Instruct: Given a question, retrieve documents that answer the question.
Query: What is the origin of the word "epistemic"?
Epistemology (/ɪˌpɪstɪˈmɒlədʒi/(listen); fromGreekἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, meaning 'knowledge',andλόγος, logos, meaning 'logical discourse') is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge.[1]
"As evidentialism is a thesis about "epistemic" justification, it is a thesis about what it takes for one to believe justifiably, or reasonably, in the sense thought to be necessary for knowledge. Particular versions of evidentialism can diverge in virtue of their providing different claims about what sorts of things count as evidence, what it is for one to have evidence, and what it is for one's evidence to support believing a proposition. Thus, while (EVI) is often referred to as "the theory" of epistemic justification known as evidentialism, it is more accurately conceived as a "kind" of epistemic theory. In this light, (EVI) can be seen as the central, guiding thesis of evidentialism. All evidentialist theories conform to (EVI), but various divergent theories of evidentialism can be formulated."
Although the term epistemic injustice was coined in 2007, analysis of the experience of epistemic injustice has been offered by those who experience it for a long time. Vivian May points as far back as the 1800s, to Anna Julia Cooper writing in 1892 about the suppression of Black women's ideas and Sojourner Truth speaking in 1867 about Black women being denied recognition as knowers because they given as much cognitive authority. Pohlhaus Jr. points to Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak's 1988 "Can the Subaltern Speak?" as another example. In that piece, Spivak describes what she calls epistemic violence occurring when subaltern persons are prevented from speaking for themselves about their own interests because of others claiming to know what those interests are. 
Epistemic logic is a modal logic. So, what we call an epistemic model formula_73 is just a Kripke model as defined in modal logic. The set formula_74 is a non-empty set whose elements are called "possible worlds" and the "interpretation" formula_75 is a function specifying which propositional facts (such as ‘Ann has the red card’) are true in each of these worlds. The "accessibility relations" formula_76 are binary relations for each agent formula_77; they are intended to capture the uncertainty of each agent (about the actual world and about the other agents' uncertainty). Intuitively, we have formula_78 when the world formula_79 is compatible with agent formula_39’s information in world formula_81 or, in other words, when agent formula_39 considers that world formula_79 might correspond to the world formula_81 (from this standpoint). We abusively write formula_85 for formula_86 and formula_87 denotes the set of worlds formula_88.
In the 20th century, in the essay “What is Enlightenment?” (1984) Michel Foucault took up Kant's formulation of “dare to know” in an attempt to find a place for the individual man and woman in post-structuralist philosophy, and so come to terms with the problematic legacy of the Enlightenment. Moreover, in the essay "The Baroque Episteme: the Word and the Thing" (2013) Jean-Claude Vuillemin proposed that the Latin phrase "Sapere aude" be the motto of the Baroque "episteme".
Although the members of an epistemic community may originate from a variety of academic or professional backgrounds, they are linked by a set of unifying characteristics for the promotion of collective amelioration and not collective gain. This is termed their "normative component". In the big picture, epistemic communities are socio-psychological entities that create and justify knowledge. Such communities can constitute of only two persons and yet gain an important role in building knowledge on any specific subject. Miika Vähämaa has recently suggested that epistemic communities consist of persons being able to understand, discuss and gain self-esteem concerning the matters being discussed.
Being a sub-type of linguistic modality, epistemic modality can in its turn be classified into a number of sub-types according to various criteria. An original classification of epistemic modality based on the conception of alienated knowledge is given in the work of V. A. Yatsko.Some linguists consider evidentiality (the indication of the source of the information upon which a proposition is based) to be a type of epistemic modality, and oppose it to "judgement modality" as epistemic modality based on the speaker's own judgement. An English example follows:
One way to understand the motivation and themes of the neopragmatist is to understand how neopragmatism (and pragmatism in general) distinguishes itself from both idealism and relativism. Neopragmatism is to be distinguished from idealism primarily in the fact that it does not, like idealism, believe that what is actually in the world is affected in any way by what individuals believe concerning it. Neopragmatism holds to the doctrine of a mind-independent reality while simultaneously maintaining that this world is not knowable in the classical Cartesian sense of the word "know". The neopragmatist views mind-independent reality to causally influence people's minds but whatever way that influence may be on the individual mind is up to the individual. Neopragmatism is to be distinguished from epistemic relativism on the force of the idea that in order to be an epistemic relativist one must be concerned about getting one's ideas "right" in relation to reality. The neopragmatist thesis views this to be a concern which is of no use and therefore is to be discarded. Neopragmatists hold that it makes no sense to talk about getting reality right due to the fact that this adds no utility to do so. The neopragmatist is concerned with developing beliefs and habits which allow one to adapt to one's environment with success rather than generating pictures used in order to describe reality. Since neopragmatism lacks any concern for generating descriptive pictures of reality the whole question of epistemic relativism is meaningless.
The initial identification and bounding of environmental issues by epistemic community members is very influential. They can limit what would be preferable in terms of national interests, frame what issues are available for collective debate, and delimit the policy alternatives deemed possible. The political effects are not easily reversible. The epistemic community vision is institutionalised as a collective set of understandings reflected in any subsequent policy choices.
Epistemology, from the Greek words "episteme" ("knowledge") and "logos" ("word, speech") is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge. Rupture, from Old French "rupture" or Latin "ruptura", is defined as an instance of breaking or bursting suddenly and completely, as well as a breach of a harmonious link in a figurative way.
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a logical framework dealing with knowledge and information change. Typically, DEL focuses on situations involving multiple agents and studies how their knowledge changes when events occur. These events can change factual properties of the actual world (they are called "ontic events"): for example a red card is painted in blue. They can also bring about changes of knowledge without changing factual properties of the world (they are called "epistemic events"): for example a card is revealed publicly (or privately) to be red. Originally, DEL focused on epistemic events. We only present in this entry some of the basic ideas of the original DEL framework; more details about DEL in general can be found in the references.
"Epistemic impossibility" describes things which absolutely cannot occur within our "current" formulation of the physical laws. This interpretation of the word "impossible" is what is intended in discussions of the impossibility of perpetual motion in a closed system.
Rules or standards that properly govern responsible belief-formation and the pursuit of intellectual excellence are what philosophers call epistemic (or "doxastic") norms. Widely accepted epistemic norms include:
Plato contrasts episteme with "doxa": common belief or opinion. Episteme is also distinguished from "techne": a craft or applied practice. The word "epistemology" is derived from episteme.
We now have enough information to give a name to Northrop's epistemology. He calls it "logical realism in epistemic correlation with radical empiricism." In other words, reason (in the form of concepts-by-postulation) epistemically correlated with the senses (in the form of concepts-by-intuition).
Other scholars have expanded what the term epistemic injustice includes. These contributions have included naming kinds of epistemic injustice such as epistemic oppression , epistemic exploitation , silencing as testimonial quieting and as testimonial smothering , contributory injustice , distributive epistemic injustice , and epistemic trust injustice.  Developments in the literature on epistemic injustice has also included José Medina's push for an account that incorporates more voices and pays attention to context and the relationships at play , as well as Elizabeth S. Anderson's argument for looking more closely at structural causes and structural remedies of epistemic injustice . A closely related literature on epistemologies of ignorance has also been developing, which has included the identification of overlapping concepts such as white ignorance and willful hermeneutical ignorance. 
The effects of epistemic feedback can be viewed as either negative or positive depending on the goal of the observations. When trying to get a secret survey of results, epistemic feedback can be seen as a negative factor which distorts the original data. However if the goal is to improve quality, then epistemic feedback could be a positive factor to periodically report areas which need improvement. The risk comes when the feedback temporarily slants the evaluation of quality so that long-term performance is hindered by distortion in the way results were measured.
According to Ross, there are four conditions for a message to be considered propaganda.It is misleading to say, as some do, that propaganda is simply false, or that it is conditional to an intent to lie, since often the propagandist believes in what he/she is propagandizing. In other words, it is not necessarily a lie if the person who creates the propaganda is trying to persuade you of a view that they actually hold. "The aim of the propagandist is to create the semblance of credibility." This means that they appeal to an epistemology that is weak or defective.False statements, bad arguments, immoral commands as well as inapt metaphors (and other literary tropes) are the sorts of things that are epistemically defective... Not only does epistemic defectiveness more accurately describe how propaganda endeavors to function... since many messages are in forms such as commands that do not admit to truth-values, [but it] also accounts for the role context plays in the workings of propaganda.
Although the term epistemic injustice was coined in 2007, analysis of the experience of epistemic injustice has been offered by those who experience it for a long time. Vivian May points as far back as the 1800s, to Anna Julia Cooper writing in 1892 about the suppression of Black women's ideas and Sojourner Truth speaking in 1867 about Black women being denied recognition as knowers because they given as much cognitive authority. Pohlhaus Jr. points to Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak's 1988 "Can the Subaltern Speak?" as another example. In that piece, Spivak describes what she calls epistemic violence occurring when subaltern persons are prevented from speaking for themselves about their own interests because of others claiming to know what those interests are. 
Approaches to quantum theory, like QBism, which treat quantum states as expressions of information, knowledge, belief, or expectation are called "epistemic" interpretations. These approaches differ from each other in what they consider quantum states to be information or expectations "about", as well as in the technical features of the mathematics they employ. Furthermore, not all authors who advocate views of this type propose an answer to the question of what the information represented in quantum states concerns. In the words of the paper that introduced the Spekkens Toy Model,if a quantum state is a state of knowledge, and it is not knowledge of local and noncontextual hidden variables, then what is it knowledge about? We do not at present have a good answer to this question. We shall therefore remain completely agnostic about the nature of the reality to which the knowledge represented by quantum states pertains. This is not to say that the question is not important. Rather, we see the epistemic approach as an unfinished project, and this question as the central obstacle to its completion. Nonetheless, we argue that even in the absence of an answer to this question, a case can be made for the epistemic view. The key is that one can hope to identify phenomena that are characteristic of states of incomplete knowledge regardless of what this knowledge is about.Leifer and Spekkens propose a way of treating quantum probabilities as Bayesian probabilities, thereby considering quantum states as epistemic, which they state is "closely aligned in its philosophical starting point" with QBism. However, they remain deliberately agnostic about what physical properties or entities quantum states are information (or beliefs) about, as opposed to QBism, which offers an answer to that question. Another approach, advocated by Bub and Pitowsky, argues that quantum states are information about propositions within event spaces that form non-Boolean lattices. On occasion, the proposals of Bub and Pitowsky are also called "quantum Bayesianism".
Epistemic modality is a sub-type of linguistic modality that deals with a speaker's evaluation/judgment of, degree of confidence in, or belief of the knowledge upon which a proposition is based. In other words, epistemic modality refers to the way speakers communicate their doubts, certainties, and guesses—their "modes of knowing". More technically, epistemic modality may be defined "...as (the linguistic expression of) an evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring, or has occurred in a possible world which serves as the universe of interpretation for the evaluation process… In other words, epistemic modality concerns an estimation of the likelihood that (some aspect of) a certain state of affairs is/has been/will be true (or false) in the context of the possible world under consideration. This estimation of likelihood is situated on a scale going from certainty that the state of affairs applies, via a neutral or agnostic stance towards its occurrence, to certainty that it does not apply, with intermediary positions on the positive and the negative sides of the scale".
Epistemic logic is a modal logic dealing with the notions of knowledge and belief. As a logic, it is concerned with understanding the process of "reasoning" about knowledge and belief: which principles relating the notions of knowledge and belief are intuitively plausible? Like epistemology, it stems from the Greek word formula_1 or ‘episteme’ meaning knowledge. Epistemology is nevertheless more concerned with analyzing the very "nature" and "scope" of knowledge, addressing questions such as “What is the definition of knowledge?” or “How is knowledge acquired?”. In fact, epistemic logic grew out of epistemology in the Middle Ages thanks to the efforts of Burley and Ockham. The formal work, based on modal logic, that inaugurated contemporary research into epistemic logic dates back only to 1962 and is due to Hintikka. It then sparked in the 1960s discussions about the principles of knowledge and belief and many axioms for these notions were proposed and discussed. For example, the interaction axioms formula_2 and formula_3 are often considered to be intuitive principles: if an agent Knows formula_4 then (s)he also Believes formula_4, or if an agent Believes formula_4, then (s)he Knows that (s)he Believes formula_4. More recently, these kinds of philosophical theories were taken up by researchers in economics, artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science where reasoning about knowledge is a central topic. Due to the new setting in which epistemic logic was used, new perspectives and new features such as computability issues were then added to the research agenda of epistemic logic.
The contrast with epistemic possibility is especially important to draw, since in ordinary language the same phrases ("it's possible," "it can't be", "it must be") are often used to express either sort of possibility. But they are not the same. We do not "know" whether Goldbach's conjecture is true or not (no-one has come up with a proof yet); so it is (epistemically) "possible that" it is true and it is (epistemically) "possible that" it is false. But if it "is", in fact, provably true (as it may be, for all we know), then it would have to be (subjunctively) "necessarily" true; what being provable "means" is that it would not be (logically) "possible for" it to be false. Similarly, it might not be at all (epistemically) "possible that" it is raining outside—we might "know" beyond a shadow of a doubt that it is not—but that would hardly mean that it is (subjunctively) "impossible for" it to rain outside. This point is also made by Norman Swartz and Raymond Bradley.
The basic modal operator of epistemic logic, usually written "K", can be read as "it is known that," "it is epistemically necessary that," or "it is inconsistent with what is known that not." If there is more than one agent whose knowledge is to be represented, subscripts can be attached to the operator (formula_1, formula_2, etc.) to indicate which agent one is talking about. So formula_3 can be read as "Agent formula_4 knows that formula_5." Thus, epistemic logic can be an example of multimodal logic applied for knowledge representation. The dual of "K", which would be in the same relationship to "K" as formula_6 is to formula_7, has no specific symbol, but can be represented by formula_8, which can be read as "formula_4 does not know that not formula_5" or "It is consistent with formula_4's knowledge that formula_5 is possible". The statement "formula_4 does not know whether or not formula_5" can be expressed as formula_15.
Epistemic communities usually aid in issues concerning a technical nature. Normally, they guide decision makers towards the appropriate norms and institutions by framing and institutionalizing the issue-area.
Epistemic communities are also a source of policy innovation. Communities have indirect and direct roles in policy coordination by diffusing ideas and influencing the positions adopted. Policy evolution occurs in four steps: policy innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence. Through framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, defining state interests, and setting standards epistemic communities can define the best solution to a problem. The definition of interest is specially important because there are many different definitions of what is a priority for a government. Intellectual innovations (produced by epistemic communities) are carried by domestic or international organizations (epistemic communities are a part of these organizations) then are selected by political process. Peter M. Haas argued “that epistemic communities help to explain the emergence and character of cooperation at the international level,” (Thomas 1997, 223). The shared interests they represent last more than the disagreements about a specific issue. Epistemic communities create a reality that is hindered by political factors and related considerations. If an epistemic community only acquires power in one country or international body, then its power is a direct effect of that country or body’s power.