Instruct: Given a question, retrieve relevant passages that answer the question.
Query: Who fought in the Gheluvelt Plateau actions?
The Gheluvelt Plateau actions, July–August 1917 took place from 31 July to 27 August, during the Third Battle of Ypres (31 July – 10 November 1917) in Belgium, in the First World War. The British Fifth Army and the German 4th Army fought for possession of the plateau, at the highest part of the ridges to the south-east, east and north-east of Ypres in West Flanders. The 4th Army had been building defensive positions in the Ypres Salient since 1915 and the Gheluvelt Plateau was the most fortified section of the front. The Fifth Army had made the plateau its main objective during the Battle of Pilckem Ridge (31 July – 2 August) but the II Corps advance was contained short of its objectives and German counter-attacks later recaptured some ground.
By late August, Inverness Copse on the north side of the Menin road and Herenthage Park to the south were held by troops of Infantry Regiment 67, in shell-hole positions along the western fringe of the Copse. The Albrechtstellung ran along eastern edge of the Copse but the defences on the west side, about 600yd (550m) forward, were a vital outpost line. The defenders were ordered to hold on at all costs because the Albrechtstellung was on the edge of the Gheluvelt Plateau. The ground declined to the east and its capture would provide the British with observation posts, excellently placed for the next advance.[102] The British attack was intended to capture the Albrechtstellung from Herenthage Château south of the Menin road to Glencorse Wood, with a defensive flank back to the old British front line. The line was to follow the eastern fringe of Inverness Copse north of the Menin road and further on to Fitzclarence Farm; on the left (northern) flank, the 42nd Brigade was to capture blockhouses in Glencorse Wood.[103]
On 28 June, Haig discussed the Davidson memo at a meeting with Gough and General Plumer (commander of the Second Army on the right of the Fifth Army) and emphasised the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau. Edmonds wrote that the Fifth Army plan did not conform to Haig's requirement that the main battle would be fought for the plateau. Gough had spread the Fifth Army divisions evenly along the front, when he could have increased the size of II Corps (Lieutenant-General Claud Jacob), opposite the plateau. In a footnote, Edmonds described Fifth Army intelligence summaries in July, that stressed the strength of the German defences on the plateau, that the Germans were building more defences there than on the rest of the front and that the assembly areas of the German "Eingreif divisions" (specialist counter-attack divisions) were behind the plateau and the Broodseinde–Passchendaele ridge. The summaries predicted that the Germans would try to hold the plateau, even if driven back across the Steenbeek further north.
On 12 August, Jacob asked for a delay in the general offensive due on 14 August, to allow time to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau at least as far as the 10 August objectives. The British had not gained artillery superiority over the German guns beyond the plateau, which were destroying the tracks through Sanctuary and Château woods, interrupting the delivery of supplies and ammunition needed for the next attack.[84] The eight divisions in corps reserve had been committed and the two in Fifth Army reserve had also been used, the 56th (1/1st London) Division joining II Corps on 6 August, along with the 47th (1/2nd London) Division and the 14th (Light) Division from the Second Army, by 15 August. Gough was constrained by Operation Hush needing the high tides due at the end of the month; if they were missed it would be four weeks before the next high tides. The Fifth Army offensive was postponed for a day but after a thunderstorm and downpour late on 14 August, Gough ordered another postponement until 16 August.[85]
...the results of the day's fighting were all the more satisfactory because the counter-attack divisions of Group Wytschaete behind Gheluvelt Plateau had scarcely been used.
The II Corps operations on the Gheluvelt Plateau from 31 July to 31 August were conducted by the 24th, 30th, 8th, 25th, 14th, 47th and 56th divisions; from 25 June – 31 August, the II Corps artillery fired more than 2.75 million shells. All of the II Corps divisions suffered many casualties and the torrential rains created exhausting conditions for the infantry. Edmonds wrote in 1948 that the costly failure to capture the plateau in August depressed British morale lower than ever before. The experience among the survivors, recounted in Britain by wounded troops, made a greater impression than the run of victories in September and early October. Edmonds also wrote that the fighting exhausted the divisions of the 4th Army, which was reinforced with divisions and 70 percent of the heavy artillery ammunition allotment from the French section of the Western Front.[120] The French had been left "unmolested" and the Germans postponed plans for an offensive against the Russians. Edmonds quoted from Ludendorff (My War Memoirs, 1919) that
But at no time in these documents did...Gough...advocate a "rush-through," as has been said elsewhere.
...the enemy cannot continue his intended breakthrough...until he has gained freedom for his right flank by pressing back the 52nd Reserve Division on Gheluvelt Plateau....The next blow may therefore be expected to be delivered with the utmost strength against the 52nd Reserve and 12th Divisions.
The Fifth Army needed to maintain a brisk tempo of attack to prevent the Germans from recovering and to create the conditions for Operation Hush on the coast. Hush had to begin during the high tide period at the end of August or it would have to be postponed until the end of September. The Fifth Army had captured ground on the Gheluvelt Plateau on 31 July but the unusually wet and murky weather, the tenacious German defence and determined counter-attacks, left the 4th Army in control of the most vital objectives around Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood.[85] The II Corps attacked the Gheluvelt Plateau on 10, 16, 22 and 27 August. The Germans conducted local counter-attacks (Gegenstoße) with reserve units of the ground-holding divisions and made a bigger methodical counter-attack (Gegenangriff) on 24 August. Haig cancelled a general attack intended for 25 August and altered the Fifth Army–Second Army boundary for the third time. The Second Army took over the II Corps front on the Gheluvelt Plateau in early September and Plumer was allowed three weeks to prepare the next attack.[119]
Gough replied to Davidson that the extent of the preparations for the attack justified a more optimistic plan,
...there is no reason to suggest that the weather broke early in the month with any regularity.
In July 1917, Field Marshal Douglas Haig began the Third Battle of Ypres campaign, in an attempt to break out of the Ypres Salient. At the Battle of Messines the far side of the Messines Ridge had been captured down to the Oosttaverne Line and a substantial success gained in the subsequent Battle of Pilckem Ridge. At the Battle of Langemarck there was an advance of around Langemarck village by XIV Corps. In view of the failure of the British Fifth Army to advance on the Gheluvelt Plateau in August, Haig ordered that artillery reinforcements be added to the south-east along the higher ground of the Gheluvelt plateau, Broodseinde Ridge and the southern half of Passchendaele Ridge. The main offensive was switched to the British Second Army under command of General Herbert Plumer, who continued the evolution of bite-and-hold tactics that had been used in July and August.
After II Corps reported that it was close to the second objective, Gough ordered another attack on 2 August and then altered the order, to make certain that the second objective had been captured before the Fifth Army attacked again. On 1 August, Davidson recommended that the attack by II Corps should not be rushed but start after two to three days of clear weather, to exploit the observation points and the two maps captured on 31 July. The maps showed the positions of camouflaged pillboxes and Davidson argued that fresh divisions should be used because it was vital for II Corps to secure the Gheluvelt Plateau. The Fifth Army corps commanders agreed that taking the area from Inverness Copse to Westhoek would not be enough because the priority given to the defence of the plateau by the German 4th Army, meant that a big counter-attack to restore the front line must be expected.[66] On the evening of 31 July, Rupprecht had made a diary entry,
At General Headquarters (GHQ) Colonel George Macmullen proposed to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau with a massed tank attack but a reconnaissance in April, found that narrow defiles between three woods on the Plateau and broken ground obstructed the approaches. Tanks would have to detour north of Bellewaarde lake to Westhoek then wheel right at the . Plumer produced another plan to take Messines Ridge and the west end of the Gheluvelt Plateau first and Pilckem Ridge soon after. The Fourth Army commander, General Henry Rawlinson proposed to take Messines Ridge, then the Gheluvelt Plateau and Pilckem Ridge within 
The power of the German artillery behind the Gheluvelt Plateau after 31 July was undiminished and a continuous bombardment fell on the front line and rear areas of II Corps. The counter-battery artillery of the Fifth Army fired on German artillery positions along the width of the army front, ready for the general attack due after the II Corps operation on the Gheluvelt Plateau. The British guns often bombarded the wrong artillery positions because of a lack of air reconnaissance to track the moves of German artillery from one artillery position to another in the bad weather. The British failed to achieve artillery superiority over the German artillery behind the plateau, which made the completion of new battery positions a long and costly effort that took until 8 August. Casualties in men and guns were so high that on 4 August, many British batteries were reduced to half strength. The state of the ground was so bad that gunners had to live in shell holes. New plank roads to carry ammunition forward could easily be seen by German artillery observers and wagon drivers and carrying parties moved only at night, dodging German bombardments which frequently included mustard gas. Amidst the rain and mud, the delivery of supplies and the passage of troops across the beaten zone extremely dangerous and caused a constant drain of casualties.[71]
To force the Germans to disperse their artillery-fire, the Second Army planned to attack on a 6,800yd (3.9mi; 6.2km) front from the Ypres–Comines canal to the Ypres–Roulers railway, with the Fifth Army continuing the attack north to the French First Army boundary.[119] The British plan included more emphasis on the use of heavy and medium artillery to destroy German concrete pill-boxes and machine-gun nests, which were more numerous in the battle zones being attacked and to engage in more counter-battery fire. The Second Army corps on the Gheluvelt Plateau had 575 heavy and medium and 720 field guns and howitzers, more than double the quantity at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge.[138]
In 2007, Jack Sheldon wrote that the daily report of the 4th Army claimed that the Allied attack had been a costly failure, which Sheldon called hyperbole. The attackers had advanced 1.9mi (3km), overrun two defensive positions and heavy artillery had severely bombarded German Eingreifdivisionen moving behind the front line. The German defence was most successful on the Gheluvelt Plateau; despite the loss of the observation posts on Bellewaarde Ridge, the Eingreifdivisionen of Gruppe Ypres had not been needed. The defenders had made powerful and determined counter-attacks and the defensive success on the plateau compromised British advances further north, which were vulnerable to enfilade fire by small-arms and observed artillery-fire from the plateau. The capture of the Gheluvelt Plateau would have to be a slow process of preparatory bombardments and limited advances. British and French commanders considered the attack to be the first of a series of blows which would lead to an inevitable German collapse and German commanders were concerned at the demands that the battle made on their troops.[118]
In 1996, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson wrote that changes in Fifth Army infantry tactics had no effect on the lack of accurate artillery firepower necessary to get infantry through the German defences without prohibitive casualties, then keep them there against German artillery-fire and infantry counter-attacks. After the German recapture of Inverness Copse on 24 August, Haig made the Second Army responsible for the Gheluvelt Plateau, preparatory to a new attack on both sides of the Menin road. The Fifth Army continued with local attacks and by 27 August was worn out.[122] In 2004, John Lee wrote that the weather in August was the worst for 75 years but despite the conditions, Gough continued to order attacks which were inevitably defeated, causing a "severe loss of morale" among the British infantry.[123]
The Fifth Army Intelligence summary of 7 July described the elaborate defences on the Gheluvelt Plateau, noted that most new fortifications were being added to the plateau compared to the flanks and had much of the German artillery. The summary contained a prediction that the Germans would pivot on the Gheluvelt Plateau if they were pushed back over the Steenbeek further north. Summaries on 14, 17 and 21 July, reported that the German field artillery west of the Steenbeek had been withdrawn 3,000yd (1.7mi; 2.7km) behind the front line and that the assembly areas for Eingreif divisions (Eingreifdivisionen) were behind the Gheluvelt Plateau and Passchendaele Ridge.[33] In the Fifth Army operation order issued on 27 June, the green line (third objective) was made the main objective, where a protective barrage would fall for one hour after the infantry were scheduled to arrive. After the protective barrage finished, patrols of fresh troops were to move forward to reconnoitre and occupy tactically valuable ground not occupied by the Germans, up to the fourth objective (red line).[34]
and Gruppe Wytschaete announced that
The Fifyh Army plan emphasised that information should quickly be communicated back to headquarters and that troops should be independent within the plan, to achieve a high tempo of operations (the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy) rather than lose time referring back for orders.[30] On 27 June, Haig agreed to widen the II Corps frontage to attack Tower Hamlets, a cluster of pillboxes at the top of the Bassevillebeek Spur opposite the right flank, which was an obvious base for a German counter-attack into the right flank of II Corps. Haig arranged through the Fifth Army HQ for II Corps to take over the 24th Division and artillery from the Second Army, extending the southern flank of the II Corps to the Klein Zillebeke–Zandvoorde road on 4 July.[lower-alpha 1] After meeting with Gough and Plumer on 28 June, Haig endorsed the Fifth Army plan but emphasised that the main battle would be for the Gheluvelt Plateau and the plan should reflect this. An advance in the north should depend on the capture and consolidation of the plateau, after which an advance along the main ridge to Broodseinde could begin.[32]
After the defeat of Gruppe Wytachaete at Messines in June, the Germans feared a British attack on the Tower Hamlets (Bassevillebeek) spur beyond the north end of the ridge. Since early 1917, there had three German defensive positions behind the front line. The Albrechtstellung ran from Bixschoote in the north, southwards behind Pilckem Ridge and across the Gheluvelt Plateau. The Wilhemstellung began at Langemarck, ran south to Gravenstafel then crossed the Gheluvelt Plateau to Zandvoorde to the east of Messines Ridge. The Flandernstellung (Flanders Position) had been built earlier in the year, along Passchendaele Ridge and across the Gheluvelt Plateau behind Polygon Wood and in front of Becelaere, across the Menin road and south to the Lys river. Because of the flat ground and high water table, hundreds of pillboxes and blockhouses, rather than deep dugouts, had been built above ground and camouflaged with mud and turf. The many stone farmhouses dotted around had also been fortified; from two to forty men could be accommodated in the concrete and steel shelters, immune to anything smaller than a hit by an 8-inch shell.[13][14]
The rain that began on 31 July continued for three days and turned the ground into a morass about 4,000yd (2.3mi; 3.7km) wide behind the new British front line. The banks of streams had been smashed up by artillery-fire. The stream banks became bogs with few places to cross, all easily visible to the Germans and frequently bombarded, especially on the Gheluvelt Plateau. The consolidation of captured ground was retarded; troops who deviated from the tracks could drown. Roads were covered in mud and full of shell craters 3–4ft (0.91–1.22m) deep and the conditions exhausted rapidly the infantry of both sides.[69]
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The Germans were apprehensive of a British attempt to exploit the victory over Group Wytschaete at Messines, with an advance to the Tower Hamlets (Bassevillebeek) spur beyond the north end of the ridge. Since early 1917, there had been three German defensive positions behind the front line. The "Albrechtstellung" ran from Bixschoote in the north, behind Pilckem Ridge and south across the Gheluvelt Plateau. The "Wilhemstellung" began at Langemarck, ran south to Gravenstafel then crossed the Gheluvelt Plateau to Zandvoorde, east of Messines Ridge. The "Flandernstellung" (Flanders Position) had been built earlier in the year, along Passchendaele Ridge, south across Gheluvelt Plateau behind Polygon Wood, in front of Becelaere, across the Menin road and south to the Lys Leie river. Because of the flat ground and high water table hundreds of pillboxes and blockhouses rather than deep dugouts, had been built above ground and camouflaged with mud and turf. The many stone farmhouses dotted around had also been fortified; from two to forty men could be accommodated in the concrete and steel shelters, immune to anything smaller than a hit by an 8-inch shell.