gains of the North Koreans in the east on September 4 caused Walker to shift still more troops to that area.[26] The day before, he had ordered the US 24th Infantry Division to move from its reserve position near Taegu to the lower Naktong River to relieve the US 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the Naktong Bulge area of the US 2nd Infantry Division front. It bivouacked that night on the banks of the Naktong near Susan-nil. On the morning of the 4th, before it could begin relief of the US Marine Corps forces there, the 24th Infantry Division received a new order to proceed to Kyongju. The assistant division commander, Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson, proceeding at once by jeep, arrived at Kyongju that evening. Division troops and the US 19th Infantry Regiment started at 13:00 the next day, September 5, and, traveling over muddy roads, most of them arrived at Kyongju just before midnight. Major General John H. Church, the 24th Division commander, had arrived there during the day. All division units had arrived by 07:00, September 6.[37]
With the North Koreans having cut off all other approaches from the Kyongju area, the task force spent all of September 10 making a circuitous southern approach to its objective. It arrived in its assembly area at Yongdok-tong, 1 mile (1.6km) south of Yonil Airfield, at 19:00 that evening. Davidson early that morning had flown on ahead from Kyongju to Yongdok-tong. Emmerich was there to meet him when his light plane landed on the road. On the flight over, Davidson looked for but did not see any North Korean soldiers. Emmerich told Davidson the North Koreans had driven the ROK troops from Hill 131. This hill was on the southern side of the boundary between the two ROK regiments holding the Yonil defensive position. Davidson and Emmerich agreed that the ROK troops would have to recapture Hill 131 during the night and that then the task force would attack through the ROK 3rd Division to capture the main North Korean positions on Hill 482. They thought that if the task force could establish the ROK troops on Hill 482 they should be able to hold it and control the situation thereafter. Emmerich took Davidson to meet the ROK 3rd Division commander. Davidson told him that he was in command in that area and informed him of his plan for the attack. That night the South Korean troops did succeed in recapturing Hill 131 and restoring their lines there. In this attack the ROK 3rd Engineer Battalion fought as infantry, and under the leadership and guidance of Captain Walter J. Hutchins, the KMAG adviser to the battalion, contributed heavily to the success.[40]
Facing the NK 12th Division was the ROK Capital Division.[22] At 04:00 August 27, a North Korean attack overran one company of the ROK 17th Regiment, Capital Division, north of Kigye. This caused the whole regiment to buckle and retreat. Then the ROK 18th Regiment to the east fell back because of its exposed flank. The ROK 17th Regiment lost the town of Kigye in pulling back, and the entire Capital Division fell back 3 miles (4.8km) to the south side of the Kigye valley.[24][25]
Receiving orders to withdraw and join the regiment above Kyongju, the 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry had to fight through a North Korean roadblock on the east side of the Hyongsan-gang 3 miles (4.8km) southeast of An'gang-ni. Upon arrival, it discovered that G Company was missing and the battalion had to turn around and get G Company. The 2nd Battalion fought its way back north and found G Company at the bridge. Reunited, the battalion fought its way out again, with tanks firing down the road ahead of the column and into the hills along the sides. North Korean fire knocked the tracks off three US M46 Patton tanks. US artillery then destroyed them to prevent North Korean use. The 2nd Battalion arrived in the Kyongju area shortly before 12:00.[34]
The next morning, September 11, the 19th Infantry passed through the left-hand ROK regiment just south of Hill 131 and, with the 1st Battalion leading, attacked west. At 09:30 it captured without opposition the first hill mass 2 miles (3.2km) west of its starting point. The 2nd Battalion then passed through the 1st Battalion and continued the attack toward Hill 482 (Unje-san), 1 mile (1.6km) westward across a steep-sided gorge. There, North Koreans held entrenched positions, and their machine gun fire checked the 2nd Battalion for the rest of the day. The morning of September 12 four Australian pilots from No. 77 Squadron RAAF struck the North Korean positions with napalm, and an artillery preparation followed the strike. The 2nd Battalion then launched its attack and secured Hill 482 about 12:00. That afternoon, ROK forces relieved Task Force Davidson on the hill mass, and the task force descended to the valley southwest of Yongdok-tong for the night. On September 13, Task Force Davidson returned to Kyongju.[40]
While this action was in progress near Yonil Airfield, the week-long battle for Hill 300 north of Kyongju came to an end. A regiment of the ROK 3rd Division captured the hill on September 11. In midafternoon the 3rd Battalion, US 19th Infantry, relieved the South Korean troops there. Scattered over Hill 300 lay 257 counted North Korean dead and great quantities of abandoned equipment and weapons, some of it American. In this fighting for Hill 300, the US 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, 37 men killed.[40]
The ROK 3rd Division followed the withdrawing NK 5th Division, and the ROK Capital Division advanced against the retreating survivors of the NK 12th Division.[26] On September 15 some elements of the Capital Division reached the southern edge of An'gang-ni. Reports indicated that North Korean troops were retreating toward Kigye. With the threat in the east subsiding, Eighth Army dissolved Task Force Church, effective at 12:00 September 15, and the ROK Army resumed control of the ROK I Corps. Eighth Army also ordered the US 24th Infantry Division to move to Kyongsan, southeast of Taegu, in a regrouping of forces. The US 21st Infantry Regiment had already moved there on the 14th. The US 9th Infantry was to remain temporarily at Kyongju in Eighth Army reserve.[41]
The unit subsequently moved back to the Naktong River, and was involved in the subsequent Pusan Perimeter campaign during August and September 1950. During the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the 19th Infantry was moved up from reserve positions in to combat the NK 4th Division, which was attempting to break through their lines. Having been badly mauled in these fights, the division was moved into reserve along the Pusan Perimeter on 23 September. It was replaced by units of the 2nd Infantry Division. In the subsequent Great Naktong Offensive, the 19th Infantry served as a reserve force to help units under attack in the Second Battle of Naktong Bulge. The 19th Infantry would later participate in the Battle of Kyongju, assisting troops of the Republic of Korea Army to help push back North Korean troops from the Kyongju area. During these battles, Red Cloud's experience as a combat veteran made him a valued member of his unit for leading the less experienced troops.
Fighting continued between the North Koreans and the ROK Capital Division on the hills bordering the valley from An'gang-ni to Kyongju.[26] The 3rd Battalion, US 19th Infantry, became involved there just after midnight on September 8–9. A North Korean force attacked K Company and drove it from Hill 300, a defensive position midway between An'gang-ni and Kyongju. North Koreans held the hill during September 9 against counterattack. Farther north, on the left side of the valley, the ROK 17th Regiment attacked and, with the support of the US 13th Field Artillery Battalion, captured Hill 285 and held it against several North Korean counterattacks. On the opposite, east side of the valley the ROK 18th Regiment made limited gains. These battles took place in drenching typhoon rains. Low-hanging clouds allowed very little air support. The rains finally ceased on September 10.[39]
Fighting was heavy and the two sides fought to capture and recapture P'ohang-dong and An'gang-ni, with the North Koreans seeking to break through the Kyongju corridor as a way to attack the UN base at Pusan. However, with large amounts of UN air and naval support, the US and South Korean ground forces were able to rout and force back the North Korean troops after two weeks of fighting.
On August 20, the North Korean commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units.[15] The North Koreans called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. These attacks would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the North Koreans to break through the lines in at least one place to force the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered.[18] The easternmost of these was for the NK 12th and NK 5th Divisions break through the ROK Capital Division and ROK 3rd Division to P'ohang-dong and Kyongju.[19]
North Korean forces had four possible routes in the perimeter: to the south, the pass through the city of Masan around the confluence of the Nam and Naktong rivers; another southerly route through the Naktong Bulge and into the railroad lines at Miryang; through the route into Taegu in the north; and through Kyongju in the eastern corridor. North Korea mounted a large offensive in August, simultaneously attacking all four entries into the perimeter. As a result, the Battle of Pusan Perimeter was not one single engagement but a series of large battles fought between the UN and North Korean divisions all along the perimeter.
The North Korean attack struck first on the UN's right flank on Korea's east coast.[20] Although the NK II Corps general attack in the north and east was planned for September 2, the NK 12th Division, now with a strength of 5,000 men, started to move forward from the mountains earlier than planned, from where it had reorganized after its defeat in the Kigye and P'ohang-dong area.[21] The division was low in food supply, weapons, and ammunition, and its men suffered from low morale.[22][23] On August 26, American and South Korean officers in the P'ohang-dong and Kigye area were optimistic; they congratulated each other on having repulsed what they thought was the last serious threat to the Pusan Perimeter.[21]
At a briefing in Taegu on August 27, Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker showed his concern over this development. One of those present was Major General John B. Coulter who had arrived in Korea about a month earlier.[22] Half an hour after the briefing ended, Walker ordered Coulter to observe the South Korean troops on the east.[25] Coulter flew to Kyongju, arriving there at 12:00 that day. Walker in the meantime formally appointed Coulter Deputy Commander, Eighth Army, placing him in command of the ROK I Corps which controlled the Capital and 3rd Divisions, the US 21st Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Battalion, US 9th Infantry Regiment, and the 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, less C Company. Coulter designated these units Task Force Jackson and established his headquarters in the same building in Kyongju in which the ROK I Corps commander and the KMAG officers had their command post.[25]
By 1200 on September 4, North Korean units had established roadblocks along the Kyongju-An'gang-ni road within 3 miles (4.8km) of Kyongju. A 2 miles (3.2km) gap existed between the ROK 3rd and Capital Divisions in the P'ohang-dong area.[24] But the big break in the United Nations line was in the high mountain mass west of the Hyongsan valley and southwest of An'gang-ni. In this area northwest of Kyongju there was an 8 miles (13km) gap between the Capital Division and the ROK 8th Division to the west. From that direction the North Koreans posed a threat to the railroad and the road net running south through the Kyongju corridor to Pusan. Faced with this big gap on his left flank, Coulter put the US 21st Infantry in the broad valley and on its bordering hills northwest of Kyongju to block any approach from that direction.[35]
By 12:00 on September 4, North Korean units had established roadblocks along the Kyongju-An'gang-ni road within of Kyongju. A gap existed between the ROK 3rd and Capital Divisions in the P'ohang-dong area. But the big break in the UN line was in the high mountain mass west of the Hyongsan valley and southwest of An'gang-ni. In this area northwest of Kyongju there was an gap between the Capital Division and the ROK 8th Division to the west. From that direction the North Koreans posed a threat to the railroad and the road net running south through the Kyongju corridor to Pusan. Faced with this big gap on his left flank, Coulter put the US 21st Infantry in the broad valley and on its bordering hills northwest of Kyongju to block any approach from that direction.
The situation at Kyongju during the evening of September 4 was tense. Kim Hong Il, The South Korean corps commander, proposed to evacuate the town. He said that the North Koreans were only 3 miles (4.8km) away on the hills to the north, and that they would attack and overrun the town that night.[36] Coulter told him that he would not move his command post. Coulter put four tanks around the building where the command posts were located. Out on the roads he stationed KMAG officers to round up ROK stragglers and get them into positions at the edge of the town. One KMAG Major stopped ROK troops fleeing south, sometimes having to do so with a pistol.[35]
Holding a line north of P'ohang-dong, An'gang-ni, and Kyongju, the so-called "Kyongju corridor," the Republic of Korea Army I Corps was unexpectedly hit with an attack by the North Korean People's Army's II Corps, part of the wider Great Naktong Offensive. The South Korean troops, already demoralized and struggling to maintain a strong defensive line, were easily pushed back from their positions. US Army units were called in to assist the South Koreans repel the attack.
The Battle of Kyongju was an engagement between United Nations (UN) and North Korean (NK) forces early in the Korean War from August 31 to September 15, 1950, in the vicinity of Kyongju in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. The battle ended in a victory for the United Nations after large numbers of United States (US) and Republic of Korea (ROK) troops repelled a strong North Korean attack.
North and South Korean forces suffered heavily in the battle, each side inflicted large numbers of casualties on one another. The exact numbers of casualties are impossible to determine.[23] Both sides are known to have suffered heavily.[42] Following the counterattack at Inchon, the North Korean units in the sector fled back North, no more than a few thousand troops from the NK 5th and 12th divisions were known to have returned to North Korea.[43] US casualties, in the meantime, were relatively light.[40]