Daily Papers

"Read the room" is a significant social reasoning capability in human daily life. Humans can infer others' mental states from subtle social cues. Previous social reasoning tasks and datasets lack complexity (e.g., simple scenes, basic interactions, incomplete mental state variables, single-step reasoning, etc.) and fall far short of the challenges present in real-life social interactions. In this paper, we contribute a valuable, high-quality, and comprehensive video dataset named R^3-VQA with precise and fine-grained annotations of social events and mental states (i.e., belief, intent, desire, and emotion) as well as corresponding social causal chains in complex social scenarios. Moreover, we include human-annotated and model-generated QAs. Our task R^3-VQA includes three aspects: Social Event Understanding, Mental State Estimation, and Social Causal Reasoning. As a benchmark, we comprehensively evaluate the social reasoning capabilities and consistencies of current state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). Comprehensive experiments show that (i) LVLMs are still far from human-level consistent social reasoning in complex social scenarios; (ii) Theory of Mind (ToM) prompting can help LVLMs perform better on social reasoning tasks. We provide some of our dataset and codes in supplementary material and will release our full dataset and codes upon acceptance.

Time-series foundation models excel at tasks like forecasting across diverse data types by leveraging informative waveform representations. Wearable sensing data, however, pose unique challenges due to their variability in patterns and frequency bands, especially for healthcare-related outcomes. The main obstacle lies in crafting generalizable representations that adapt efficiently across heterogeneous sensing configurations and applications. To address this, we propose NormWear, the first multi-modal and ubiquitous foundation model designed to extract generalized and informative representations from wearable sensing data. Specifically, we design a channel-aware attention mechanism with a shared special liaison [CLS] token to detect signal patterns in both intra-sensor and inter-sensors. This helps the model to extract more meaningful information considering both time series themselves and the relationships between input sensors. This helps the model to be widely compatible with various sensors settings. NormWear is pretrained on a diverse set of physiological signals, including PPG, ECG, EEG, GSR, and IMU, from various public datasets. Our model shows exceptional generalizability across 11 public wearable sensing datasets, spanning 18 applications in mental health, body state inference, vital sign estimation, and disease risk evaluation. It consistently outperforms competitive baselines under zero-shot, partial-shot, and full-shot settings, indicating broad applicability in real-world health applications.

Effective real-world assistance requires AI agents with robust Theory of Mind (ToM): inferring human mental states from their behavior. Despite recent advances, several key challenges remain, including (1) online inference with robust uncertainty updates over multiple hypotheses; (2) efficient reasoning suitable for real-time assistance; and (3) the lack of ground-truth mental state annotations in real-world domains. We address these challenges by introducing MindZero, a self-supervised reinforcement learning framework that trains multimodal large language models (MLLMs) for efficient and robust online mental reasoning. During training, the model is rewarded for generating mental state hypotheses that maximize the likelihood of observed actions estimated by a planner, similar to model-based ToM reasoning. This method thus eliminates the need for explicit mental state annotations. After training, MindZero internalizes model-based reasoning into fast single-pass inference. We evaluate MindZero against baselines across challenging mental reasoning and AI assistance tasks in gridworld and household domains. We found that LLMs alone are insufficient; model-based methods improve accuracy but are slow, costly, and limited by backbone MLLM capacity. In contrast, MindZero enhances MLLMs' intrinsic ToM ability and significantly outperforms model-based methods in both accuracy and efficiency, showing that mental reasoning can be effectively learned as a self-supervised skill.

Given a stationary state-space model that relates a sequence of hidden states and corresponding measurements or observations, Bayesian filtering provides a principled statistical framework for inferring the posterior distribution of the current state given all measurements up to the present time. For example, the Apollo lunar module implemented a Kalman filter to infer its location from a sequence of earth-based radar measurements and land safely on the moon. To perform Bayesian filtering, we require a measurement model that describes the conditional distribution of each observation given state. The Kalman filter takes this measurement model to be linear, Gaussian. Here we show how a nonlinear, Gaussian approximation to the distribution of state given observation can be used in conjunction with Bayes' rule to build a nonlinear, non-Gaussian measurement model. The resulting approach, called the Discriminative Kalman Filter (DKF), retains fast closed-form updates for the posterior. We argue there are many cases where the distribution of state given measurement is better-approximated as Gaussian, especially when the dimensionality of measurements far exceeds that of states and the Bernstein-von Mises theorem applies. Online neural decoding for brain-computer interfaces provides a motivating example, where filtering incorporates increasingly detailed measurements of neural activity to provide users control over external devices. Within the BrainGate2 clinical trial, the DKF successfully enabled three volunteers with quadriplegia to control an on-screen cursor in real-time using mental imagery alone. Participant "T9" used the DKF to type out messages on a tablet PC.

Existing LLM reasoning methods have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks, such as solving math and coding problems. However, applying these methods to scenarios without ground-truth answers or rule-based verification methods - such as tracking the mental states of an agent - remains challenging. Inspired by the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm, we introduce thought-tracing, an inference-time reasoning algorithm designed to trace the mental states of specific agents by generating hypotheses and weighting them based on observations without relying on ground-truth solutions to questions in datasets. Our algorithm is modeled after the Bayesian theory-of-mind framework, using LLMs to approximate probabilistic inference over agents' evolving mental states based on their perceptions and actions. We evaluate thought-tracing on diverse theory-of-mind benchmarks, demonstrating significant performance improvements compared to baseline LLMs. Our experiments also reveal interesting behaviors of the recent reasoning models - e.g., o3 and R1 - on theory-of-mind, highlighting the difference of social reasoning compared to other domains.

We propose a lightweight and single-pass uncertainty quantification method for detecting hallucinations in Large Language Models. The method uses attention matrices to estimate uncertainty without requiring repeated sampling or external models. Specifically, we measure the Kullback-Leibler divergence between each attention head's distribution and a uniform reference distribution, and use these features in a logistic regression probe. Across multiple datasets, task types, and model families, attention divergence is highly predictive of answer correctness and performs competitively with existing uncertainty estimation methods. We find that this signal is concentrated in middle layers and on factual tokens such as named entities and numbers, suggesting that attention dynamics provides an efficient and interpretable white-box signal of model uncertainty.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

World models enable a predictive substrate for planning and action, yet existing formulations merely answer a physical question: what/where it is, and how will it evolve. Human behavior, however, is driven by hidden mental state (what a person believes, wants, intends, feels, and considers socially permissible), so a model that tracks the physical scene but not what each agent knows and believes about it predicts the wrong action for the right-looking scene. We formulate Mental World Modeling (MWM), a generic theoretical framework that makes mental variables core components of a world model rather than posthoc rationales: MWM aintains a coupled physical-mental world state, renders a target-specific partial observation, and simulates how candidate actions jointly update both components. We instantiate the framework in MENTIS, a training-free and fully inspectable baseline that decomposes the process into state parsing, target-observation generation, action decomposition, coupled physical and mental transition, and branch-level value evaluation. On a manually constructed, quality-controlled dataset of situated decision scenarios spanning text, image, and sounding-video stories, experiments with 8 modern LLM-based world models demonstrate that explicitly modeling the mental state is essential for predicting human decisions. Deeper analyses further expose the bottlenecks of current mental world modeling. We expect MWM as a next stage of world modeling, from simulating physical scenes to simulating the minds that act in them.

Detecting mental states of human users is crucial for the development of cooperative and intelligent robots, as it enables the robot to understand the user's intentions and desires. Despite their importance, it is difficult to obtain a large amount of high quality data for training automatic recognition algorithms as the time and effort required to collect and label such data is prohibitively high. In this paper we present a multimodal machine learning approach for detecting dis-/agreement and confusion states in a human-robot interaction environment, using just a small amount of manually annotated data. We collect a data set by conducting a human-robot interaction study and develop a novel preprocessing pipeline for our machine learning approach. By combining semi-supervised and supervised architectures, we are able to achieve an average F1-score of 81.1\% for dis-/agreement detection with a small amount of labeled data and a large unlabeled data set, while simultaneously increasing the robustness of the model compared to the supervised approach.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly participate in human-AI interactions, evaluating their Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities - particularly their ability to track dynamic mental states - becomes crucial. While existing benchmarks assess basic ToM abilities, they predominantly focus on static snapshots of mental states, overlooking the temporal evolution that characterizes real-world social interactions. We present DynToM, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to understand and track the temporal progression of mental states across interconnected scenarios. Through a systematic four-step framework, we generate 1,100 social contexts encompassing 5,500 scenarios and 78,100 questions, each validated for realism and quality. Our comprehensive evaluation of ten state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that their average performance underperforms humans by 44.7\%, with performance degrading significantly when tracking and reasoning about the shift of mental states. This performance gap highlights fundamental limitations in current LLMs' ability to model the dynamic nature of human mental states.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Large Language models are revolutionizing the conversational recommender systems through their impressive capabilities in instruction comprehension, reasoning, and human interaction. A core factor underlying effective recommendation dialogue is the ability to infer and reason about users' mental states (such as desire, intention, and belief), a cognitive capacity commonly referred to as Theory of Mind. Despite growing interest in evaluating ToM in LLMs, current benchmarks predominantly rely on synthetic narratives inspired by Sally-Anne test, which emphasize physical perception and fail to capture the complexity of mental state inference in realistic conversational settings. Moreover, existing benchmarks often overlook a critical component of human ToM: behavioral prediction, the ability to use inferred mental states to guide strategic decision-making and select appropriate conversational actions for future interactions. To better align LLM-based ToM evaluation with human-like social reasoning, we propose RecToM, a novel benchmark for evaluating ToM abilities in recommendation dialogues. RecToM focuses on two complementary dimensions: Cognitive Inference and Behavioral Prediction. The former focus on understanding what has been communicated by inferring the underlying mental states. The latter emphasizes what should be done next, evaluating whether LLMs can leverage these inferred mental states to predict, select, and assess appropriate dialogue strategies. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that RecToM poses a significant challenge. While the models exhibit partial competence in recognizing mental states, they struggle to maintain coherent, strategic ToM reasoning throughout dynamic recommendation dialogues, particularly in tracking evolving intentions and aligning conversational strategies with inferred mental states.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

Probabilistic mental simulation is thought to play a key role in human reasoning, planning, and prediction, yet the demands of simulation in complex environments exceed realistic human capacity limits. A theory with growing evidence is that people simulate using simplified representations of the environment that abstract away from irrelevant details, but it is unclear how people determine these simplifications efficiently. Here, we present a "Just-in-Time" framework for simulation-based reasoning that demonstrates how such representations can be constructed online with minimal added computation. The model uses a tight interleaving of simulation, visual search, and representation modification, with the current simulation guiding where to look and visual search flagging objects that should be encoded for subsequent simulation. Despite only ever encoding a small subset of objects, the model makes high-utility predictions. We find strong empirical support for this account over alternative models in a grid-world planning task and a physical reasoning task across a range of behavioral measures. Together, these results offer a concrete algorithmic account of how people construct reduced representations to support efficient mental simulation.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Detecting hallucination risk before generation enables abstention, retrieval augmentation, and routing decisions without incurring the cost of decoding. While prior work has shown that such risk can be estimated from a model's internal representations, existing approaches treat this as binary classification over a single decoded output. We instead formulate it as a risk-estimation problem. Under this formulation, we introduce soft-target supervision based on the empirical answer error rate over stochastically sampled outputs - an estimator we prove to be the unique unbiased minimum-variance estimator of the model's per-prompt error probability under its sampling distribution. We further adapt attention probing to the pre-generation setting, enabling the detector to selectively aggregate hallucination-relevant prompt representations. Across three question-answering benchmarks and five models, attention probing outperforms linear probing on short-answer tasks. Replacing binary labels with soft-target supervision further and consistently improves detection quality.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Humans' internal states play a key role in human-machine interaction, leading to the rise of human state estimation as a prominent field. Compared to swift state changes such as surprise and irritation, modeling gradual states like trust and satisfaction are further challenged by label sparsity: long time-series signals are usually associated with a single label, making it difficult to identify the critical span of state shifts. Windowing has been one widely-used technique to enable localized analysis of long time-series data. However, the performance of downstream models can be sensitive to the window size, and determining the optimal window size demands domain expertise and extensive search. To address this challenge, we propose a Selective Windowing Attention Network (SWAN), which employs window prompts and masked attention transformation to enable the selection of attended intervals with flexible lengths. We evaluate SWAN on the task of trust prediction on a new multimodal driving simulation dataset. Experiments show that SWAN significantly outperforms an existing empirical window selection baseline and neural network baselines including CNN-LSTM and Transformer. Furthermore, it shows robustness across a wide span of windowing ranges, compared to the traditional windowing approach.

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Despite extensive standardization, diagnostic interviews for mental health disorders encompass substantial subjective judgment. Previous studies have demonstrated that EEG-based neural measures can function as reliable objective correlates of depression, or even predictors of depression and its course. However, their clinical utility has not been fully realized because of 1) the lack of automated ways to deal with the inherent noise associated with EEG data at scale, and 2) the lack of knowledge of which aspects of the EEG signal may be markers of a clinical disorder. Here we adapt an unsupervised pipeline from the recent deep representation learning literature to address these problems by 1) learning a disentangled representation using beta-VAE to denoise the signal, and 2) extracting interpretable features associated with a sparse set of clinical labels using a Symbol-Concept Association Network (SCAN). We demonstrate that our method is able to outperform the canonical hand-engineered baseline classification method on a number of factors, including participant age and depression diagnosis. Furthermore, our method recovers a representation that can be used to automatically extract denoised Event Related Potentials (ERPs) from novel, single EEG trajectories, and supports fast supervised re-mapping to various clinical labels, allowing clinicians to re-use a single EEG representation regardless of updates to the standardized diagnostic system. Finally, single factors of the learned disentangled representations often correspond to meaningful markers of clinical factors, as automatically detected by SCAN, allowing for human interpretability and post-hoc expert analysis of the recommendations made by the model.

We introduce EgoToM, a new video question-answering benchmark that extends Theory-of-Mind (ToM) evaluation to egocentric domains. Using a causal ToM model, we generate multi-choice video QA instances for the Ego4D dataset to benchmark the ability to predict a camera wearer's goals, beliefs, and next actions. We study the performance of both humans and state of the art multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on these three interconnected inference problems. Our evaluation shows that MLLMs achieve close to human-level accuracy on inferring goals from egocentric videos. However, MLLMs (including the largest ones we tested with over 100B parameters) fall short of human performance when inferring the camera wearers' in-the-moment belief states and future actions that are most consistent with the unseen video future. We believe that our results will shape the future design of an important class of egocentric digital assistants which are equipped with a reasonable model of the user's internal mental states.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Knowledge hallucination have raised widespread concerns for the security and reliability of deployed LLMs. Previous efforts in detecting hallucinations have been employed at logit-level uncertainty estimation or language-level self-consistency evaluation, where the semantic information is inevitably lost during the token-decoding procedure. Thus, we propose to explore the dense semantic information retained within LLMs' INternal States for hallucInation DEtection (INSIDE). In particular, a simple yet effective EigenScore metric is proposed to better evaluate responses' self-consistency, which exploits the eigenvalues of responses' covariance matrix to measure the semantic consistency/diversity in the dense embedding space. Furthermore, from the perspective of self-consistent hallucination detection, a test time feature clipping approach is explored to truncate extreme activations in the internal states, which reduces overconfident generations and potentially benefits the detection of overconfident hallucinations. Extensive experiments and ablation studies are performed on several popular LLMs and question-answering (QA) benchmarks, showing the effectiveness of our proposal.

Students' mental well-being is vital for academic success, with activities such as studying, socializing, and sleeping playing a role. Current mobile sensing data highlight this intricate link using statistical and machine learning analyses. We propose a novel LLM agent-based simulation framework to model student activities and mental health using the StudentLife Dataset. Each LLM agent was initialized with personality questionnaires and guided by smartphone sensing data throughout the simulated semester. These agents predict individual behaviors, provide self-reported mental health data via ecological momentary assessments (EMAs), and complete follow-up personality questionnaires. To ensure accuracy, we investigated various prompting techniques, memory systems, and activity-based mental state management strategies that dynamically update an agent's mental state based on their daily activities. This simulation goes beyond simply replicating existing data. This allows us to explore new scenarios that are not present in the original dataset, such as peer influence through agent-to-agent interactions and the impact of social media. Furthermore, we can conduct intervention studies by manipulating activity patterns via sensing signals and personality traits using questionnaire responses. This provides valuable insights into the behavioral changes that could enhance student well-being. The framework also facilitates hypothetical interviews with LLM agents, offering deeper insights into their mental health. This study showcases the power of LLM-driven behavioral modeling with sensing data, opening new avenues for understanding and supporting student mental health.

We propose a stronger formulation of RL on top of RWKV-style recurrent sequence models, in which the fixed-size recurrent state is explicitly interpreted as a belief state rather than an opaque hidden vector. Instead of conditioning policy and value on a single summary h_t, we maintain a compact uncertainty-aware state b_t = (μ_t, Σ_t) derived from RWKV-style recurrent statistics and let control depend on both memory and uncertainty. This design targets a key weakness of plain fixed-state policies in partially observed settings: they may store evidence, but not necessarily confidence. We present the method, a theoretical program, and a pilot RL experiment with hidden episode-level observation noise together with a test-time noise sweep. The pilot shows that belief-state policies nearly match the best recurrent baseline overall while slightly improving return on the hardest in-distribution regime and under a held-out noise shift. Additional ablations show that this simple belief readout is currently stronger than two more structured extensions, namely gated memory control and privileged belief targets, underscoring the need for richer benchmarks.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' perceptions and mental states, is fundamental to human interaction but remains a challenging task for Large Language Models (LLMs). While existing ToM reasoning methods show promise with reasoning via perceptual perspective-taking, they often rely excessively on LLMs, reducing their efficiency and limiting their applicability to high-order ToM reasoning, which requires multi-hop reasoning about characters' beliefs. To address these issues, we present EnigmaToM, a novel neuro-symbolic framework that enhances ToM reasoning by integrating a Neural Knowledge Base of entity states (Enigma) for (1) a psychology-inspired iterative masking mechanism that facilitates accurate perspective-taking and (2) knowledge injection that elicits key entity information. Enigma generates structured representations of entity states, which construct spatial scene graphs -- leveraging spatial information as an inductive bias -- for belief tracking of various ToM orders and enhancing events with fine-grained entity state details. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks, including ToMi, HiToM, and FANToM, show that EnigmaToM significantly improves ToM reasoning across LLMs of varying sizes, particularly excelling in high-order reasoning scenarios.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

Large Language Models are known to capture real-world knowledge, allowing them to excel in many downstream tasks. Despite recent advances, these models are still prone to what are commonly known as hallucinations, causing them to emit unwanted and factually incorrect text. In this work, we propose a novel calibration method that can be used to combat hallucinations. We add a special [IDK] ("I don't know") token to the model's vocabulary and introduce an objective function that shifts probability mass to the [IDK] token for incorrect predictions. This approach allows the model to express uncertainty in its output explicitly. We evaluate our proposed method across multiple model architectures and factual downstream tasks. We find that models trained with our method are able to express uncertainty in places where they would previously make mistakes while suffering only a small loss of encoded knowledge. We further perform extensive ablation studies of multiple variations of our approach and provide a detailed analysis of the precision-recall tradeoff of our method.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

While confidence estimation is a promising direction for mitigating hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs), current research dominantly focuses on single-turn settings. The dynamics of model confidence in multi-turn conversations, where context accumulates and ambiguity is progressively resolved, remain largely unexplored. Reliable confidence estimation in multi-turn settings is critical for many downstream applications, such as autonomous agents and human-in-the-loop systems. This work presents the first systematic study of confidence estimation in multi-turn interactions, establishing a formal evaluation framework grounded in two key desiderata: per-turn calibration and monotonicity of confidence as more information becomes available. To facilitate this, we introduce novel metrics, including a length-normalized Expected Calibration Error (InfoECE), and a new "Hinter-Guesser" paradigm for generating controlled evaluation datasets. Our experiments reveal that widely-used confidence techniques struggle with calibration and monotonicity in multi-turn dialogues. We propose P(Sufficient), a logit-based probe that achieves comparatively better performance, although the task remains far from solved. Our work provides a foundational methodology for developing more reliable and trustworthy conversational agents.

Existing Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks diverge from real-world scenarios in three aspects: 1) they assess a limited range of mental states such as beliefs, 2) false beliefs are not comprehensively explored, and 3) the diverse personality traits of characters are overlooked. To address these challenges, we introduce ToMATO, a new ToM benchmark formulated as multiple-choice QA over conversations. ToMATO is generated via LLM-LLM conversations featuring information asymmetry. By employing a prompting method that requires role-playing LLMs to verbalize their thoughts before each utterance, we capture both first- and second-order mental states across five categories: belief, intention, desire, emotion, and knowledge. These verbalized thoughts serve as answers to questions designed to assess the mental states of characters within conversations. Furthermore, the information asymmetry introduced by hiding thoughts from others induces the generation of false beliefs about various mental states. Assigning distinct personality traits to LLMs further diversifies both utterances and thoughts. ToMATO consists of 5.4k questions, 753 conversations, and 15 personality trait patterns. Our analysis shows that this dataset construction approach frequently generates false beliefs due to the information asymmetry between role-playing LLMs, and effectively reflects diverse personalities. We evaluate nine LLMs on ToMATO and find that even GPT-4o mini lags behind human performance, especially in understanding false beliefs, and lacks robustness to various personality traits.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) is a standard approach for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, the common CoT paradigm treats thinking as a prerequisite for answering, which can delay access to plausible answers and incur unnecessary token costs even when the model is able to identify an answer before extended thinking, a behavior known as performative reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CopT, a reformulated reasoning pipeline that reverses the usual order of thinking and answering. Instead of thinking before answering, CopT first elicits a draft answer and then invokes subsequent on-policy thinking conditioned on its own draft answer for reflection and correction. To assess whether the draft answer should be trusted, CopT recasts continuous embeddings as inference-time contrastive verifiers. Specifically, it contrasts the model's support for the same generated tokens under discrete-token inputs and continuous-embedding inputs, yielding a sequence-level reverse KL estimator for answer reliability. Our analysis shows that under certain assumptions, the expected estimate equals the mutual information between the unresolved latent state and the emitted answer token, explaining why it captures answer-relevant uncertainty rather than arbitrary uncertainty in the latent state. When the answer is deemed insufficiently reliable, CopT performs further on-policy thinking, where a second KL estimator dynamically controls draft-answer visibility, preserving useful partial information while reducing the risk of being misled by unreliable content. Across mathematics, coding, and agentic reasoning tasks, CopT improves peak accuracy by up to 23% and reduces token usage by up to 57% at comparable or higher accuracy, without any additional training. The code is available at https://github.com/sdc17/CopT.

Smart glasses with AI assistants are increasingly used in daily life. However, current systems lack awareness of the user's internal cognitive state, leaving them unable to proactively anticipate users' needs without access to cognitive load. Existing methods for assessing cognitive load either rely on impractical sensors for lightweight eyewear or utilize eye gaze-based models that suffer from poor interpretability, and require task-specific fine-tuning, often failing to generalize across individuals. We propose GazeMind, a gaze-guided LLM agent framework for cognitive load assessment on smart glasses. It encodes eye-tracking data into structured representations for LLM-based reasoning and provides interpretable cognitive load predictions. Importantly, GazeMind generalizes across scenarios without LLM fine-tuning through a novel task-guidance reasoning approach and achieves personalized adaptation by incorporating user-specific characteristics and historical references. To support evaluation, we introduce CogLoad-Bench, the largest gaze-based cognitive load dataset with 152 participants, 40+ hours of multimodal data, and 10K+ real-time annotations across controlled and real-world tasks. Experiments show that GazeMind achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming baselines by over 20% across all metrics.

Passively collected behavioral health data from ubiquitous sensors holds significant promise to provide mental health professionals insights from patient's daily lives; however, developing analysis tools to use this data in clinical practice requires addressing challenges of generalization across devices and weak or ambiguous correlations between the measured signals and an individual's mental health. To address these challenges, we take a novel approach that leverages large language models (LLMs) to synthesize clinically useful insights from multi-sensor data. We develop chain of thought prompting methods that use LLMs to generate reasoning about how trends in data such as step count and sleep relate to conditions like depression and anxiety. We first demonstrate binary depression classification with LLMs achieving accuracies of 61.1% which exceed the state of the art. While it is not robust for clinical use, this leads us to our key finding: even more impactful and valued than classification is a new human-AI collaboration approach in which clinician experts interactively query these tools and combine their domain expertise and context about the patient with AI generated reasoning to support clinical decision-making. We find models like GPT-4 correctly reference numerical data 75% of the time, and clinician participants express strong interest in using this approach to interpret self-tracking data.

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) possess a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Research into this question has focused on evaluating LLMs against benchmarks and found success across a range of social tasks. However, these evaluations do not test for the actual representations posited by ToM: namely, a causal model of mental states and behavior. Here, we use a cognitively-grounded definition of ToM to develop and test a new evaluation framework. Specifically, our approach probes whether LLMs have a coherent, domain-general, and consistent model of how mental states cause behavior -- regardless of whether that model matches a human-like ToM. We find that even though LLMs succeed in approximating human judgments in a simple ToM paradigm, they fail at a logically equivalent task and exhibit low consistency between their action predictions and corresponding mental state inferences. As such, these findings suggest that the social proficiency exhibited by LLMs is not the result of an domain-general or consistent ToM.

Reconstructing human vision from brain activities has been an appealing task that helps to understand our cognitive process. Even though recent research has seen great success in reconstructing static images from non-invasive brain recordings, work on recovering continuous visual experiences in the form of videos is limited. In this work, we propose Mind-Video that learns spatiotemporal information from continuous fMRI data of the cerebral cortex progressively through masked brain modeling, multimodal contrastive learning with spatiotemporal attention, and co-training with an augmented Stable Diffusion model that incorporates network temporal inflation. We show that high-quality videos of arbitrary frame rates can be reconstructed with Mind-Video using adversarial guidance. The recovered videos were evaluated with various semantic and pixel-level metrics. We achieved an average accuracy of 85% in semantic classification tasks and 0.19 in structural similarity index (SSIM), outperforming the previous state-of-the-art by 45%. We also show that our model is biologically plausible and interpretable, reflecting established physiological processes.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand the mental states of oneself and others, remains a challenging area for large language models (LLMs), which often fail to predict human mental states accurately. In this paper, we introduce UniToMBench, a unified benchmark that integrates the strengths of SimToM and TOMBENCH to systematically improve and assess ToM capabilities in LLMs by integrating multi-interaction task designs and evolving story scenarios. Supported by a custom dataset of over 1,000 hand-written scenarios, UniToMBench combines perspective-taking techniques with diverse evaluation metrics to better stimulate social cognition in LLMs. Through evaluation, we observe that while models like GPT-4o and GPT-4o Mini show consistently high accuracy in tasks involving emotional and belief-related scenarios, with results usually above 80%, there is significant variability in their performance across knowledge-based tasks. These results highlight both the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in ToM-related tasks, underscoring the value of UniToMBench as a comprehensive tool for future development. Our code is publicly available here: https://github.com/Shamant/unifiedtombenchmark.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate due to misaligned self-awareness, generating erroneous outputs when addressing queries beyond their knowledge boundaries. While existing approaches mitigate hallucinations via uncertainty estimation or query rejection, they suffer from computational inefficiency or sacrificed helpfulness. To address these issues, we propose the Explicit Knowledge Boundary Modeling (EKBM) framework, integrating fast and slow reasoning systems to harmonize reliability and usability. The framework first employs a fast-thinking model to generate confidence-labeled responses, enabling immediate use of high-confidence outputs. For uncertain predictions, a slow refinement model conducts targeted reasoning to improve accuracy. To align model behavior with our proposed object, we propose a hybrid training pipeline, enhancing self-awareness without degrading task performance. Evaluations on dialogue state tracking tasks demonstrate that EKBM achieves superior model reliability over uncertainty-based baselines. Further analysis reveals that refinement substantially boosts accuracy while maintaining low computational overhead. Our work establishes a scalable paradigm for advancing LLM reliability and balancing accuracy and practical utility in error-sensitive applications.

Humans continuously infer the states, goals, and behaviors of others by perceiving their surroundings in dynamic, real-world social interactions. However, most Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks only evaluate static, text-based scenarios, which have a significant gap compared to real interactions. We propose the SoMi-ToM benchmark, designed to evaluate multi-perspective ToM in embodied multi-agent complex social interactions. This benchmark is based on rich multimodal interaction data generated by the interaction environment SoMi, covering diverse crafting goals and social relationships. Our framework supports multi-level evaluation: (1) first-person evaluation provides multimodal (visual, dialogue, action, etc.) input from a first-person perspective during a task for real-time state inference, (2) third-person evaluation provides complete third-person perspective video and text records after a task for goal and behavior inference. This evaluation method allows for a more comprehensive examination of a model's ToM capabilities from both the subjective immediate experience and the objective global observation. We constructed a challenging dataset containing 35 third-person perspective videos, 363 first-person perspective images, and 1225 expert-annotated multiple-choice questions (three options). On this dataset, we systematically evaluated the performance of human subjects and several state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). The results show that LVLMs perform significantly worse than humans on SoMi-ToM: the average accuracy gap between humans and models is 40.1% in first-person evaluation and 26.4% in third-person evaluation. This indicates that future LVLMs need to further improve their ToM capabilities in embodied, complex social interactions.

As part of a series on first-principles modeling of cognitive functions, this paper attempts to provide a mathematical formulation of thinking and perception. It formally derives slow thinking or more generally, active perception, and encompasses the design, training and inference of slow thinking large language models. Our starting point is the lifting and projection of probability distributions on the observable and latent spaces, with the objective of representing complex data distributions by simple function families such as neural networks. A theory called "active lifting" is proposed, based on the sampling of latent sequences and an intrinsic drive to reduce uncertainty with maximum rate. It derives a large design space, containing the slow thinking models in a subspace that we call the static theory. These models are positioned on the representation hierarchy and sampler hierarchy induced by the static theory, and can be upgraded by climbing the two hierarchies. Active lifting further derives an inference process with an internal time axis, and a training objective that resembles minimum-length coding as well as the invention of languages. Thus, it characterizes the agency of perception, including the emergence of the slow thinking formats. Technical by-products of this theory include a three-stage pathway for improving slow thinking models, a unified approach to constructing encoders and generative models for all data modalities, a priori formation of human-like visual representations, and a possible solution to policy collapse.

The detection of depression through non-verbal cues has gained significant attention. Previous research predominantly centred on identifying depression within the confines of controlled laboratory environments, often with the supervision of psychologists or counsellors. Unfortunately, datasets generated in such controlled settings may struggle to account for individual behaviours in real-life situations. In response to this limitation, we present the Extended D-vlog dataset, encompassing a collection of 1, 261 YouTube vlogs. Additionally, the emergence of large language models (LLMs) like GPT3.5, and GPT4 has sparked interest in their potential they can act like mental health professionals. Yet, the readiness of these LLM models to be used in real-life settings is still a concern as they can give wrong responses that can harm the users. We introduce a virtual agent serving as an initial contact for mental health patients, offering Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)-based responses. It comprises two core functions: 1. Identifying depression in individuals, and 2. Delivering CBT-based therapeutic responses. Our Mistral model achieved impressive scores of 70.1% and 30.9% for distortion assessment and classification, along with a Bert score of 88.7%. Moreover, utilizing the TVLT model on our Multimodal Extended D-vlog Dataset yielded outstanding results, with an impressive F1-score of 67.8%

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

Classical state estimation algorithms rely on predefined target's state-space model, which complicates model derivation and limits adaptability when system dynamics change. Neural network based estimators offer a data-driven alternative, but rarely fuse classical estimation theory into their structure and demand large, pre-computed training sets. To overcome these limitations, we propose a unified state-space structure without target's state-space model and treats both the input-layer activations and all network weights as latent states to be estimated online. We instantiate this nonlinear model with three canonical estimators-the extended Kalman estimator, the unscented Kalman estimator, and the particle estimator to simulate different neural network and demonstrate its generality. We then benchmark our approach against seven leading neural network estimators across three representative scenarios. Results show that our neural network state-space estimators not only retain the robust learning capability, but also match or exceed the accuracy of both classical and pre-trained neural network methods. Code, data, and more result: github.com/ShineMinxing/PaperNNSSE.git

One of the challenges of developing a summarization model arises from the difficulty in measuring the factual inconsistency of the generated text. In this study, we reinterpret the decoder overconfidence-regularizing objective suggested in (Miao et al., 2021) as a hallucination risk measurement to better estimate the quality of generated summaries. We propose a reference-free metric, HaRiM+, which only requires an off-the-shelf summarization model to compute the hallucination risk based on token likelihoods. Deploying it requires no additional training of models or ad-hoc modules, which usually need alignment to human judgments. For summary-quality estimation, HaRiM+ records state-of-the-art correlation to human judgment on three summary-quality annotation sets: FRANK, QAGS, and SummEval. We hope that our work, which merits the use of summarization models, facilitates the progress of both automated evaluation and generation of summary.

Inference-Time-Compute (ITC) methods like Best-of-N and Tree-of-Thoughts are meant to produce output candidates that are both high-quality and diverse, but their use of high-temperature sampling often fails to achieve meaningful output diversity. Moreover, existing ITC methods offer limited control over how to perform reasoning, which in turn limits their explainability. We present STATe-of-Thoughts (STATe), an interpretable ITC method that searches over high-level reasoning patterns. STATe replaces stochastic sampling with discrete and interpretable textual interventions: a controller selects actions encoding high-level reasoning choices, a generator produces reasoning steps conditioned on those choices, and an evaluator scores candidates to guide search. This structured approach yields three main advantages. First, action-guided textual interventions produce greater response diversity than temperature-based sampling. Second, in a case study on argument generation, STATe's explicit action sequences capture interpretable features that are highly predictive of output quality. Third, estimating the association between performance and action choices allows us to identify promising yet unexplored regions of the action space and steer generation directly toward them. Together, these results establish STATe as a practical framework for generating high-quality, diverse, and interpretable text. Our framework is available at https://github.com/zbambergerNLP/state-of-thoughts.

Modeling the interplay between external stimuli and internal neural representations is a pivotal research area for Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs). A major limitation of prior work is the prevailing paradigm of specialized, single-task models, which curtails versatility and neglects inter-task synergies. To address this, we propose Mind-Omni, the first versatile framework that unifies seven distinct encoding and decoding tasks through a discrete diffusion paradigm. At its core is a novel Brain Tokenizer that transforms heterogeneous, continuous brain signals into standardized, discrete tokens. This enables direct, token-level interactions for mutual understanding and generation between any two or more modalities within a shared semantic space. To unlock advanced reasoning capabilities, we further curate a specialized Brain Question Answering (BQA) instruction-tuning dataset. Our model not only establishes a new state-of-the-art among multi-task unified frameworks but also provides strong evidence for multi-task synergy. By demonstrating performance competitive with, and at times superior to, larger specialized models, our work offers a powerful new paradigm for neural modeling and paves the way for foundation models of neural activity. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/ReedOnePeck/Mind-Omni.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Mental health disorders are one of the most serious diseases in the world. Most people with such a disease lack access to adequate care, which highlights the importance of training models for the diagnosis and treatment of mental health disorders. However, in the mental health domain, privacy concerns limit the accessibility of personalized treatment data, making it challenging to build powerful models. In this paper, we introduce MentalArena, a self-play framework to train language models by generating domain-specific personalized data, where we obtain a better model capable of making a personalized diagnosis and treatment (as a therapist) and providing information (as a patient). To accurately model human-like mental health patients, we devise Symptom Encoder, which simulates a real patient from both cognition and behavior perspectives. To address intent bias during patient-therapist interactions, we propose Symptom Decoder to compare diagnosed symptoms with encoded symptoms, and dynamically manage the dialogue between patient and therapist according to the identified deviations. We evaluated MentalArena against 6 benchmarks, including biomedicalQA and mental health tasks, compared to 6 advanced models. Our models, fine-tuned on both GPT-3.5 and Llama-3-8b, significantly outperform their counterparts, including GPT-4o. We hope that our work can inspire future research on personalized care. Code is available in https://github.com/Scarelette/MentalArena/tree/main

While large language models have demonstrated exceptional performance across a wide range of tasks, they remain susceptible to hallucinations -- generating plausible yet factually incorrect contents. Existing methods to mitigating such risk often rely on sampling multiple full-length generations, which introduces significant response latency and becomes ineffective when the model consistently produces hallucinated outputs with high confidence. To address these limitations, we introduce Monitoring Decoding (MD), a novel framework that dynamically monitors the generation process and selectively applies in-process interventions, focusing on revising crucial tokens responsible for hallucinations. Instead of waiting until completion of multiple full-length generations, we identify hallucination-prone tokens during generation using a monitor function, and further refine these tokens through a tree-based decoding strategy. This approach ensures an enhanced factual accuracy and coherence in the generated output while maintaining efficiency. Experimental results demonstrate that MD consistently outperforms self-consistency-based approaches in both effectiveness and efficiency, achieving higher factual accuracy while significantly reducing computational overhead.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Large Language Models (LLMs) hallucinate, generating factually incorrect yet confident assertions. We argue this stems from the Transformer's Softmax function, which creates "Artificial Certainty" by collapsing ambiguous attention scores into a single probability distribution, discarding uncertainty information at each layer. To fix this, we introduce the Credal Transformer, which replaces standard attention with a Credal Attention Mechanism (CAM) based on evidential theory. CAM produces a "credal set" (a set of distributions) instead of a single attention vector, with the set's size directly measuring model uncertainty. We implement this by re-conceptualizing attention scores as evidence masses for a Dirichlet distribution: sufficient evidence recovers standard attention, while insufficient evidence yields a diffuse distribution, representing ambiguity. Empirically, the Credal Transformer identifies out-of-distribution inputs, quantifies ambiguity, and significantly reduces confident errors on unanswerable questions by abstaining. Our contribution is a new architecture to mitigate hallucinations and a design paradigm that integrates uncertainty quantification directly into the model, providing a foundation for more reliable AI.

Demand for mental health support through AI chatbots is surging, though current systems present several limitations, like sycophancy or overvalidation, and reinforcement of maladaptive beliefs. A core obstacle to the creation of better systems is the scarcity of benchmarks that capture the complexity of real therapeutic interactions. Most existing benchmarks either only test clinical knowledge through multiple-choice questions or assess single responses in isolation. To bridge this gap, we present MindEval, a framework designed in collaboration with Ph.D-level Licensed Clinical Psychologists for automatically evaluating language models in realistic, multi-turn mental health therapy conversations. Through patient simulation and automatic evaluation with LLMs, our framework balances resistance to gaming with reproducibility via its fully automated, model-agnostic design. We begin by quantitatively validating the realism of our simulated patients against human-generated text and by demonstrating strong correlations between automatic and human expert judgments. Then, we evaluate 12 state-of-the-art LLMs and show that all models struggle, scoring below 4 out of 6, on average, with particular weaknesses in problematic AI-specific patterns of communication. Notably, reasoning capabilities and model scale do not guarantee better performance, and systems deteriorate with longer interactions or when supporting patients with severe symptoms. We release all code, prompts, and human evaluation data.

Decoding and expressing brain activity in a comprehensible form is a challenging frontier in AI. This paper presents Thought2Text, which uses instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) fine-tuned with EEG data to achieve this goal. The approach involves three stages: (1) training an EEG encoder for visual feature extraction, (2) fine-tuning LLMs on image and text data, enabling multimodal description generation, and (3) further fine-tuning on EEG embeddings to generate text directly from EEG during inference. Experiments on a public EEG dataset collected for six subjects with image stimuli and text captions demonstrate the efficacy of multimodal LLMs (LLaMA-v3, Mistral-v0.3, Qwen2.5), validated using traditional language generation evaluation metrics, as well as fluency and adequacy measures. This approach marks a significant advancement towards portable, low-cost "thoughts-to-text" technology with potential applications in both neuroscience and natural language processing.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

Mutual information (MI) is a fundamental measure of statistical dependence between two variables, yet accurate estimation from finite data remains notoriously difficult. No estimator is universally reliable, and common approaches fail in the high-dimensional, undersampled regimes typical of modern experiments. Recent machine learning-based estimators show promise, but their accuracy depends sensitively on dataset size, structure, and hyperparameters, with no accepted tests to detect failures. We close these gaps through a systematic evaluation of classical and neural MI estimators across standard benchmarks and new synthetic datasets tailored to challenging high-dimensional, undersampled regimes. We contribute: (i) a practical protocol for reliable MI estimation with explicit checks for statistical consistency; (ii) confidence intervals (error bars around estimates) that existing neural MI estimator do not provide; and (iii) a new class of probabilistic critics designed for high-dimensional, high-information settings. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocol with computational experiments, showing that it consistently matches or surpasses existing methods while uniquely quantifying its own reliability. We show that reliable MI estimation is sometimes achievable even in severely undersampled, high-dimensional datasets, provided they admit accurate low-dimensional representations. This broadens the scope of applicability of neural MI estimators and clarifies when such estimators can be trusted.

Neurophysiological recordings such as electroencephalography (EEG) offer accessible and minimally invasive means of estimating physiological activity for applications in healthcare, diagnostic screening, and even immersive entertainment. However, these recordings yield high-dimensional, noisy time-series data that typically require extensive pre-processing and handcrafted feature extraction to reveal meaningful information. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in applying representation learning techniques from large pre-trained (foundation) models to effectively decode and interpret biosignals. We discuss the challenges posed for incorporating such methods and introduce BioCodec, an alternative representation learning framework inspired by neural codecs to capture low-level signal characteristics in the form of discrete tokens. Pre-trained on thousands of EEG hours, BioCodec shows efficacy across multiple downstream tasks, ranging from clinical diagnostic tasks and sleep physiology to decoding speech and motor imagery, particularly in low-resource settings. Additionally, we provide a qualitative analysis of codebook usage and estimate the spatial coherence of codebook embeddings from EEG connectivity. Notably, we also document the suitability of our method to other biosignal data, i.e., electromyographic (EMG) signals. Overall, the proposed approach provides a versatile solution for biosignal tokenization that performs competitively with state-of-the-art models. The source code and model checkpoints are shared.

State-space language models such as Mamba and gated linear attention (GLA) offer efficient alternatives to transformers due to their linear complexity and parallel training, but often lack the expressivity and robust state-tracking needed for complex reasoning. We address these limitations by reframing sequence modelling through a probabilistic lens, using Bayesian filters as a core primitive. While classical filters such as Kalman filters provide principled state estimation and uncertainty tracking, they are typically viewed as inherently sequential. We show that reparameterising the Kalman filter in information form enables its updates to be computed via an associative scan, allowing efficient parallel training. Building on this insight, we introduce the Kalman Linear Attention (KLA) layer, a neural sequence-modelling primitive that performs time-parallel probabilistic inference while maintaining explicit belief-state uncertainty. KLA offers strictly more expressive nonlinear updates and gating than GLA variants while retaining their computational advantages. On language modelling tasks, KLA matches or outperforms modern SSMs and GLAs across representative discrete token-manipulation and state-tracking benchmarks.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Recent work on dialogue-based collaborative plan acquisition (CPA) has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) modelling can improve missing knowledge prediction in settings with asymmetric skill-sets and knowledge. Although ToM was claimed to be important for effective collaboration, its real impact on this novel task remains under-explored. By representing plans as graphs and by exploiting task-specific constraints we show that, as performance on CPA nearly doubles when predicting one's own missing knowledge, the improvements due to ToM modelling diminish. This phenomenon persists even when evaluating existing baseline methods. To better understand the relevance of ToM for CPA, we report a principled performance comparison of models with and without ToM features. Results across different models and ablations consistently suggest that learned ToM features are indeed more likely to reflect latent patterns in the data with no perceivable link to ToM. This finding calls for a deeper understanding of the role of ToM in CPA and beyond, as well as new methods for modelling and evaluating mental states in computational collaborative agents.

Despite their impressive capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are prone to hallucinations, i.e., the generated content that is nonsensical or unfaithful to input sources. Unlike in LLMs, hallucinations in MLLMs often stem from the sensitivity of text decoder to visual tokens, leading to a phenomenon akin to "amnesia" about visual information. To address this issue, we propose MemVR, a novel decoding paradigm inspired by common cognition: when the memory of an image seen the moment before is forgotten, people will look at it again for factual answers. Following this principle, we treat visual tokens as supplementary evidence, re-injecting them into the MLLM through Feed Forward Network (FFN) as "key-value memory" at the middle trigger layer. This "look-twice" mechanism occurs when the model exhibits high uncertainty during inference, effectively enhancing factual alignment. Comprehensive experimental evaluations demonstrate that MemVR significantly mitigates hallucination across various MLLMs and excels in general benchmarks without incurring additional time overhead. The implementation is available from https://github.com/1zhou-Wang/MemVR

In recent years, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress but continue to face inherent challenges in multimodal reasoning, which requires multi-level (e.g., perception, reasoning) and multi-granular (e.g., multi-step reasoning chain) advanced inferencing. Prior work on estimating model confidence tends to focus on the overall response for training and calibration, but fails to assess confidence in each reasoning step, leading to undesirable hallucination snowballing. In this work, we present MMBoundary, a novel framework that advances the knowledge boundary awareness of MLLMs through reasoning step confidence calibration. To achieve this, we propose to incorporate complementary textual and cross-modal self-rewarding signals to estimate confidence at each step of the MLLM reasoning process. In addition to supervised fine-tuning MLLM on this set of self-rewarded confidence estimation signal for initial confidence expression warm-up, we introduce a reinforcement learning stage with multiple reward functions for further aligning model knowledge and calibrating confidence at each reasoning step, enhancing reasoning chain self-correction. Empirical results show that MMBoundary significantly outperforms existing methods across diverse domain datasets and metrics, achieving an average of 7.5% reduction in multimodal confidence calibration errors and up to 8.3% improvement in task performance.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

As large language models evolve, there is growing anticipation that they will emulate human-like Theory of Mind (ToM) to assist with routine tasks. However, existing methods for evaluating machine ToM focus primarily on unimodal models and largely treat these models as black boxes, lacking an interpretative exploration of their internal mechanisms. In response, this study adopts an approach based on internal mechanisms to provide an interpretability-driven assessment of ToM in multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Specifically, we first construct a multimodal ToM test dataset, GridToM, which incorporates diverse belief testing tasks and perceptual information from multiple perspectives. Next, our analysis shows that attention heads in multimodal large models can distinguish cognitive information across perspectives, providing evidence of ToM capabilities. Furthermore, we present a lightweight, training-free approach that significantly enhances the model's exhibited ToM by adjusting in the direction of the attention head.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

Scaling inference-time compute has emerged as an important driver of LLM performance, making inference efficiency a central focus of model design alongside model quality. While the current Transformer-based models deliver strong model quality, their quadratic compute and linear memory make inference expensive. This has spurred the development of sub-quadratic models with reduced linear compute and constant memory requirements. However, many recent linear models trade off model quality and capability for algorithmic efficiency, failing on tasks such as state tracking. Moreover, their theoretically linear inference remains hardware-inefficient in practice. Guided by an inference-first perspective, we introduce three core methodological improvements inspired by the state space model (SSM) viewpoint of linear models. We combine: (1) a more expressive recurrence derived from SSM discretization, (2) a complex-valued state update rule that enables richer state tracking, and (3) a multi-input, multi-output (MIMO) formulation for better model performance without increasing decode latency. Together with architectural refinements, our Mamba-3 model achieves significant gains across retrieval, state-tracking, and downstream language modeling tasks. At the 1.5B scale, Mamba-3 improves average downstream accuracy by 0.6 percentage points compared to the next best model (Gated DeltaNet), with Mamba-3's MIMO variant further improving accuracy by another 1.2 points for a total 1.8 point gain. Across state-size experiments, Mamba-3 achieves comparable perplexity to Mamba-2 despite using half of its predecessor's state size. Our evaluations demonstrate Mamba-3's ability to advance the performance-efficiency Pareto frontier.

Mental health disorders affect hundreds of millions globally, and the Web now serves as a primary medium for accessing support, information, and assessment. Large language models (LLMs) offer scalable and accessible assistance, yet their deployment in mental-health settings remains risky when their reasoning is incomplete, inconsistent, or ungrounded. Existing psychological LLMs emphasize emotional understanding or knowledge recall but overlook the step-wise, clinically aligned reasoning required for appraisal, diagnosis, intervention planning, abstraction, and verification. To address these issues, we introduce MentraSuite, a unified framework for advancing reliable mental-health reasoning. We propose MentraBench, a comprehensive benchmark spanning five core reasoning aspects, six tasks, and 13 datasets, evaluating both task performance and reasoning quality across five dimensions: conciseness, coherence, hallucination avoidance, task understanding, and internal consistency. We further present Mindora, a post-trained model optimized through a hybrid SFT-RL framework with an inconsistency-detection reward to enforce faithful and coherent reasoning. To support training, we construct high-quality trajectories using a novel reasoning trajectory generation strategy, that strategically filters difficult samples and applies a structured, consistency-oriented rewriting process to produce concise, readable, and well-balanced trajectories. Across 20 evaluated LLMs, Mindora achieves the highest average performance on MentraBench and shows remarkable performances in reasoning reliability, demonstrating its effectiveness for complex mental-health scenarios.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, there is increasing interest in their ability to infer human mental states and demonstrate a human-like Theory of Mind (ToM). Most existing ToM evaluations, however, are centered on text-based inputs, while scenarios relying solely on visual information receive far less attention. This leaves a gap, since real-world human-AI interaction typically requires multimodal understanding. In addition, many current methods regard the model as a black box and rarely probe how its internal attention behaves in multiple-choice question answering (QA). The impact of LLM hallucinations on such tasks is also underexplored from an interpretability perspective. To address these issues, we introduce VisionToM, a vision-oriented intervention framework designed to strengthen task-aware reasoning. The core idea is to compute intervention vectors that align visual representations with the correct semantic targets, thereby steering the model's attention through different layers of visual features. This guidance reduces the model's reliance on spurious linguistic priors, leading to more reliable multimodal language model (MLLM) outputs and better QA performance. Experiments on the EgoToM benchmark-an egocentric, real-world video dataset for ToM with three multiple-choice QA settings-demonstrate that our method substantially improves the ToM abilities of MLLMs. Furthermore, results on an additional open-ended generation task show that VisionToM enables MLLMs to produce free-form explanations that more accurately capture agents' mental states, pushing machine-human collaboration toward greater alignment.

Human-like personality traits have recently been discovered in large language models, raising the hypothesis that their (known and as yet undiscovered) biases conform with human latent psychological constructs. While large conversational models may be tricked into answering psychometric questionnaires, the latent psychological constructs of thousands of simpler transformers, trained for other tasks, cannot be assessed because appropriate psychometric methods are currently lacking. Here, we show how standard psychological questionnaires can be reformulated into natural language inference prompts, and we provide a code library to support the psychometric assessment of arbitrary models. We demonstrate, using a sample of 88 publicly available models, the existence of human-like mental health-related constructs (including anxiety, depression, and Sense of Coherence) which conform with standard theories in human psychology and show similar correlations and mitigation strategies. The ability to interpret and rectify the performance of language models by using psychological tools can boost the development of more explainable, controllable, and trustworthy models.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

Logical reasoning encompasses deduction, induction, and abduction. However, while Large Language Models (LLMs) have effectively mastered the former two, abductive reasoning remains significantly underexplored. Existing frameworks, predominantly designed for static deductive tasks, fail to generalize to abductive reasoning due to unstructured state representation and lack of explicit state control. Consequently, they are inevitably prone to Evidence Fabrication, Context Drift, Failed Backtracking, and Early Stopping. To bridge this gap, we introduce Graph of States (GoS), a general-purpose neuro-symbolic framework tailored for abductive tasks. GoS grounds multi-agent collaboration in a structured belief states, utilizing a causal graph to explicitly encode logical dependencies and a state machine to govern the valid transitions of the reasoning process. By dynamically aligning the reasoning focus with these symbolic constraints, our approach transforms aimless, unconstrained exploration into a convergent, directed search. Extensive evaluations on two real-world datasets demonstrate that GoS significantly outperforms all baselines, providing a robust solution for complex abductive tasks. Code repo and all prompts: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Graph-of-States-5B4E.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

According to the World Health Organization, the number of mental disorder patients, especially depression patients, has grown rapidly and become a leading contributor to the global burden of disease. However, the present common practice of depression diagnosis is based on interviews and clinical scales carried out by doctors, which is not only labor-consuming but also time-consuming. One important reason is due to the lack of physiological indicators for mental disorders. With the rising of tools such as data mining and artificial intelligence, using physiological data to explore new possible physiological indicators of mental disorder and creating new applications for mental disorder diagnosis has become a new research hot topic. However, good quality physiological data for mental disorder patients are hard to acquire. We present a multi-modal open dataset for mental-disorder analysis. The dataset includes EEG and audio data from clinically depressed patients and matching normal controls. All our patients were carefully diagnosed and selected by professional psychiatrists in hospitals. The EEG dataset includes not only data collected using traditional 128-electrodes mounted elastic cap, but also a novel wearable 3-electrode EEG collector for pervasive applications. The 128-electrodes EEG signals of 53 subjects were recorded as both in resting state and under stimulation; the 3-electrode EEG signals of 55 subjects were recorded in resting state; the audio data of 52 subjects were recorded during interviewing, reading, and picture description. We encourage other researchers in the field to use it for testing their methods of mental-disorder analysis.

Language models (LMs) hallucinate. We inquire: Can we detect and mitigate hallucinations before they happen? This work answers this research question in the positive, by showing that the internal representations of LMs provide rich signals that can be used for this purpose. We introduce FactCheckMate, which preemptively detects hallucinations by learning a classifier that predicts whether the LM will hallucinate, based on the model's hidden states produced over the inputs, before decoding begins. If a hallucination is detected, FactCheckMate then intervenes, by adjusting the LM's hidden states such that the model will produce more factual outputs. FactCheckMate provides fresh insights that the inner workings of LMs can be revealed by their hidden states. Practically, both the detection and mitigation models in FactCheckMate are lightweight, adding little inference overhead; FactCheckMate proves a more efficient approach for mitigating hallucinations compared to many post-hoc alternatives. We evaluate FactCheckMate over LMs of different scales and model families (including Llama, Mistral, and Gemma), across a variety of QA datasets from different domains. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of leveraging internal representations for early hallucination detection and mitigation, achieving over 70% preemptive detection accuracy. On average, outputs generated by LMs with intervention are 34.4% more factual compared to those without intervention. The average overhead difference in the inference time introduced by FactCheckMate is around 3.16 seconds.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Cognitive neuroscience is enjoying rapid increase in extensive public brain-imaging datasets. It opens the door to large-scale statistical models. Finding a unified perspective for all available data calls for scalable and automated solutions to an old challenge: how to aggregate heterogeneous information on brain function into a universal cognitive system that relates mental operations/cognitive processes/psychological tasks to brain networks? We cast this challenge in a machine-learning approach to predict conditions from statistical brain maps across different studies. For this, we leverage multi-task learning and multi-scale dimension reduction to learn low-dimensional representations of brain images that carry cognitive information and can be robustly associated with psychological stimuli. Our multi-dataset classification model achieves the best prediction performance on several large reference datasets, compared to models without cognitive-aware low-dimension representations, it brings a substantial performance boost to the analysis of small datasets, and can be introspected to identify universal template cognitive concepts.

Egocentric perception on smart glasses could transform how we learn new skills in the physical world, but automatic skill assessment remains a fundamental technical challenge. We introduce SkillSight for power-efficient skill assessment from first-person data. Central to our approach is the hypothesis that skill level is evident not only in how a person performs an activity (video), but also in how they direct their attention when doing so (gaze). Our two-stage framework first learns to jointly model gaze and egocentric video when predicting skill level, then distills a gaze-only student model. At inference, the student model requires only gaze input, drastically reducing power consumption by eliminating continuous video processing. Experiments on three datasets spanning cooking, music, and sports establish, for the first time, the valuable role of gaze in skill understanding across diverse real-world settings. Our SkillSight teacher model achieves state-of-the-art performance, while our gaze-only student variant maintains high accuracy using 73x less power than competing methods. These results pave the way for in-the-wild AI-supported skill learning.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Unified multimodal models (UMMs) interleave generated ''visual thoughts'' (VTs) with text reasoning to improve spatial tasks. This incurs roughly an order-of-magnitude inference cost from multi-step diffusion. We find this cost yields limited direct benefit. On ThinkMorph, removing or noising VTs barely changes accuracy across nine benchmarks. Once rendered, attention concentrates on the VT regardless of content. Yet a KL diagnostic shows that conditioning on a privileged VT trace shifts the model's completion distribution. This suggests the generation pathway encodes useful reasoning beyond the rendered pixels. Motivated by this gap, we propose Visual On-Policy Self-Distillation(Visual-OPSD). Teacher and student share identical weights but differ in context: the teacher sees privileged VTs while the student sees only the question. Token-level JSD distillation on on-policy student trajectories transfers the teacher's reasoning to a text-only student. Across nine benchmarks, Visual-OPSD improves over its generative teacher by +3.40pp with 14.3times speedup (10.0s vs. 142.8s per sample) and outperforms same-scale VLMs by +63.83pp on VSP. A Gaussian-noise control (+0.40pp vs. +10.28pp for real VTs) and 58.4% closure of the KL gap confirm that gains come from the semantic content of the generation pathway.

This work stems from prior complementary observations on the dynamics of Chain-of-Thought (CoT): Large Language Models (LLMs) is shown latent planning of subsequent reasoning prior to CoT emergence, thereby diminishing the significance of explicit CoT; whereas CoT remains critical for tasks requiring multi-step reasoning. To deepen the understanding between LLM's internal states and its verbalized reasoning trajectories, we investigate the latent planning strength of LLMs, through our probing method, Tele-Lens, applying to hidden states across diverse task domains. Our empirical results indicate that LLMs exhibit a myopic horizon, primarily conducting incremental transitions without precise global planning. Leveraging this characteristic, we propose a hypothesis on enhancing uncertainty estimation of CoT, which we validate that a small subset of CoT positions can effectively represent the uncertainty of the entire path. We further underscore the significance of exploiting CoT dynamics, and demonstrate that automatic recognition of CoT bypass can be achieved without performance degradation. Our code, data and models are released at https://github.com/lxucs/tele-lens.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, yet they struggle with spatial tasks that require mental simulation, such as mental rotation. This paper investigates whether equipping an LLM with an external ``Imagery Module'' -- a tool capable of rendering and rotating 3D models -- can bridge this gap, functioning as a ``cognitive prosthetic.'' We conducted experiments using a dual-module architecture in which a reasoning module (an MLLM) interacts with an imagery module on 3D model rotation tasks. Performance was lower than expected, with accuracy reaching at most 62.5%. Further investigation suggests that even when the burden of maintaining and manipulating a holistic 3D state is outsourced, the system still fails. This reveals that current frontier models lack the foundational visual-spatial primitives required to interface with imagery. Specifically, they lack: (1) the low-level sensitivity to extract spatial signals such as (a) depth, (b) motion, and (c) short-horizon dynamic prediction; and (2) the capacity to reason contemplatively over images, dynamically shifting visual focus and balancing imagery with symbolic and associative information.

Object Hallucination (OH) has been acknowledged as one of the major trustworthy challenges in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) indicate that internal states, such as hidden states, encode the "overall truthfulness" of generated responses. However, it remains under-explored how internal states in LVLMs function and whether they could serve as "per-token" hallucination indicators, which is essential for mitigating OH. In this paper, we first conduct an in-depth exploration of LVLM internal states in relation to OH issues and discover that (1) LVLM internal states are high-specificity per-token indicators of hallucination behaviors. Moreover, (2) different LVLMs encode universal patterns of hallucinations in common latent subspaces, indicating that there exist "generic truthful directions" shared by various LVLMs. Based on these discoveries, we propose Truthful-Guided Pre-Intervention (TruthPrInt) that first learns the truthful direction of LVLM decoding and then applies truthful-guided inference-time intervention during LVLM decoding. We further propose ComnHallu to enhance both cross-LVLM and cross-data hallucination detection transferability by constructing and aligning hallucination latent subspaces. We evaluate TruthPrInt in extensive experimental settings, including in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, over popular LVLMs and OH benchmarks. Experimental results indicate that TruthPrInt significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods. Codes will be available at https://github.com/jinhaoduan/TruthPrInt.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

This paper introduces KnowHalu, a novel approach for detecting hallucinations in text generated by large language models (LLMs), utilizing step-wise reasoning, multi-formulation query, multi-form knowledge for factual checking, and fusion-based detection mechanism. As LLMs are increasingly applied across various domains, ensuring that their outputs are not hallucinated is critical. Recognizing the limitations of existing approaches that either rely on the self-consistency check of LLMs or perform post-hoc fact-checking without considering the complexity of queries or the form of knowledge, KnowHalu proposes a two-phase process for hallucination detection. In the first phase, it identifies non-fabrication hallucinations--responses that, while factually correct, are irrelevant or non-specific to the query. The second phase, multi-form based factual checking, contains five key steps: reasoning and query decomposition, knowledge retrieval, knowledge optimization, judgment generation, and judgment aggregation. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate that KnowHalu significantly outperforms SOTA baselines in detecting hallucinations across diverse tasks, e.g., improving by 15.65% in QA tasks and 5.50% in summarization tasks, highlighting its effectiveness and versatility in detecting hallucinations in LLM-generated content.

We propose semantic entropy probes (SEPs), a cheap and reliable method for uncertainty quantification in Large Language Models (LLMs). Hallucinations, which are plausible-sounding but factually incorrect and arbitrary model generations, present a major challenge to the practical adoption of LLMs. Recent work by Farquhar et al. (2024) proposes semantic entropy (SE), which can detect hallucinations by estimating uncertainty in the space semantic meaning for a set of model generations. However, the 5-to-10-fold increase in computation cost associated with SE computation hinders practical adoption. To address this, we propose SEPs, which directly approximate SE from the hidden states of a single generation. SEPs are simple to train and do not require sampling multiple model generations at test time, reducing the overhead of semantic uncertainty quantification to almost zero. We show that SEPs retain high performance for hallucination detection and generalize better to out-of-distribution data than previous probing methods that directly predict model accuracy. Our results across models and tasks suggest that model hidden states capture SE, and our ablation studies give further insights into the token positions and model layers for which this is the case.

We provide an optimization-based framework to perform counterfactual analysis in a dynamic model with hidden states. Our framework is grounded in the ``abduction, action, and prediction'' approach to answer counterfactual queries and handles two key challenges where (1) the states are hidden and (2) the model is dynamic. Recognizing the lack of knowledge on the underlying causal mechanism and the possibility of infinitely many such mechanisms, we optimize over this space and compute upper and lower bounds on the counterfactual quantity of interest. Our work brings together ideas from causality, state-space models, simulation, and optimization, and we apply it on a breast cancer case study. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compute lower and upper bounds on a counterfactual query in a dynamic latent-state model.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

While multimodal reasoning models (MLRMs) have exhibited impressive capabilities, they remain prone to hallucinations, and effective solutions are still underexplored. In this paper, we experimentally analyze the hallucination cause and propose C3PO, a training-based mitigation framework comprising Chain-of-Thought Compression and Contrastive Preference Optimization. Firstly, we identify that introducing reasoning mechanisms exacerbates models' reliance on language priors while overlooking visual inputs, which can produce CoTs with reduced visual cues but redundant text tokens. To this end, we propose to selectively filter redundant thinking tokens for a more compact and signal-efficient CoT representation that preserves task-relevant information while suppressing noise. In addition, we observe that the quality of the reasoning trace largely determines whether hallucination emerges in subsequent responses. To leverage this insight, we introduce a reasoning-enhanced preference tuning scheme that constructs training pairs using high-quality AI feedback. We further design a multimodal hallucination-inducing mechanism that elicits models' inherent hallucination patterns via carefully crafted inducers, yielding informative negative signals for contrastive correction. We provide theoretical justification for the effectiveness and demonstrate consistent hallucination reduction across diverse MLRMs and benchmarks.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to an agent's ability to model the internal states of others. Contributing to the debate whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit genuine ToM capabilities, our study investigates their ToM robustness using perturbations on false-belief tasks and examines the potential of Chain-of-Thought prompting (CoT) to enhance performance and explain the LLM's decision. We introduce a handcrafted, richly annotated ToM dataset, including classic and perturbed false belief tasks, the corresponding spaces of valid reasoning chains for correct task completion, subsequent reasoning faithfulness, task solutions, and propose metrics to evaluate reasoning chain correctness and to what extent final answers are faithful to reasoning traces of the generated CoT. We show a steep drop in ToM capabilities under task perturbation for all evaluated LLMs, questioning the notion of any robust form of ToM being present. While CoT prompting improves the ToM performance overall in a faithful manner, it surprisingly degrades accuracy for some perturbation classes, indicating that selective application is necessary.

To mitigate the impact of hallucination nature of LLMs, many studies propose detecting hallucinated generation through uncertainty estimation. However, these approaches predominantly operate at the sentence or paragraph level, failing to pinpoint specific spans or entities responsible for hallucinated content. This lack of granularity is especially problematic for long-form outputs that mix accurate and fabricated information. To address this limitation, we explore entity-level hallucination detection. We propose a new data set, HalluEntity, which annotates hallucination at the entity level. Based on the dataset, we comprehensively evaluate uncertainty-based hallucination detection approaches across 17 modern LLMs. Our experimental results show that uncertainty estimation approaches focusing on individual token probabilities tend to over-predict hallucinations, while context-aware methods show better but still suboptimal performance. Through an in-depth qualitative study, we identify relationships between hallucination tendencies and linguistic properties and highlight important directions for future research.

Theory of Mind (ToM) can be used to assess the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in complex scenarios where social reasoning is required. While the research community has proposed many ToM benchmarks, their hardness varies greatly, and their complexity is not well defined. This work proposes a framework inspired by cognitive load theory to measure the complexity of ToM tasks. We quantify a problem's complexity as the number of states necessary to solve it correctly. Our complexity measure also accounts for spurious states of a ToM problem designed to make it apparently harder. We use our method to assess the complexity of five widely adopted ToM benchmarks. On top of this framework, we design a prompting technique that augments the information available to a model with a description of how the environment changes with the agents' interactions. We name this technique Discrete World Models (DWM) and show how it elicits superior performance on ToM tasks.

Depression poses significant challenges to patients and healthcare organizations, necessitating efficient assessment methods. Existing paradigms typically focus on a patient-doctor way that overlooks multi-role interactions, such as family involvement in the evaluation and caregiving process. Moreover, current automatic depression detection (ADD) methods usually model depression detection as a classification or regression task, lacking interpretability for the decision-making process. To address these issues, we developed InterMind, a doctor-patient-family interactive depression assessment system empowered by large language models (LLMs). Our system enables patients and families to contribute descriptions, generates assistive diagnostic reports for doctors, and provides actionable insights, improving diagnostic precision and efficiency. To enhance LLMs' performance in psychological counseling and diagnostic interpretability, we integrate retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and chain-of-thoughts (CoT) techniques for data augmentation, which mitigates the hallucination issue of LLMs in specific scenarios after instruction fine-tuning. Quantitative experiments and professional assessments by clinicians validate the effectiveness of our system.

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.

Mental rotation -- the ability to compare objects seen from different viewpoints -- is a fundamental example of mental simulation and spatial world modelling in humans. Here we propose a mechanistic model of human mental rotation, leveraging advances in deep, equivariant, and neuro-symbolic learning. Our model consists of three stacked components: (1) an equivariant neural encoder, taking images as input and producing 3D spatial representations of objects, (2) a neuro-symbolic object encoder, deriving symbolic descriptions of objects from these spatial representations, and (3) a neural decision agent, comparing these symbolic descriptions to prescribe rotation simulations in 3D latent space via a recurrent pathway. Our model design is guided by the abundant experimental literature on mental rotation, which we complemented with experiments in VR where participants could at times manipulate the objects to compare, providing us with additional insights into the cognitive process of mental rotation. Our model captures well the performance, response times and behavior of participants in our and others' experiments. The necessity of each model component is shown through systematic ablations. Our work adds to a recent collection of deep neural models of human spatial reasoning, further demonstrating the potency of integrating deep, equivariant, and symbolic representations to model the human mind.

Video world models (WMs) have shown promise for policy evaluation and improvement by imagining realistic future observations conditioned on ego-robot actions. While WMs can model distributions over futures, policy evaluation and improvement typically rely on nominal imaginations, which can miss high-impact outcomes of robot actions unless prohibitively many samples are drawn. To enable robust policy evaluation and improvement over WM imaginations, we propose StressDream, which steers imaginations toward high-impact yet plausible outcomes specified at inference time by optimizing the initial noise of diffusion-based WMs. However, optimizing high-dimensional noise is challenging: the optimization must reason about nuanced, scene-dependent target events in generated videos while avoiding out-of-distribution (OOD) noise that yields implausible imaginations. We address this with two complementary objectives: a semantic objective with a Vision-Language Model that provides informative gradients by reasoning about the generated video, and a plausibility objective that prevents the optimized noise from drifting OOD. With state-of-the-art video world models for autonomous driving and robotic manipulation, we show that StressDream effectively steers imaginations toward high-impact yet plausible outcomes specified by text at inference time, such as task failures, enabling robust policy evaluation and improvement by identifying actions whose plausible futures include undesirable outcomes. Video results are available at https://junwon.me/StressDream/.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated potential in predicting mental health outcomes from online text, yet traditional classification methods often lack interpretability and robustness. This study evaluates structured reasoning techniques-Chain-of-Thought (CoT), Self-Consistency (SC-CoT), and Tree-of-Thought (ToT)-to improve classification accuracy across multiple mental health datasets sourced from Reddit. We analyze reasoning-driven prompting strategies, including Zero-shot CoT and Few-shot CoT, using key performance metrics such as Balanced Accuracy, F1 score, and Sensitivity/Specificity. Our findings indicate that reasoning-enhanced techniques improve classification performance over direct prediction, particularly in complex cases. Compared to baselines such as Zero Shot non-CoT Prompting, and fine-tuned pre-trained transformers such as BERT and Mental-RoBerta, and fine-tuned Open Source LLMs such as Mental Alpaca and Mental-Flan-T5, reasoning-driven LLMs yield notable gains on datasets like Dreaddit (+0.52\% over M-LLM, +0.82\% over BERT) and SDCNL (+4.67\% over M-LLM, +2.17\% over BERT). However, performance declines in Depression Severity, and CSSRS predictions suggest dataset-specific limitations, likely due to our using a more extensive test set. Among prompting strategies, Few-shot CoT consistently outperforms others, reinforcing the effectiveness of reasoning-driven LLMs. Nonetheless, dataset variability highlights challenges in model reliability and interpretability. This study provides a comprehensive benchmark of reasoning-based LLM techniques for mental health text classification. It offers insights into their potential for scalable clinical applications while identifying key challenges for future improvements.

Hallucinations are a persistent problem with Large Language Models (LLMs). As these models become increasingly used in high-stakes domains, such as healthcare and finance, the need for effective hallucination detection is crucial. To this end, we propose a versatile framework for zero-resource hallucination detection that practitioners can apply to real-world use cases. To achieve this, we adapt a variety of existing uncertainty quantification (UQ) techniques, including black-box UQ, white-box UQ, and LLM-as-a-Judge, transforming them as necessary into standardized response-level confidence scores ranging from 0 to 1. To enhance flexibility, we introduce a tunable ensemble approach that incorporates any combination of the individual confidence scores. This approach enables practitioners to optimize the ensemble for a specific use case for improved performance. To streamline implementation, the full suite of scorers is offered in this paper's companion Python toolkit, UQLM. To evaluate the performance of the various scorers, we conduct an extensive set of experiments using several LLM question-answering benchmarks. We find that our tunable ensemble typically surpasses its individual components and outperforms existing hallucination detection methods. Our results demonstrate the benefits of customized hallucination detection strategies for improving the accuracy and reliability of LLMs.

Can Vision Language Models (VLMs) imagine the full scene from just a few views, like humans do? Humans form spatial mental models, internal representations of unseen space, to reason about layout, perspective, and motion. Our new MindCube benchmark with 21,154 questions across 3,268 images exposes this critical gap, where existing VLMs exhibit near-random performance. Using MindCube, we systematically evaluate how well VLMs build robust spatial mental models through representing positions (cognitive mapping), orientations (perspective-taking), and dynamics (mental simulation for "what-if" movements). We then explore three approaches to help VLMs approximate spatial mental models, including unseen intermediate views, natural language reasoning chains, and cognitive maps. The significant improvement comes from a synergistic approach, "map-then-reason", that jointly trains the model to first generate a cognitive map and then reason upon it. By training models to reason over these internal maps, we boosted accuracy from 37.8% to 60.8% (+23.0%). Adding reinforcement learning pushed performance even further to 70.7% (+32.9%). Our key insight is that such scaffolding of spatial mental models, actively constructing and utilizing internal structured spatial representations with flexible reasoning processes, significantly improves understanding of unobservable space.

In recent years, multiple notions of algorithmic fairness have arisen. One such notion is individual fairness (IF), which requires that individuals who are similar receive similar treatment. In parallel, matrix estimation (ME) has emerged as a natural paradigm for handling noisy data with missing values. In this work, we connect the two concepts. We show that pre-processing data using ME can improve an algorithm's IF without sacrificing performance. Specifically, we show that using a popular ME method known as singular value thresholding (SVT) to pre-process the data provides a strong IF guarantee under appropriate conditions. We then show that, under analogous conditions, SVT pre-processing also yields estimates that are consistent and approximately minimax optimal. As such, the ME pre-processing step does not, under the stated conditions, increase the prediction error of the base algorithm, i.e., does not impose a fairness-performance trade-off. We verify these results on synthetic and real data.

Large language models (LLMs) can make scientific software easier to use. However, a general model does not automatically know which measurements a particular sensor can support, which algorithms are implemented in the current software, or which conclusions are justified by a computed result. These distinctions are especially important for low-channel electroencephalography (EEG), where sparse spatial coverage and variable signal quality make plausible but unsupported interpretations easy to produce. We present NeuraDock Agent, an open-source architecture that separates a deterministic local EEG engine from a hardware-aware language layer. The numerical engine parses recordings, performs quality control, executes reviewed spectral workflows, and writes machine-readable artifacts. The LLM receives only a compact, allowlisted summary and a versioned context pack. The context describes the seven-channel hardware, reviewed workflows, result fields, implementation boundaries, scientific limits, and reference cases. Raw EEG and dense per-sample arrays remain local We evaluate the system at three levels. First, 12 recordings produced identical structured results over ten numerical repetitions, and a complete Rest/Task run produced identical result, report, and figure hashes over three repetitions. Second, request-capture and failure-injection experiments confirmed the tested data boundary and preservation of local artifacts under HTTP, malformed-output, and connection failures. Third, a boundary-awareness benchmark tested 36 ordinary and adversarial questions under four context ablations and two LLMs, yielding 288 outputs.These results support hardware- and implementation-aware grounding as a practical mechanism for calibrating what an EEG agent accepts, qualifies, or refuses; they do not establish clinical validity or a validated absolute cognitive-load index.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (Med-MLLMs) require egocentric clinical intent understanding for real-world deployment, yet existing benchmarks fail to evaluate this critical capability. To address these challenges, we introduce MedGaze-Bench, the first benchmark leveraging clinician gaze as a Cognitive Cursor to assess intent understanding across surgery, emergency simulation, and diagnostic interpretation. Our benchmark addresses three fundamental challenges: visual homogeneity of anatomical structures, strict temporal-causal dependencies in clinical workflows, and implicit adherence to safety protocols. We propose a Three-Dimensional Clinical Intent Framework evaluating: (1) Spatial Intent: discriminating precise targets amid visual noise, (2) Temporal Intent: inferring causal rationale through retrospective and prospective reasoning, and (3) Standard Intent: verifying protocol compliance through safety checks. Beyond accuracy metrics, we introduce Trap QA mechanisms to stress-test clinical reliability by penalizing hallucinations and cognitive sycophancy. Experiments reveal current MLLMs struggle with egocentric intent due to over-reliance on global features, leading to fabricated observations and uncritical acceptance of invalid instructions.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

When researchers claim AI systems possess ToM or mental models, they are fundamentally discussing behavioral predictions and bias corrections rather than genuine mental states. This position paper argues that the current discourse conflates sophisticated pattern matching with authentic cognition, missing a crucial distinction between simulation and experience. While recent studies show LLMs achieving human-level performance on ToM laboratory tasks, these results are based only on behavioral mimicry. More importantly, the entire testing paradigm may be flawed in applying individual human cognitive tests to AI systems, but assessing human cognition directly in the moment of human-AI interaction. I suggest shifting focus toward mutual ToM frameworks that acknowledge the simultaneous contributions of human cognition and AI algorithms, emphasizing the interaction dynamics, instead of testing AI in isolation.

Learning accurate predictive models of real-world dynamic phenomena (e.g., climate, biological) remains a challenging task. One key issue is that the data generated by both natural and artificial processes often comprise time series that are irregularly sampled and/or contain missing observations. In this work, we propose the Neural Continuous-Discrete State Space Model (NCDSSM) for continuous-time modeling of time series through discrete-time observations. NCDSSM employs auxiliary variables to disentangle recognition from dynamics, thus requiring amortized inference only for the auxiliary variables. Leveraging techniques from continuous-discrete filtering theory, we demonstrate how to perform accurate Bayesian inference for the dynamic states. We propose three flexible parameterizations of the latent dynamics and an efficient training objective that marginalizes the dynamic states during inference. Empirical results on multiple benchmark datasets across various domains show improved imputation and forecasting performance of NCDSSM over existing models.

Foundation Models that are capable of processing and generating multi-modal data have transformed AI's role in medicine. However, a key limitation of their reliability is hallucination, where inaccurate or fabricated information can impact clinical decisions and patient safety. We define medical hallucination as any instance in which a model generates misleading medical content. This paper examines the unique characteristics, causes, and implications of medical hallucinations, with a particular focus on how these errors manifest themselves in real-world clinical scenarios. Our contributions include (1) a taxonomy for understanding and addressing medical hallucinations, (2) benchmarking models using medical hallucination dataset and physician-annotated LLM responses to real medical cases, providing direct insight into the clinical impact of hallucinations, and (3) a multi-national clinician survey on their experiences with medical hallucinations. Our results reveal that inference techniques such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Search Augmented Generation can effectively reduce hallucination rates. However, despite these improvements, non-trivial levels of hallucination persist. These findings underscore the ethical and practical imperative for robust detection and mitigation strategies, establishing a foundation for regulatory policies that prioritize patient safety and maintain clinical integrity as AI becomes more integrated into healthcare. The feedback from clinicians highlights the urgent need for not only technical advances but also for clearer ethical and regulatory guidelines to ensure patient safety. A repository organizing the paper resources, summaries, and additional information is available at https://github.com/mitmedialab/medical hallucination.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Large language models and deep neural networks achieve strong performance but suffer from reliability issues and high computational cost. This thesis proposes a unified framework based on spectral geometry and random matrix theory to address both problems by analyzing the eigenvalue structure of hidden activations. The first contribution, EigenTrack, is a real-time method for detecting hallucinations and out-of-distribution behavior in language and vision-language models using spectral features and their temporal dynamics. The second contribution, RMT-KD, is a principled compression method that identifies informative spectral components and applies iterative knowledge distillation to produce compact and efficient models while preserving accuracy. Together, these results show that spectral statistics provide interpretable and robust signals for monitoring uncertainty and guiding compression in large-scale neural networks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

Simulating human clients in mental health counseling is crucial for training and evaluating counselors (both human or simulated) in a scalable manner. Nevertheless, past research on client simulation did not focus on complex conversation tasks such as mental health counseling. In these tasks, the challenge is to ensure that the client's actions (i.e., interactions with the counselor) are consistent with with its stipulated profiles and negative behavior settings. In this paper, we propose a novel framework that supports consistent client simulation for mental health counseling. Our framework tracks the mental state of a simulated client, controls its state transitions, and generates for each state behaviors consistent with the client's motivation, beliefs, preferred plan to change, and receptivity. By varying the client profile and receptivity, we demonstrate that consistent simulated clients for different counseling scenarios can be effectively created. Both our automatic and expert evaluations on the generated counseling sessions also show that our client simulation method achieves higher consistency than previous methods.