Daily Papers

Modern language models often rely on Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to encourage safe behaviors. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks due to three key limitations: (1) the inefficiency and high cost of human annotation, (2) the vast diversity of potential adversarial attacks, and (3) the risk of feedback bias and reward hacking. To address these challenges, we introduce Adversarial Preference Learning (APL), an iterative adversarial training method incorporating three key innovations. First, a direct harmfulness metric based on the model's intrinsic preference probabilities, eliminating reliance on external assessment. Second, a conditional generative attacker that synthesizes input-specific adversarial variations. Third, an iterative framework with automated closed-loop feedback, enabling continuous adaptation through vulnerability discovery and mitigation. Experiments on Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 demonstrate that APL significantly enhances robustness, achieving 83.33% harmlessness win rate over the base model (evaluated by GPT-4o), reducing harmful outputs from 5.88% to 0.43% (measured by LLaMA-Guard), and lowering attack success rate by up to 65% according to HarmBench. Notably, APL maintains competitive utility, with an MT-Bench score of 6.59 (comparable to the baseline 6.78) and an LC-WinRate of 46.52% against the base model.

Language model alignment has become a critical step in training modern generative language models. The goal of alignment is to finetune a reference model such that the win rate of a sample from the aligned model over a sample from the reference model is high, subject to a KL divergence constraint. Today, we are increasingly using inference-time algorithms (e.g., Best-of-N, controlled decoding, tree search) to decode from language models rather than standard sampling. However, the alignment objective does not capture such inference-time decoding procedures. We show that the existing alignment framework is sub-optimal in view of such inference-time methods. We then modify the alignment objective and propose a framework for inference-aware alignment (IAPO). We prove that for any inference-time decoding algorithm, the optimal solution that optimizes the inference-time win rate of the aligned policy against the reference policy is the solution to the typical RLHF problem with a transformation of the reward. This motivates us to provide the KL-regularized calibrate-and-transform RL (CTRL) algorithm to solve this problem, which involves a reward calibration step and a KL-regularized reward maximization step with a transformation of the calibrated reward. We particularize our study to two important inference-time strategies: best-of-N sampling and best-of-N jailbreaking, where N responses are sampled from the model and the one with the highest or lowest reward is selected. We propose specific transformations for these strategies and demonstrate that our framework offers significant improvements over existing state-of-the-art methods for language model alignment. Empirically, we outperform baselines that are designed without taking inference-time decoding into consideration by 8-12% and 4-9% on inference-time win rates over the Anthropic helpfulness and harmlessness dialog benchmark datasets.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have become essential backbones for multimodal intelligence, yet significant safety challenges limit their real-world application. While textual inputs are often effectively safeguarded, adversarial visual inputs can easily bypass VLM defense mechanisms. Existing defense methods are either resource-intensive, requiring substantial data and compute, or fail to simultaneously ensure safety and usefulness in responses. To address these limitations, we propose a novel two-phase inference-time alignment framework, Evaluating Then Aligning (ETA): 1) Evaluating input visual contents and output responses to establish a robust safety awareness in multimodal settings, and 2) Aligning unsafe behaviors at both shallow and deep levels by conditioning the VLMs' generative distribution with an interference prefix and performing sentence-level best-of-N to search the most harmless and helpful generation paths. Extensive experiments show that ETA outperforms baseline methods in terms of harmlessness, helpfulness, and efficiency, reducing the unsafe rate by 87.5% in cross-modality attacks and achieving 96.6% win-ties in GPT-4 helpfulness evaluation. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/DripNowhy/ETA.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, alignment, and task-specific performance. However, ensuring harmlessness in these systems remains a critical challenge, particularly in advanced models like DeepSeek-R1. This paper examines the limitations of Reinforcement Learning (RL) as the primary approach for reducing harmful outputs in DeepSeek-R1 and compares it with Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). While RL improves reasoning capabilities, it faces challenges such as reward hacking, generalization failures, language mixing, and high computational costs. We propose hybrid training approaches combining RL and SFT to achieve robust harmlessness reduction. Usage recommendations and future directions for deploying DeepSeek-R1 responsibly are also presented.

Despite extensive safety alignment efforts, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful behavior. While existing studies predominantly focus on attack methods that require technical expertise, two critical questions remain underexplored: (1) Are jailbroken responses truly useful in enabling average users to carry out harmful actions? (2) Do safety vulnerabilities exist in more common, simple human-LLM interactions? In this paper, we demonstrate that LLM responses most effectively facilitate harmful actions when they are both actionable and informative--two attributes easily elicited in multi-step, multilingual interactions. Using this insight, we propose HarmScore, a jailbreak metric that measures how effectively an LLM response enables harmful actions, and Speak Easy, a simple multi-step, multilingual attack framework. Notably, by incorporating Speak Easy into direct request and jailbreak baselines, we see an average absolute increase of 0.319 in Attack Success Rate and 0.426 in HarmScore in both open-source and proprietary LLMs across four safety benchmarks. Our work reveals a critical yet often overlooked vulnerability: Malicious users can easily exploit common interaction patterns for harmful intentions.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks that require complex reasoning. Most benchmarks focus on final outcomes but overlook the intermediate reasoning steps - such as planning, revision, and decision making under resource constraints. We argue that measuring these internal processes is essential for understanding model behavior and improving reliability. We propose using strategic games as a natural evaluation environment: closed, rule-based systems with clear states, limited resources, and automatic feedback. We introduce a framework that evaluates LLMs along three core dimensions: planning, revision, and resource-constrained decision making. To operationalize this, we define metrics beyond win rate, including overcorrection risk rate, correction success rate, improvement slope, and over-budget ratio. In 4320 adversarial rounds across 12 leading models, ChatGPT-o3-mini achieves the top composite score, with a win rate of 74.7 percent, a correction success rate of 78.6 percent, and an improvement slope of 0.041. By contrast, Qwen-Plus, despite an overcorrection risk rate of 81.6 percent, wins only 25.6 percent of its matches - primarily due to excessive resource use. We also observe a negative correlation between overcorrection risk rate and correction success rate (Pearson r = -0.51, p = 0.093), suggesting that more frequent edits do not always improve outcomes. Our findings highlight the value of assessing not only what LLMs decide but how they arrive at those decisions

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) across various regions underscores the urgent need to evaluate their alignment with human values. Current benchmarks, however, fall short of effectively uncovering safety vulnerabilities in LLMs. Despite numerous models achieving high scores and 'topping the chart' in these evaluations, there is still a significant gap in LLMs' deeper alignment with human values and achieving genuine harmlessness. To this end, this paper proposes a value alignment benchmark named Flames, which encompasses both common harmlessness principles and a unique morality dimension that integrates specific Chinese values such as harmony. Accordingly, we carefully design adversarial prompts that incorporate complex scenarios and jailbreaking methods, mostly with implicit malice. By prompting 17 mainstream LLMs, we obtain model responses and rigorously annotate them for detailed evaluation. Our findings indicate that all the evaluated LLMs demonstrate relatively poor performance on Flames, particularly in the safety and fairness dimensions. We also develop a lightweight specified scorer capable of scoring LLMs across multiple dimensions to efficiently evaluate new models on the benchmark. The complexity of Flames has far exceeded existing benchmarks, setting a new challenge for contemporary LLMs and highlighting the need for further alignment of LLMs. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/AIFlames/Flames.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io