Instruct: Given a question, retrieve documents that answer the question.
Query: What's a tariff?
A tariff is a tax on imports or exports between sovereign states. It is a form of regulation of foreign trade. It is a policy that taxes foreign products to encourage or protect domestic industry. It helps limit trade deficits. The tariff is historically used to protect infant industries and to allow import substitution industrialization.
Ad valorem tax Bound tariff rate Environmental tariff Import quota List of tariffs Tariff-rate quota Telecommunications tariff Electricity tariff
In contrast, in economic theory tariffs are viewed as a primary element in international trade with the function of the tariff being to influence the flow of trade by lowering or raising the price of targeted goods to create what amounts to an artificial competitive advantage. When tariffs are viewed and used in this fashion, they are addressing the country's and the competitors' respective economic healths in terms of maximizing or minimizing revenue flow rather than in terms of the ability to generate and maintain a competitive advantage which is the source of the revenue. As a result, the impact of the tariffs on the economic health of the country are at best minimal but often are counter-productive.
Chadbourne railed against the Smoot–Hawley Tariff:
"How have we gone about the business of protecting and promoting the world trade so vital to our prosperity? We pass the highest tariff bill in history…and with what result? Already some forty-five nations have raised tariff walls of their own in direct retaliation."
In Edwardian Britain, proposals for tariff reform which had begun in the 1890s became a mass political movement with high visibility. The Tariff Reform League, founded in 1903 and headed by Britain's most outspoken champion of protectionism, Joseph Chamberlain, pushed for the implementation of tariffs to protect British goods in domestic and Imperial markets. Tariff reformers like Chamberlain were worried by what was seen as a deluge of American and German products entering the domestic market; they argued that part of the reason for the success of the U.S. and German economies were the national tariffs each imposed to protect fledgling industries from foreign competition. Without tariffs, it was claimed, vulnerable young industries like electrical goods, automobiles, and chemicals would never gain traction in Britain.
On April 22, 1930, President Hoover appointed him chairman of the United States Tariff Commission after the Tariff Act of 1930. He was said to have accomplished more work in one year than what had been done in the previous seven.
Before the RTAA, if Congress wanted to establish a lower tariff for particular imports, it would act unilaterally, taking the foreign country's tariff rate as fixed. Congress would choose a tariff rate that was either a little higher or lower than the median preferred tariff, depending upon the composition of the Congress. Generally, a Republican controlled Congress would prefer higher tariffs and a Democrat controlled Congress would prefer lower tariffs. Thus, tariffs were chosen based on the domestic politics of the United States. Individual members of Congress were under great pressure from industry lobbyists to raise tariffs to protect them from the negative effects of foreign imports. 
The RTAA’s novel approach freed Roosevelt and Congress to break this trend of tariff increases. First, it tied tariff reductions by the United States to reciprocal tariff reductions with international partners. It also allowed Congress to approve the tariffs with a simple majority, as opposed to the requisite two-thirds majority necessary for other treaties. Lastly, the president had the authority to negotiate the terms. These three innovations in trade policy created the political will and feasibility to enact a more liberal American trade policy. 
Reciprocity was an important tenet of the trade agreements brokered under RTAA because it gave Congress more of an incentive to lower tariffs. As more foreign countries entered into bilateral tariff reduction deals with the United States, American exporters had more incentive to lobby Congress for even lower tariffs across many industries. 
By giving the President the authority to negotiate these deals, the Congress effectively ceded a part of their power (authorized under US Constitution, Article I, Section VIII) to the executive branch. The President had to consider the aggregate welfare of all Americans, his foreign policy priorities, and what was feasible with other countries in making his decisions on tariffs. These considerations generally left presidents more inclined to reduce tariffs than the Congress. Whether Roosevelt or Congress foresaw this result is a matter of historical debate.
In March 2018, Trump announced tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, triggering a series of tit for tat tariffs and threatened additional tariffs from multiple nations, which by June 2018 had escalated into what some characterized as a trade war The trade dispute disrupted global commerce, with the "New York Times" noting that "shipments are slowing at ports and airfreight terminals around the world. Prices for crucial raw materials are rising. At factories from Germany to Mexico, orders are being cut and investments delayed. American farmers are losing sales as trading partners hit back with duties of their own." By June 2018, negative effects of the Trump tariffs policy had begun to ripple through the American economy, in particular the agriculture sector. In July 2018, China retaliated with a $34billion in tariffs on U.S. goods. Trump had signaled that he might impose an additional $200billion in tariffs if China imposed their own tariffs, with the potential for a further $200billion, in an escalating trade war.
Feed-In Tariffs are intended to incentivise small-scale (less than 5MW), low-carbon electricity generation. These feed-in tariffs work alongside the Renewables Obligation (RO), which will remain the primary mechanism to incentivise deployment of large-scale renewable electricity generation. The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) in intended to incentivise the generation of heat from renewable sources. They also currently offer up to 21p per kWh from December 2011 in the Tariff for photovoltaics plus another 3p for the Export Tariff - an overall figure which could see a household earning back double what they currently pay for their electricity.
The clothing business in the US is still largely subject to what remains of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, passed in 1930. Since 2001, Columbia has paired its designers with teams of trade experts in a process the company calls "tariff engineering" in order to reach lower tariffs, taxes, or duties. For example, Columbia applies a very thin layer of fabric to the soles of its shoes since tariffs on fabric soles are lower than those on rubber soles; the fabric wears away within days. For similar reasons, jackets are waterproofed and filled with at least 10% down.
Market access refers to the reduction of tariff (or non-tariff) barriers to trade by WTO members. The 1995 Agreement on Agriculture consists of tariff reductions of:
Least developed countries (LDCs) were exempt from tariff reductions, but they either had to convert non-tariff barriers to tariffs—a process called tariffication—or "bind" their tariffs, creating a ceiling that could not be increased in future.
In September 2018, after President Trump announced tariffs on 200 billion worth of goods from China, Corker stated that the move was misrepresented and Americans would be paying for the tariffs. Corker stated that while China was using the US and other countries to its advantage, the administration had not articulated what the US hoped to achieve with imposing the tariffs.
The ending of what amounted to an export tariff severely damaged government revenues, and as of 4 February 1952, the rupiah was officially devalued to Rp 11.4, with export tariffs of 15–25% on commodities that Indonesia was strong in. Weaker commodities were not subject to tariffs, and from 1955 were actually given a premium of 5–25% to boost their export.
Tariff increase approvals occur infrequently and are insufficient to compensate for inflation, thus resulting in an erosion of real tariff levels. Tariffs in municipal systems tend to be even lower than tariffs for systems managed by SANAA, suggesting that tariff setting in municipalities is more prone to political capture in Honduras than tariff setting at the national level.
SANAA's sanitation tariff corresponds to 25% of the water tariff.
Water tariffs are set based on a number of formal criteria defined by law, as well as informal criteria. Formal criteria typically include:Social and political considerations often are also important in setting tariffs. Tariff structure and levels are influenced in some cases by the desire to avoid an overly high burden for poor users. Political considerations in water pricing often lead to a delay in the approval of tariff increases in the run-up to elections. Another criterion for tariff setting is that water tariffs should be easy to understand for consumers. This is not always the case for the more complex types of tariffs, such as increasing-block tariffs and tariffs that differentiate between different categories of users.
Additionally, many foreign factory owners in newly industrialized countries and underdeveloped countries saw the attempts to impose pollution controls on them as suspicious...
Moreover, the problem of what the ideal tariff level is also a cause for concern when implementing environmental tariffs.
The Morrill Tariff was met with intense hostility in Britain, where the free trade movement dominated public opinion. Southern diplomats and agents sought to use British ire towards the Morrill Tariff in order to garner sympathy, with the aim of obtaining British recognition for the Confederacy. The new tariff schedule heavily penalized British iron, clothing, and manufactured exports with new taxes and sparked public outcry from many British politicians. The expectation of high tax rates probably caused British shippers to hasten their deliveries before the new rates took effect in the early summer of 1861. When complaints were heard from London, Congress counterattacked. The Senate Finance Committee chairman snapped, "What right has a foreign country to make any question about what we choose to do?"
While all this was going on, McLane negotiated what seemed to be a satisfactory tariff bill, but when South Carolina continued to object and triggered the Nullification Crisis, McLane prepared the important Force Bill of 1833 to provide for the tariff's enforcement.
The temporary tariffs of 8–30% were originally scheduled to remain in effect until 2005. They were imposed to give U.S. steel makers protection from what a U.S. probe determined was a detrimental surge in steel imports. More than 30 steel makers had declared bankruptcy in recent years. Steel producers had originally sought up to a 40% tariff. Canada and Mexico were exempt from the tariffs because of penalties the United States would face under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Additionally, some developing countries such as Argentina, Thailand, and Turkey were also exempt. The typical steel tariff at the time was usually between zero and one percent, making the 8–30% rates seem exceptionally high. These rates, though, are comparable to the standard permanent U.S. tariff rates on many kinds of clothes and shoes.
The Tariff Reform League (TRL) was a protectionist British pressure group formed in 1903 to protest against what they considered to be unfair foreign imports and to advocate Imperial Preference to protect British industry from foreign competition. It was well funded and included politicians, intellectuals and businessmen, and was popular with the grassroots of the Conservative Party. It was internally opposed by the Unionist Free Food League (later Unionist Free Trade Club) but that had virtually disappeared as a viable force by 1910. By 1914 the Tariff Reform League had approximately 250,000 members. It is associated with the national campaign of Joseph Chamberlain, the most outspoken and charismatic supporter of Tariff Reform. The historian Bruce Murray has claimed that the TRL "possessed fewer prejudices against large-scale government expenditure than any other political group in Edwardian Britain".
Enacted on July 13, 1832, this was referred to as a protectionist tariff in the United States. The purpose of this tariff was to act as remedy for the conflict created by the Tariff of 1828. Mainly, the protective Tariff of 1828 was created in such a way that it intended to protect the industry in the north. Because of this, the Tariff of 1828 was also called the Tariff of Abominations by Southern states as it seemed unfair on the part of the government to favor the North by sidelining the south. As compared to the hype created about the protective Tariff of 1832, it proved to be a far cry from fulfilling the demands of the south. Its predecessor pushed the duties on citizens which were as high as 45 percent on the value of specific manufactured goods, while 1832 act brought it down to 35%. For instance, the duty on hemp, which had been $60 a ton in 1828, was reduced to a duty of $40, as a result of compromise Tariff of 1832. Even then southerners were not happy with it. Eventually, their unrest and dissatisfaction was what led to the nullification crisis. Along with that, another bill was passed, Tariff of 1833.
Note: an individual may be member of several different groups, including groups that oppose each other. For example, an auto worker might pay dues to a union that supports higher tariffs on car imports. But as a buyer of cars, he may pay dues to an auto club that opposes them. In his role as a producer he is a member of a pro-tariff group. In his role as a consumer, he is a member of an anti-tariff group. What matters most is the behavior of groups as groups, not the behavior of individual members.
Many renewable sources are highly dependent on their location. For example, windmills are most profitable in windy locations, and solar plants are best at sunny locations. This means that generators tend to be concentrated at these most profitable sites. The differentiated tariff seeks to make less naturally productive sites more profitable and so spread out the generators which many consider to be an undesirable good in the area (Finon). Imagine cutting down all the forests to build wind farms; this would not be good for the environment. This, however, leads to a less cost-effective production of renewable electricity as the most efficient sites are under-utilized. The other goal of tariffs differentiated by marginal cost is to reduce the cost of the program (Finon). Under the uniform tariff all producers receive the same price which is at times in gross excess of the price needed to incentivize them to produce. The additional revenue translates into profit. Thus, the differentiated tariff attempts to give each producer what it requires to maintain production so that the optimal market quantity of renewable energy production can be reached (Finon).
Southern opponents generally felt that the protective features of tariffs were harmful to southern agrarian interests and claimed they were unconstitutional because they favored one sector of the economy over another. New England importers and ship owners also had reason to oppose provisions targeting their industries—provisions inserted by Democratic Party legislators to induce New England constituents to sink the legislation.
Those in Western states and manufacturers in the Mid-Atlantic States argued that the strengthening of the nation was in the interest of the entire country. This same reasoning swayed two-fifths of U.S. Representatives in the New England states to vote for the tariff increase:
A substantial minority of New England Congressmen (41%) saw what they believed to be long-term national benefits of an increased tariff, and voted for it; they believed the tariff would strengthen the manufacturing industry nationally (see table).
A program within the US intelligence community, Project Socrates, that was tasked with addressing America's declining economic competitiveness, determined that countries like China and India were using tariffs as an integral element of their respective technology strategies to rapidly build their countries into economic superpowers. However, the US intelligence community tends to have limited inputs into developing US trade policy. It was also determined that the US, in its early years, had also used tariffs as an integral part of what amounted to technology strategies to transform the country into a superpower.[73]