Instruct: Given a question, retrieve documents that answer the question.
Query: What's a dissenting argument?
A dissenting opinion (or dissent) is an opinion in a legal case in certain legal systems written by one or more judges expressing disagreement with the majority opinion of the court which gives rise to its judgment. When not necessarily referring to a legal decision, this can also be referred to as a minority report.[1][2]
The arguments and reasoning of a dissenting judgment (as that term is used in the United Kingdom and Australia) or dissenting opinion (the term used in courts in the United States) also constitute "obiter dicta". These, however, might also be cited should a court determine that its previous decision was in error, as when the United States Supreme Court cited Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s dissent in "Hammer v. Dagenhart" when it overturned "Hammer" in "United States v. Darby Lumber Co."
Priestley claimed throughout his life that politics did not interest him and that he did not participate in it. What appeared to others as political arguments were for Priestley always, at their root, religious arguments. Many of what we would call Priestley's political writings were aimed at supporting the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, a political issue that had its foundation in religion.
In the same year, hostility towards Dissenters increased. A Bill against occasional conformity was passed through the House of Commons and debated in the Lords. Figures such as Henry Sacheverell, a High church clergyman, warned against Dissenters assuming positions of political power. His lead was followed by the Tory press, who published a number of sermons and pamphlets making similar arguments. In December, Defoe published his own pamphlet, "The Shortest Way", assuming the same stylistic conventions as the Sacheverell and the Tory publications.
Next Jackson denied Frankfurter's argument that flag-saluting ceremonies were an appropriate way to build the "cohesive sentiment" that Frankfurter believed national unity depended on. Jackson rejected Frankfurter's argument, citing the Roman effort to drive out Christianity, the Spanish Inquisition of the Jews and the Siberian exile of Soviet dissidents as evidence of the "ultimate futility" of efforts to coerce unanimous sentiment out of a populace. Jackson warned that who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."
James Alison, a priest formerly a member of the Dominican Order and in the United Kingdom, has also argued that the teaching of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith "On the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons" regarding gay people is incompatible with the Gospel, and states that "it cannot in fact be the teaching of the Church." In "A Question of Truth", the Dominican priest Gareth Moore states that "there are no good arguments, from either Scripture or natural law, against what have come to be known as homosexual relationships. The arguments put forward to show that such relationships are immoral are bad."
In summarizing its ruling and responding to the dissent, the panel majority said that "[f]or argument's sake we accepted the district court's view of the disqualifying abstract ideas, and in each instance we then explained why, in our view, the claims seen in their entirety are not disqualified. The "Alice/Mayo" framework does not require more." The panel majority said that it and the dissent were in agreement that the specification disclosed a patent-eligible system. "Unlike the dissent, however, we find the claims at issue, understood in light of that written description [specification], to be eligible for patenting."
Chief Justice John Marshall authored the dissenting opinion. He maintained that the Contract Clause gave the federal legislature the exclusive power over bankruptcy laws, rejecting the argument that state laws became part of contracts signed within the state thereafter. Marshall was joined in his dissent by Associate Justices Gabriel Duvall and Joseph Story. 
Individuals will choose their strategy for expressing dissent based on the strength of their arguments. Kassing and Avtgis (1999) found an individual who is more argumentative and less verbally aggressive is prone to use articulated dissent. On the other hand, an individual who lacks argumentative skills will resort to using a less direct and more aggressive strategy, latent dissent.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Murphy, concurred specially "to add a few remarks in order that silence may not be understood as acquiescence in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion" of Justice Frankfurter. First, he said, the Court's ruling involved no dicta; what was said was necessary to resolve the case. More important, he condemned the dissent's "error of interpreting legislative enactments on the basis of a court's preconceived views on 'morals' and 'ethics.' " Nothing in the federal patent statute refers to contributory infringement. The basis of the dissent's arguments is "the writer's personal views on 'morals' and 'ethics.' ":
The majority upheld the Maryland Court of Appeals' ruling on the grounds of stare decisis, stating that "our existing dormant Commerce Clause cases all but dictate the result reached in this case." Three previous cases were "particularly instructive" in deciding the case; the cases all involved taxes on gross receipts that the Supreme Court struck down for posing the risk of multiple taxation. The majority rejected arguments that those cases involved gross receipts rather than net income and corporations rather than individuals. The majority also rejected the Comptroller's argument that individuals should be distinguished from corporations for the purposes of this case because individuals can vote to change the discriminatory tax scheme. In the majority's view, "the notion that the victims of such discrimination have a complete remedy at the polls is fanciful" and that "it is even more farfetched to suggest that natural persons with out-of-state income are better able to influence state." They also found "no merit" in the Comptroller's argument that the statute is constitutional because it was not intended to discriminate against interstate commerce because the Commerce Clause "regulates effects, not motives, and it does not require courts to inquire into voters' or legislators' reasons for enacting a law that has a discriminatory effect." The majority also criticized the primary dissent's arguments—that the Dormant Commerce Clause does not limit the States' sovereign power to tax income of their residents, wherever earned—as "confus[ing] what a State may do without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with what it may do without violating the Commerce Clause." 
Although he had also joined Justice Breyer's dissent, Justice Souter dissented separately to write that certain GAO studies authorized by IDEA give weight to Breyer's arguments and distinguish this case from those the majority cites.
The perceptions of supervisors and coworkers can be used to further determine an individual's choice of dissent strategy. Employees will take notice of other dissenters and the consequences of their actions and will use this information to refine their "sense of organizational tolerance for dissent, to determine what issues merit dissent, and to inform their future dissent strategy choices" (Kassing, 2001).
More recently, the Court has expressly rejected the reasoning of Holmes' "Abrams" dissent in two decisions. In "Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project" (2010) the facts were similar to those in "Abrams." Respondents had offered advice and other verbal assistance to organizations fighting established governments in Sri Lanka and Turkey, organizations that had been designated as terrorists, and were subject to prosecution for attempting to provide material support to terrorist organizations in violation of what is now the USA PATRIOT Act, section 2339B. The respondents argued, supported by three dissenting justices, that they lacked the specific intent to aid in terrorist acts, and therefore could not be prosecuted for a criminal attempt. The majority rejected this argument, however, and repeated without citing the majority opinion in "Abrams," that Congress had the power to determine that all such expressive conduct posed a threat to national security.
After a first round of arguments, all seven justices tentatively agreed that the Texas law should be struck down, but on varying grounds. Burger assigned the role of writing the Court's opinion in "Roe" (as well as "Doe") to Blackmun, who began drafting a preliminary opinion that emphasized what he saw as the Texas law's vagueness. (At this point, Black and Harlan had been replaced by Justices William Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell Jr., but they arrived too late to hear the first round of arguments.) But Blackmun felt that his opinion did not adequately reflect his liberal colleagues' views. In May 1972, he proposed that the case be reargued. Justice William O. Douglas threatened to write a dissent from the reargument order (he and the other liberal justices were suspicious that Rehnquist and Powell would vote to uphold the statute), but was coaxed out of the action by his colleagues, and his dissent was merely mentioned in the reargument order without further statement or opinion. The case was reargued on October 11, 1972. Weddington continued to represent "Roe", and Texas Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Flowers replaced Jay Floyd for Texas.
Kassing and Avtgis (1999) demonstrated that an individual's verbal aggressiveness and argumentativeness influence the manner in which an individual will approach expressing dissent. Verbal aggressiveness involves attacking another person's self concept. This may include character attacks, competence attacks, ridicule, and threats. Argumentativeness, on the other hand, is when an individual argues about controversial issues.
Justices Smith Thompson and Joseph Story dissented on the jurisdictional question, and thus reached the merits, siding with the Cherokee. According to Richard Peters, the court reporter, this dissent was written with the explicit encouragement and assistance of Marshall. Moreover, Marshall "encourage[d] Peters to publish a separate report" that included the dissents, oral arguments, treaties, and the opinion of James Kent for the Cherokees. 
As is common in opinions to which there are dissents, Stevens' opinion addressed the major arguments in dissent. For example:
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann criticize three major strategies in battling allegedly dangerous scientific dissent: masking the dissent, silencing the dissent, and discrediting the dissenters. Melo-Martin and Intermann argue that these strategies come from a misdiagnosis: the real problem is not dissent, but public scientific illiteracy. Rather than focusing on dissent, scientists must concentrate on educating the general public, so that people could make educated opinions and recognize false claims and invalid arguments. They further argue that silencing dissent rather than promoting literacy incurs the risk of undermining the public trust in science.
Thomas argued in the process that "Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, Madison's objection to the assessment bill did not rest on the premise that religious entities may never participate on equal terms in neutral government programs. Nor did Madison embrace the argument that forms the linchpin of the dissent: that monetary subsidies are constitutionally different from other neutral benefits programs. Instead, Madison's comments are more consistent with the neutrality principle that the dissent inexplicably discards. According to Madison, the Virginia assessment was flawed because it 'violate[d] that equality which ought to be the basis of every law.'"
Following the oral argument, the Chief Justice assigned Justice John Paul Stevens to write the majority opinion and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. asked Justice Thurgood Marshall to write the minority or dissenting opinion, based on the initial count of the justices' views. Since Justice Potter Stewart did not participate in the case, it would take a 5-3 vote to overturn the decision of the Circuit Court. Stevens circulated a memorandum stating that his decision would be to invalidate the tax - Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist immediately stated they would join his opinion. Justice Byron White stated that he would wait and see what the dissent said, and then indicated he would join the dissent in part. It also appeared that Justice Harry Blackmun was also going to write a separate dissent, but he also stated that he would wait to see Marshall's opinion. At this point, the tribe had the votes to win on a 4-4 vote, but the Court was close to being adjourned for the summer recess. On July 3, 1981, the Court notified the parties to reargue the case on November 4, 1981.
In Justice Souter's dissent, he disputes what he refers to as the majority's "bald assertion that "[n]othing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative." The "applicability of the "Gardner-Denver" rule" to this case, he writes, is "unquestionable" and that "[o]nce we have construed a statute, stability is the rule and… [t]here is no argument for abandoning precedent here." 
A similar argument was made by the joint dissent, although the dissenters did not join this section (or any section) of the Chief Justice's opinion. Thus a majority of the justices held that the individual mandate did not fall within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.
The portions redacted are believed to include dissenting arguments, as well as the arguments that explicitly lay out justifications for undermining the American peoples' civil liberties.
Part of the majority's decision referenced "Korematsu v. United States", , which upheld constitutionality of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order to put Japanese American citizens into internment camps during World War II. The dissenting opinions in "Trump" had raised the case among their arguments, leading Roberts to write for the majority "The dissent's reference to "Korematsu", however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—'has no place in law under the Constitution'" (citing Justice Robert H. Jackson's dissent from "Korematsu"). Scholars disagree on whether this statement "constitutes an actual overturning of "Korematsu" or merely disapproving dictum" of the decision.