Instruct: Given a question, retrieve relevant documents that can help answer the question.
Query: Who developed the first thermonuclear weapon?
The notion of using a fission weapon to ignite a process of nuclear fusion can be dated back to 1942. At the first major theoretical conference on the development of an atomic bomb hosted by J. Robert Oppenheimer at the University of California, Berkeley, participant Edward Teller directed the majority of the discussion towards Enrico Fermi's idea of a "Super" bomb that would use the same reactions that powered the Sun itself.
The scientists at the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority's Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston in Berkshire included William Penney, William Cook, Ken Allen, Samuel Curran, Henry Hulme, Bryan Taylor and John Ward. They did not know how to build a hydrogen bomb, but produced three designs: Orange Herald, a large boosted fission weapon; Green Bamboo, an interim thermonuclear design; and Green Granite, a true thermonuclear design. The first series of Operation Grapple tests involved Britain's first airdrop of a thermonuclear bomb. Although hailed as a success at the time, the first test of the Green Granite design was a failure. The second test validated Orange Herald as a usable design of a megaton weapon, but it was not a thermonuclear bomb, and the core boosting did not work. A third test attempted to correct the Green Granite design, but was another failure.
Pictures of nuclear weapons themselves (the actual casings) were not made public until 1960, and even those were only mock-ups of the "Fat Man" and "Little Boy" weapons dropped on Japan—not the more powerful weapons developed more recently. Diagrams of the general principles of operation of thermonuclear weapons have been available in very general terms since at least 1969 in at least two encyclopedia articles, and open literature research into inertial confinement fusion has been at least richly suggestive of how the "secondary" and "inter" stages of thermonuclear weapons work.
Only six countries—United States, Russia, United Kingdom, China, France, and India—have conducted thermonuclear weapon tests. (Whether India has detonated a "true" multi-staged thermonuclear weapon is controversial.)[15] North Korea claims to have tested a fusion weapon as of January2016, though this claim is disputed.[16] Thermonuclear weapons are considered much more difficult to successfully design and execute than primitive fission weapons. Almost all of the nuclear weapons deployed today use the thermonuclear design because it is more efficient.
Research has been done into the possibility of pure fusion bombs: nuclear weapons that consist of fusion reactions without requiring a fission bomb to initiate them. Such a device might provide a simpler path to thermonuclear weapons than one that required development of fission weapons first, and pure fusion weapons would create significantly less nuclear fallout than other thermonuclear weapons, because they would not disperse fission products. In 1998, the United States Department of Energy divulged that the United States had, "...made a substantial investment" in the past to develop pure fusion weapons, but that, "The U.S. does not have and is not developing a pure fusion weapon", and that, "No credible design for a pure fusion weapon resulted from the DOE investment".[18]
The Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Churchill ministry, however, believed that
The government decided on 27 July 1954 to begin development of a thermonuclear bomb, and announced its plans in February 1955. British knowledge of thermonuclear weapons was based on the work done at the Los Alamos Laboratory during the war. Two British scientists, Egon Bretscher and Klaus Fuchs, had attended the conference there on the Super (as it was then called) in April 1946, and Chadwick had written a secret report on it in May 1946, but the design was found to be unworkable. Some intelligence about Joe 4 was derived from its debris, which was provided to Britain under the 1948 "Modus Vivendi". Penney established three megaton bomb projects at Aldermaston: Orange Herald, a large boosted fission weapon; Green Bamboo, an interim thermonuclear design similar to the Soviet Layer Cake used in Joe 4 and the American Alarm Clock; and Green Granite, a true thermonuclear design.
North Korea claimed to have tested its miniaturised thermonuclear bomb on 6 January 2016. North Korea's first three nuclear tests (2006, 2009 and 2013) were relatively low yield and do not appear to have been of a thermonuclear weapon design. In 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry speculated that North Korea may be trying to develop a "hydrogen bomb" and such a device may be North Korea's next weapons test. In January 2016, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb, although only a magnitude 5.1 seismic event was detected at the time of the test, a similar magnitude to the 2013 test of a 6–9 kt atomic bomb. These seismic recordings cast doubt upon North Korea's claim that a hydrogen bomb was tested and suggest it was a non-fusion nuclear test.
A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission (fission bomb) or from a combination of fission and fusion reactions (thermonuclear bomb). Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter. The first test of a fission ("atomic") bomb released an amount of energy approximately equal to 20,000 tons of TNT (84TJ).[1] The first thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb test released energy approximately equal to 10million tons of TNT (42PJ). A thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than 2,400 pounds (1,100kg) can release energy equal to more than 1.2million tons of TNT (5.0PJ).[2] A nuclear device no larger than traditional bombs can devastate an entire city by blast, fire, and radiation. Since they are weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a focus of international relations policy.
Nuclear weapons brought an entirely new and terrifying possibility to warfare: a nuclear holocaust. While at first the United States held a monopoly on the production of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, with some assistance from espionage, managed to detonate its first weapon (dubbed "Joe-1" by the West) in August 1949. The post-war relations between the two, which had already been deteriorating, began to rapidly disintegrate. Soon the two were locked in a massive stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The United States began a crash program to develop the first hydrogen bomb in 1950, and detonated its first thermonuclear weapon in 1952. This new weapon was alone over 400 times as powerful as the weapons used against Japan. The Soviet Union detonated a primitive thermonuclear weapon in 1953 and a full-fledged one in 1955.
A New Weapons Committee was established at Aldermaston on 15 October 1951 to examine improvements to their atomic bombs. John Corner, the head of the theoretical group at Aldermaston, suggested producing a device in the "megaton range"—one with a yield of or more. In this he was thinking not of a thermonuclear weapon, but of a large fission one. The idea was not pursued at that time, because the RAF wanted more, not bigger, atomic bombs. Meeting in Bermuda in December 1953 with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had replaced Truman as president earlier that year, Churchill told him that the RAF had reckoned that fission bombs would be sufficient for most targets, and therefore that Britain had no intention of developing hydrogen bombs.
On 12 and 19 March 1954, Penney briefed the Gen 475 Committee meetings, attended by the Chiefs of Staff, senior officials from the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office, and Sir Edwin Plowden, about recent developments in thermonuclear weapons. Sir Frederick Brundrett, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff's Working Party on the Operational Use of Atomic Weapons (OAW), then asked Penney on 25 May for a working paper for an OAW meeting on 31 May. In turn, OAW sent a report to the Chiefs of Staff, who recommended that the United Kingdom develop its own thermonuclear weapons. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, the First Sea Lord, recalled that:
On 10 June 1948, Tamm headed a new group of theorists which included Andrei Sakharov, Vitaly Ginzburg, S.Z. Belenky and Romanov. They followed up Sakharov's ideas for a new thermonuclear weapon and went to KB-11 (now the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics) in the closed city of Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod. He started as a junior researcher, then senior, then head of department. In 1952, he received a degree in Physical and Mathematical Sciences with a thesis on kinetic processes of neutrons. This work on neutrons and efficiency continued, along with calculations on nuclear reaction kinetics and energy release of the Soviet Union's first thermonuclear weapon, the RDS-6, tested in 1953; for this he was awarded the Stalin Prize, the first of several awards. He was a leading developer of the RDS-37 - the first Soviet two-stage thermonuclear weapon - most specifically concerned with the power output. Romanov transferred to the new Scientific Research Institute-1011 as head of the theoretical department in 1955. Two years later, his team had developed a new megatonne-yield bomb design. He gained a Ph.D. in Physical and Mathematical Sciences in 1958 and was appointed to professorship of theoretical physics in 1962.
Test No. 6 is the codename for China's first test of a three-staged thermonuclear device and, also its sixth nuclear weapons test. The device was detonated at Lop Nur Test Base, or often dubbed as Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, in Malan, Xinjiang, on 17 June 1967. With successful testing of this three-stage thermonuclear device, China became the fourth country to have successfully developed a thermonuclear weapon after the United States, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. It was dropped from a Hong-6 (Chinese manufactured Tu-16) and was parachute-retarded for an airburst at 2960 meters. The bomb was a three-stage device with a boosted U-235 primary and U-238 pusher. The yield was 3.3 megatons.
With the basic fusion reactions confirmed, and with a feasible design in hand, there was nothing to prevent Los Alamos from testing a thermonuclear device. On 1 November 1952, the first thermonuclear explosion occurred when Ivy Mike was detonated on Enewetak Atoll, within the US Pacific Proving Grounds. This device, which used liquid deuterium as its fusion fuel, was immense and utterly unusable as a weapon. Nevertheless, its success validated the Teller–Ulam design, and stimulated intensive development of practical weapons.
A thermonuclear weapon, or fusion weapon, is a second-generation nuclear weapon design which affords vastly greater destructive power than first-generation atomic bombs. Modern fusion weapons consist essentially of two main components: a nuclear fission primary stage (fueled by Uranium-235 or Plutonium-239) and a separate nuclear fusion secondary stage containing thermonuclear fuel: the heavy hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium, or in modern weapons lithium deuteride. For this reason thermonuclear weapons are often colloquially called hydrogen bombs, or H-bombs.
In 1953, shortly after the Americans tested a thermonuclear weapon in 1952, followed by the Soviets with Joe 4, and before the UK government took a decision in July 1954 to develop a thermonuclear weapon, the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston was asked about the possibilities for a very large pure fission bomb with a yield of one megaton. This study referred to the Zodiak Mk.3 bomb, but progressed no further than a rudimentary study. At this time studies were also started that ultimately led to a decision in 1954 to develop a thermonuclear weapon, and the design studies were split into two tracks because the British at that time had not yet discovered the Teller-Ulam technique necessary to initiate fusion. One track led to an intermediate design, the so-called Type A thermonuclear design, similar to the Alarm Clock and layer cake hybrid designs of other nuclear powers; although these designs are now regarded as large boosted fission weapons, and no longer regarded as thermonuclear weapons that derive a very large part of their energy from a fusion reaction, designated by the British as Type B, but as hybrids. The British hybrid weapon was known as Green Bamboo, weighed approx 4,500 lb (2,045 kg) and its spherical shape measured approx 45 inches diameter with a 72-point implosion system. This Green Bamboo weapon was intended as the warhead for all projected British strategic delivery systems of the period; the Yellow Sun Stage 1 air-dropped bomb, and the Blue Steel air-launched stand-off missile. The large girth of these weapons was designed to accommodate the diameter of Green Bamboo's implosion sphere.
He graduated with honours from the faculty of Physics of Moscow State University in 1950. He entered the Soviet weapons programme as one of its youngest scientists, a senior laboratory assistant in Andrei Sakharov's group at Arzamas-16 (also known as KB-11), now known as All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), in Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region. In 1953, he received the Stalin Prize for his part in the work to develop the Soviet union's first thermonuclear weapon, the RDS-6 which was detonated in 1953; this was the first of several state awards for his work advancing nuclear weapons. With fellow physicist Yuri Trutnev, he proposed a new design in 1955 for a two-stage thermonuclear device with much-improved features, followed by theoretical development and finally completion in 1958. He frequently took part in testing weapons he had helped to develop. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear engineering in 1960. In 1962, he became a doctor of technical sciences and senior research worker. In 1964 he was promoted to head of his department and deputy head of VNIIEF. 
Fusion reactions do not create fission products, and thus contribute far less to the creation of nuclear fallout than fission reactions, but because all thermonuclear weapons contain at least one fission stage, and many high-yield thermonuclear devices have a final fission stage, thermonuclear weapons can generate at least as much nuclear fallout as fission-only weapons.
The French nuclear testing site was moved to the unpopulated French atolls in the Pacific Ocean. The first test conducted at these new sites was the "Canopus" test in the Fangataufa atoll in French Polynesia on 24 August 1968, the country's first multistage thermonuclear weapon test. The bomb was detonated from a balloon at a height of 520 meters. The result of this test was significant atmospheric contamination. Very little is known about France's development of the Teller–Ulam design, beyond the fact that France detonated a 2.6 Mt device in the 'Canopus" test. France reportedly had great difficulty with its initial development of the Teller-Ulam design, but it later overcame these, and is believed to have nuclear weapons equal in sophistication to the other major nuclear powers.
There are currently no known gun-type weapons in service: advanced nuclear weapon states tended to abandon the design in favor of the implosion-type weapons, boosted fission weapons, and thermonuclear weapons. New nuclear weapon states tend to develop boosted fission and thermonuclear weapons only. All known gun-type nuclear weapons previously built worldwide have been dismantled.
The B-41 (also known as Mk-41) was a thermonuclear weapon deployed by the United States Strategic Air Command in the early 1960s. It was the most powerful nuclear bomb ever developed by the United States, with a maximum yield of 25 megatons. The B-41 was the only three-stage thermonuclear weapon fielded by the U.S.
As the Mark 13 neared production, advances in thermonuclear weapon design, particularly the Ivy Mike thermonuclear test in November 1952, made the Mark 13 obsolete. Development continued for research purposes (the Upshot-Knothole Harry test shot came months after the first thermonuclear test in Ivy Mike), and in two variant designs, but the Mark 13 proper was never deployed. The Mark 13 bomb version was cancelled in August 1953, and the W-13 warhead version was cancelled in September 1953.
As thermonuclear weapons represent the most efficient design for weapon energy yield in weapons with yields above , virtually all the nuclear weapons of this size deployed by the five nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty today are thermonuclear weapons using the Teller–Ulam design.
Violet Club was a nuclear weapon deployed by the United Kingdom during the Cold War. It was Britain's first operational "high yield" weapon, and was intended to provide an emergency capability until a thermonuclear weapon could be developed from the 1956–1958 Operation Grapple tests.
The thermonuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union exceeded all expectations set out before the scientists who took part. Two countries creating thermonuclear weapons with such energy yields from two different design methods proved to be the crowning achievement for science in the 1950s. Of course, the successful and promising work from both the United States and the Soviet Union only spurred each country to push for stronger weapons, as the floodgates of thermonuclear weapon potential had been opened. This was, of course, entirely the norm at the time considering that the Cold War was in full swing. It was a significant boost to Soviet morale knowing that the Soviet Union's physicists, engineers, scientist, and great minds were able to not only compete with the Americans, but also able to out perform them in some key areas of weapon and technological development.
McCormack became involved in discussions with Edward Teller over the possibility of developing thermonuclear weapons, then known as the "Super". McCormack became an early advocate of the Super, which promised yields in the megaton range, and directed Norris Bradbury at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to proceed with its development even at the detriment of other weapons. The debate over the merits of the Super pitted the United States Air Force against the other services, which wanted more small, tactical weapons. Concurrently, there was a technical debate between Teller and other scientists like Robert Oppenheimer over the feasibility of the Super, because there was no guarantee that it would work, and even after Operation Greenhouse, the processes involved in thermonuclear reactions were not fully understood. It ultimately became apparent that the Super design would not work, but the development of the Teller-Ulam design provided a new path to high yield thermonuclear weapons. For his services as Director of Military Applications, McCormack was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal.