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03494713-4f0c-4f04-864a-f17416a19127 | https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-framework-for-water-resources-2025-water-for-growth-nature-and-a-resilient-future/12-further-evolution-of-water-resources-planning-national-framework-for-water-resources-2025 | 2,025 | [
"multi - sector water resources resilience",
"water level management planning",
"collaborative catchment management planning",
"land use change impact",
"sewerage system"
] | GOV.UK Environment Agency | The approach will build on this to automate extraction, collation, processing, and quality assurance of WRMP data. This will ensure a consistent and reproducible methodology, reduction of human error, and allows for automatic updates when new data becomes available. Further work is ongoing with the water industry and other regulators to identify and agree common planning scenarios to deliver greater consistency and efficiency in water resources planning. These could also be used for wider water planning with the water industry. There is strong support for this, with key opportunities for common scenarios identified on climate change, government demand policies, growth and environmental needs. We are looking to formalise and agree these during 2025 to enable the industry to adopt these in their next statutory water resources plans. Any common scenarios established will be included within the water resources planning guideline. For data external to the Environment Agency, the CaBA data hub provides a curated catalogue of data, maps and applications that support collaborative catchment management planning, including water resources planning. The data is presented to enable partnerships to identify issues and opportunities for collaborative action. 12.4 To deliver these plans and enable the wider inclusive work that supports them, regional groups need a sustainable source of Water companies have, so far, provided the majority of Water company Price Review constraints put in place to ensure that water company These sectors face many of the same challenges as water companies but are less equipped to plan for and manage water resources. To improve resilience and secure future water supplies across these sectors, planning and delivery of resource options is needed, which requires Some progress has been made for the agriculture sector. An package of around 2 million funded by Defra's Farming and Countryside Programme and the Ministry of Housing has enabled water resources planning activity to be enhanced and Local Resource Option studies to be applied to the agriculture sector in 2024/25 and in 2025/6. Some of this Supporting the growth of WAGs has enabled water resources planning and drought planning for agriculture to advance, it is not enough to provide for multi-sector water resources resilience that will meet societal need and government ambition. This includes: engagement and representation - engagement with and appropriate representation of non- PWS sectors in regional groups, including existing abstractor groups and aiding establishment of new local multi-sector abstractor groups environmental investigations - improving confidence in the amount of water needed to ensure that abstraction is environmentally sustainable across sectors and that the levels of investment needed to achieve this are robustly justified developing a methodology for planning and options - assessment of deficits and development of resource options to inform sector-based local and catchment-scale plans and deliver demand and supply-side solutions Regional group This includes: growth and economy (market) - a secure supply of water underpins every home and business in England. Ensuring the supply is resilient will allow water to be available for new housing developments, domestic food security, business and industry clean energy and technology - with new water using technologies developing at speed, such as data centres or hydrogen power generation, a resilient supply of water is key to our Net Zero commitments. The planning and delivery of efficient solutions now will avoid more expensive reactive costs in the future environment - multi-sector solutions are needed now in response to high levels of water stress, to prevent additional environmental degradation and relieve pressure on supplies and resilience. Regional oversight and links to integrated water management, such as through catchment planning, will bolster long-term water resources planning and help drive sustainable abstraction The Environment Agency commissioned an independent study to identify and review potential ways to sustainably fund non-public water supply (non- PWS ) water resources planning activity in regional groups (this supporting technical report is available as an appendix). The review recommended the following three main options for further consideration. 1. Abstraction licence charges scheme The Environment Agency uses charges raised from licensing abstractions of water from the environment to deliver water resources management services and key outcomes for the environment and society. Some repurposing of the charging scheme could allow This may involve reprioritisation of investment areas so that abstraction charges do not need to significantly increase to accommodate an additional use; instead, being partially reallocated towards multi-sector planning. 2. Long-term However, this option may not be stable or sustainable in the long-term due to changing policies and priorities within government. 3. Water company price review The Price Review allows for The option could be sustainable in the long-term, and regional multi-sector planning would form a modest component of the overall revenue raised. Questions would need to be answered as to whether money raised by water companies through customer charges could pay for the benefit of different sectors. There may also be restrictions in how water company revenue could be used by other sectors. To find the right Until a full They will need to prioritise efforts across catchments, sectors or technical areas. 12.5 Regional groups' role in drought planning and management Strong collaboration during drought is critical to successfully mitigate impacts on the environment and all society. The benefits of collaborating between and within sectors have been demonstrated during previous droughts - at a regional level by activities of WRSE and WRE , and at a national level through the National Drought Group. We know climate change will likely increase the frequency and severity of droughts, so it is even more important to strengthen the collaboration around drought at the regional level, to maximise its benefits. We have therefore set an expectation for regional groups to develop a drought statement of intent. This statement will clearly explain the role each regional group will take in both drought planning and management. | cc27e6b3-3081-4206-8057-8deda8f6b13d | 1 |
034b648b-0317-4034-b777-c0807c184d7a | https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/schedule/3/paragraph/11 | 2,008 | [
"statutory instrument",
"parliament",
"affirmative resolution procedure",
"majesty",
"u.k."
] | legislation.gov.uk | 11 (1) This paragraph applies to an Order in Council under paragraph 9 containing any provision that, were it to be made by regulations under this Part of this Act, would be subject to affirmative resolution procedure. U.K. (2) No recommendation is to be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order in Council to which this paragraph applies unless- (a) in the case of an Order in Council containing provision that may be made by the Secretary of State by regulations under this Part of this Act, a draft of the statutory instrument containing the Order in Council has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament, and (b) in the case of an Order in Council containing provision that may be made by a national authority other than the Secretary of State by regulations under this Part of this Act, a draft of the statutory instrument containing the Order in Council has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the relevant devolved legislature. | dd1fa666-e84a-42fa-8a3a-a845583f1890 | 0 |
034fcb1b-ac01-4a88-88b4-4bab28d2fde4 | 2,025 | [
"european union climate change policies",
"ambitious climate action",
"non - party stakeholders",
"spanish presidency council",
"society approach"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | SPANISH PRESIDENCY COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION climate change policies, plans, strategies, and action as well as in their climate finance.. Parties' actions alone will not suffice to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. What is needed is an economy-, systems-wide, whole-of-society approach that spurs creativity and innovation. Therefore, the GST outcome should capture actions of non-Party stakeholders (NPS) through transparent and robust commitments which allow for accountability, embrace NPS's know-how and capacity to mobilise for ambitious climate action, and enhance their participation in the design and implementation of domestic climate policies. | b8e40e11-7241-4479-ba55-77db6f21671c | 0 | |
03519ebe-7c3a-4f0c-82b5-e787db44786c | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009448/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain.pdf | 2,021 | [
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | The need to limit global warming to well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limiting to 1.5°C means the UK Government is committed to moving as far, and as fast, as possible. This is about the pace of change as
UK domestic transport emissions 20196 Domestic Transport Emissions MtCO2e
“Decarbonising Setting the Challenge”, published in March 2020, brought together existing work to reduce emissions across all forms of transport, and for the first time laid out the scale of the additional reductions needed to deliver transport’s contribution to legally binding carbon budgets and Sixteen months on, this plan sets out how we will deliver those emissions reductions and the associated benefits that will be realised from it across the UK. | 8f0273a5-decd-4a43-ab49-4f3473699e66 | 8 |
0354ad4c-c706-4ca5-a871-cb30a1483b58 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52000PC0884 | 2,000 | [
"Electricity and heat",
"Renewables",
"Renewables"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | [7] A4-0207/98. (7) In particular the Council in its Resolution of 8 June 1998 endorsed the objective of 12% of the gross inland consumption comprising electricity, heat and biofuels from renewable energy sources for the Community as a whole by 2010, as suggested in the White Paper and called for increased efforts at Community level as well as in Member States, bearing in mind the need to reflect different national circumstances. This Directive is therefore highly appropriate. A further Directive on biofuels from renewable energy sources should also be drawn up at some stage in the future. (8) In the White paper the indicative objective of 12% was translated into a specific share of consumption of electricity produced from renewable energy sources. Taking into account an updated scenario for electricity consumption as explained in this Directive, that indicative objective of 12% results in a 22.1% share of electricity produced from renewable energy sources. (9) A harmonised framework on electricity from renewable energy sources forms part of the Action Plan outlined in the White Paper. (10) The increased use of electricity from renewable energy sources constitutes an essential part of the package of measures needed to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, and in any policy package to meet further commitments. The net environmental effects of different renewable energy sources should be taken into account when implementing different measures. (11) The increased use of electricity from renewable energy sources is not only necessary to reduce greenhouse gases but also to reduce other harmful emissions such as emissions of SO2 and NOx. (12) The Council in its conclusion of 11 May 1999 [8] and the European Parliament in its Resolution of 26 May 1998 on electricity from renewable energy sources [9] have invited the Commission to submit a concrete proposal for a Community framework on access for electricity from renewable energy sources to the internal market. Furthermore, the European Parliament in its Resolution of 30 March 2000 on Electricity from renewable energy sources and the internal electricity market [10] underlined that binding and ambitious renewables targets at the national level are essential to results and to achieving the Community targets. [8] 8013/99. [9] A4-0199/98. [10] A5-0078/2000. (13) In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, general principles providing for a framework and objectives must be established at Community level, but their detailed implementation should be left to Member States, thus allowing each Member State to choose the regime which corresponds best to its particular situation. | 76cac7ac-830b-4291-a089-18321583a698 | 17 |
03580f55-17e0-4620-a6bc-ea65a51717f7 | https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/archives/MURE-Overall-Policy-Brochure.pdf | 2,000 | [
"Industry",
"Energy efficiency"
] | www.odyssee-mure.eu | The purpose of such
networks is to increase know-how and provide tools to increase energy efficiency at every
level of industrial firms through the exchange of information and knowledge. Approximately two thirds of the co-operative measures have been evaluated according to the
MURE database. Fifteen of the measures are in the high-impact category and eight in the
medium-impact category. The evaluation methods vary from enhanced engineering
estimates using monitoring results to a mix of top-down and bottom-up methods. However,
there are too few evaluations to draw any conclusions on typical methods, the level of results
or the degree of achievement of the targets established in the agreements. The results
should also be compared to the energy use of the branchbranches involved but this is not
possible based on MURE data. More detailed data can be found e.g. | 0a44b68e-44b8-4fcc-b398-2ce2c8fbc626 | 81 |
035941b7-1bf6-4b0e-a06a-3cc905ee0028 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | 4F non-fuel combustion (a) 50.00% (a) 50.00% High uncertainty reflects modelled assumptions and limited AD and is focussed in the EF parameter. UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 726 4G non-fuel combustion 1.00% 20.00% 1.00% 15.00% In order to assess the uncertainties for Forest Land a Monte Carlo analysis was performed using the CARBINE model. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 88 |
035a8e72-c16a-4df1-b60c-5aea67a7dd9c | https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/amendment-to-the-montreal-protocol-on-substances-that-deplete-the-ozone-layer-tre-160057/?type=treaty&xsubjects=General&xdate_max=2021&xdate_min=1900 | 2,016 | [
"energy",
"hfc",
"efficiency",
"freeze",
"objective",
"climate",
"adverse",
"modification",
"international",
"vehicle"
] | ecolex.org | Following seven years of negotiations, the 197 Montreal Protocol parties reached a compromise, under which developed countries will start to phase down HFCs by 2019. Developing countries will follow with a freeze of HFCs consumption levels in 2024, with some countries freezing consumption in 2028. By the late 2040s, all countries are expected to consume no more than 15-20 per cent of their respective baselines. (Source: http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=27086&ArticleID=36283&l=en) | f8c7faca-9341-4e27-9076-13870e97dfbe | 0 |
035bacf3-4be6-4825-934f-531d1b738872 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/budget-2021_c28084dfc4b588504fe4c17a6d60205c.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Cross Cutting Area",
"Finance",
"Banking",
"Green Bonds",
"Central Bank",
"government",
"support",
"billion",
"million",
"public"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | This means firms’ investments will be fully relieved after 10 years compared with the standard 33 ¹/³ years at the 3% rate available nationwide. This will be made available for corporation tax and income tax purposes. To qualify, the structure or building must be brought into use on or before 30 September 2026. • An enhanced capital allowance of 100% for companies investing in plant and machinery for use in Freeport tax sites in Great Britain, once designated. This will apply to both main and special rate assets, allowing firms to reduce their taxable profits by the full cost of the qualifying investment in the year it is made, and will remain available until • Full relief from Stamp Duty Land Tax on the purchase of land or property within Freeport tax sites in England, once designated. Land or property must be purchased and used for a qualifying commercial purpose. The relief will be available until 30 September • Full Business Rates relief in Freeport tax sites in England, once designated. Relief will be available to all new businesses, and certain existing businesses where they expand, until 30 September 2026. Relief will apply for five years from the point at which each beneficiary • Subject to Parliamentary process and approval, the government also intends to make an employer National Insurance contributions relief available for eligible employees in all Freeport tax sites from April 2022 or when a tax site is designated if after this date. This would be available until at least April 2026 with the intention to extend for up to a further five years to April 2031, subject to a review of the relief. 19 ‘UK Infrastructure Bank Policy & Design’, HM Treasury, March 2021. 2.116 Boosting Public Health England’s vaccine testing capacity – The government is investing £28 million to increase the UK’s capacity for vaccine testing and support for clinical trials.20 This investment in UK life sciences will boost Public Health England’s testing capacity and improve the UK’s ability to rapidly acquire samples of new variants of COVID-19. This will ensure that all parts of the UK are in the best position to secure access to appropriate successful vaccines as quickly as possible. 2.117 Centre for Process Innovation vaccine variant collaboration – The government is providing a further £5 million upfront investment in clinical-scale mRNA21 vaccine manufacturing to the Centre for Process Innovation in Darlington, on top of £9 million funding which has already been provided to develop their mRNA vaccine manufacturing capability and support mRNA process development. The funding will support the creation of a ‘library’ of mRNA vaccines for COVID-19 variants for possible rapid response deployment to allow the UK to get ahead of potential virus variants. This will enable development of a set of potential COVID-19 vaccine updates, similar to the way annual flu vaccine updates are developed. 2.118 New and expanded UK vaccine studies – The government is committing £22 million to fund the expansion of the world’s first trial of combining different vaccines as part of a two- dose regime. This will also fund the world’s first study assessing the effectiveness of a third dose of vaccine to improve the response against current and future variants of COVID-19. 2.119 Levelling Up Fund prospectus launch – The government is launching the prospectus for the £4.8 billion Levelling Up Fund alongside Budget.22 The Levelling Up Fund will invest in infrastructure that improves everyday life across the UK, including town centre and high street regeneration, local transport projects, and cultural and heritage assets. The prospectus will provide guidance to local areas on the process for submitting bids, the types of projects eligible for funding, and how bids will be assessed. To ensure that funding reaches the places most in need, the government has identified priority places based on an index of local need to receive capacity funding to help them co-ordinate their applications. 2.120 City and Growth Deals – The government is accelerating investment in three City and Growth Deals in Scotland (Ayrshire, Argyll and Bute, and Falkirk) and three City and Growth Deals in Wales (Swansea Bay, North-Wales and Mid-Wales). Over the next five years £84.5 million in funding will be brought forward to speed up investment in local economic priorities. The government also welcomes the signing of Heads of Terms for the Derry-Londonderry and Strabane City Deal on 24 February, to which it is contributing £105 million. The project proposals for this Deal focus on inclusive and sustainable growth and have the potential to create an additional 7,000 jobs. 20 This testing, Public Health England’s virus neutralising antibody (VNA) assay testing, plays a vital global role in developing vaccines against new 21 Messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines are a new class of vaccines which deliver the code for making a particular viral protein to our cells. Our cells then make the protein, and the immune system builds an immune response to the protein, protecting the body in the event of future infection. 22 'Levelling Up Fund Prospectus’, HM Treasury & Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, March 2021. 2.121 Towns Fund – The government is confirming over £1 billion from the Towns Fund for a further 45 Town Deals across England. | 51e4a741-ced6-4d30-9268-128e174fffe6 | 25 |
035e606b-e761-4371-b6cf-721af0a7dd06 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2104.13330v1 | 2,021 | [
"biochar",
"wine",
"cost",
"production",
"carbon"
] | arxiv.org | Biochar produced from wine industry waste was applied to 288 Hectares of vineyard, the maximum waste that can be collected in the BC wine industry. Each sector of the wine value chain is potentially profitable. The mean value chain NPV for the integrated biochar scenario is $19.3 million: $13.2 million for the biochar production segment, $864,725 for the vineyard segment, and $5.2 million for the winery segment. The probability of exceeding the break-even point (Benefit Cost ratio >1.0) is 99% for the biochar segment, 93% for the vineyard segment, and 100% for the winery segment. The amount of carbon that can be sequestered each year from wine industry waste is 9,000 tonnes, this is equivalent of removing 2,200 automobiles from the road. The implications for producing biochar as a profitable independent business are likely minimal compared to what could be achieved along the value chain. Biochar use as a soil amendment is a longterm investment for farmers with results best assessed after multiple years. Today's practices for grape growing and wine making are based primarily on grape quantity per acre, not the quality-quantity ratio
The overwhelming body of scientific evidence shows that global temperatures due to CO2 emissions from human industrial activity are increasing, and the rising temperature will have a significant impact on Canadian agriculture (USGCRP, 2017; Bush and Lemmen, 2019;Warren & Lemmen, 2014). Moreover, Canadian agricultural activity makes a significant contribution to Canada's greenhouse gas emissions (Pembina Institute, 2010). Governments are beginning to respond to the impact of climate change. The Canadian government is committed to becoming carbon neutral by 2050. This will involve developing programs that reduce CO2 emissions, using carbon offsets to compensate for ongoing CO2 emission activities, and investing in sequestration technologies that capture CO2 before it is released into the atmosphere (Government of Canada, nda). In British Columbia (BC), the provincial government has set targets to reduce GHG by 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050. To help achieve these targets the government had purchased 5.6 million tonnes of carbon offsets by 2017 (United Nations, nd). Canadian business is also moving to embrace carbon neutrality, even in its most carbon intensive oil and gas industries. These companies are adopting new processes and technology to reduce their carbon footprint. For example, Suncor Energy will invest $1.4 billion to construct a new power cogeneration plan that will remove 2.5 megatons of CO2 from their operations, and Shell Canada has built a carbon capture and storage facility that removes 4 million tonnes of CO2. Overall, Alberta oil and gas companies have reduced their GHG emissions by 28% per barrel of oil produced since 2000 (Government of Canada, ndb). We cannot reverse the impact of climate change, but we can take steps to adapt to these changes. The purpose of this study is to measure the benefits and costs of using carbon sequestration technology to reduce the B.C Wine Industry's carbon emissions. In this study, carbon sequestration refers to the process of capturing and storing atmospheric carbon dioxide in the soil2 . In British Columbia, the BC wine industry is taking a leadership role in climate change adaptation. Through its Sustainable Winegrowing BC program (SWBC), the industry is taking an aggressive approach to mitigating climate change. The industry has established two sustainability standards: the SWBC Vineyard Standard and the SWBC Wineries Standard. These standards form the basis of sustainability certification. The wineries certification program identifies seven standards:
1. Setting the sustainability foundation 2. Water efficiency and conservation 3. Energy efficiency and management 4. Responsible waste management 5. Climate action a. Reduced GHG emissions b. Safe and reduced use of hazardous substances c. Preparation for disasters and extreme weather events 6. Social equity 7. Eco-efficient and sustainable winery infrastructure (Sustainable Wineries SWBC Standard) This research project is focused on the Climate Action standard, specifically reducing GHG emissions. According to Budinis (2020), "achieving carbon neutrality, or "net zero," means that any CO2 released into the atmosphere from human activity is offset by an equivalent amount being removed." This means that achieving net-zero will require more than just reducing human CO2 emissions. It will also require the use of negative emissions technology (NETs) to remove existing CO2 from the atmosphere (Gasser, Guivarch, Tachiiri, Jones & Ciais, 2015). Globally, signatories to the Paris Climate Agreement are rapidly moving to reduce their CO2 emissions by replacing fossil fuel energy sources with renewable sources such as solar, wind power and hydrogen, and electrifying their transportation systems. Although the global adoption of NETs has been slower than for emissions reduction technology, these technologies already exist. The focus of this study is the removal and sequestration of CO2. Further, the analysis is based on the premise that useful products, with economic value, can be created from atmospheric CO2. Hepburn, Adlen, Beddington, Carter, Fuss, Mac Dowell, Minx, Smith & Williams (2019) discuss ten different pathways to create useful products for atmospheric CO2:
1. Chemicals from CO2 2. Fuels from CO2 3. Products from microalgae 4. Concrete building materials 5. CO2 -EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) 6. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 7. Enhanced weathering 8. Forestry techniques 9. Soil carbon sequestration techniques 10. Biochar A summary of each pathway is reproduced in Appendix A. Biochar production has been chosen for this study. Biochar will be produced from wine industry biomass waste (pomace and grape prunings) and then used as a soil amendment in the vineyard. The result is that atmospheric CO2 removed through photosynthesis is sequestered in the vineyard soils. Biochar is a form of charcoal and is very stable. It can remain in the soil for hundreds or thousands of years. Biochar is produced through the process of pyrolysis. Pyrolysis involves heating biomass in the absence of air or oxygen. Once the biomass is fed into the pyrolizer and ignited oxygen is removed from the chamber. Once initiated the process is exothermic and continues without further energy input until all the biomass is converted into finished products. | 470fa3cd-4de4-432d-a4ea-554111accb19 | 0 |
035e69ca-e30c-49bf-8bd4-e52bd25c7b20 | 2,025 | [
"water agencies",
"marine nature parks",
"state infrastructure",
"third parties",
"strategic intervention"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | The measure will be implemented by the following operators, in accordance with their strategic intervention or management guidelines: water agencies, French Office for Biodiversity (OFB) for the needs of the marine nature parks it manages and benefit of third parties responding to these calls for projects, national parks, Conservatory of the coastal area and lake shores, Center for studies and expertise on risks, the environment, mobility and planning (CEREMA), as well as by decentralized State services (for the benefit of third parties or on State infrastructure or works). Credits will be delegated to operators and decentralized services in early 2021. The actions that make up the measure are as follows: | bb82f74f-fb4b-434e-b147-17f0f4624dd7 | 0 | |
0360e633-e09d-4959-9128-9ade304af373 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 3.2. The reference to paragraph 3. of Annex 10 in paragraph 3.4.1. of Annex 8 to UNECE Regulation No 83 shall be under-
stood as reference to to Section B of Annex IX to this Regulation. 3.3. The references to hydrocarbons shall be read as total hydrocarbons in the following sections of Annex 8 to UNECE
Regulation No 83
Paragraph 2.4.1
Paragraph 5.1.1
L 19988
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
28.7.2008
ANNEX IX
SPECIFICATIONS OF REFERENCE FUELS
A. REFERENCE FUELS
1. Technical data on fuels for testing vehicles with positive-ignition engines
Type Petrol E5
Parameter
Unit
Limits 1
Minimum
Maximum
Test method
Research octane number, RON
95,0
EN 25164
Motor octane number, MON
85,0
EN 25163
Density at 15 C
kgm3
743
756
EN ISO 3675
prEN ISO 5163
prEN ISO 5164
Vapour pressure
Water content
Distillation
Evaporated at 70 C,
evaporated at 100 C,
evaporated at150 C,
final boiling point,
Residue
Hydrocarbon analysis
olefins,
aromatics,
benzene,
saturates,
Carbonhydrogen ratio
Carbonoxygen ratio
Induction period 2
Oxygen content 3
Existent gum
Sulphur content 4
Copper corrosion
Lead content
kPa
vv
vv
vv
vv
C
vv
vv
vv
vv
vv
EN ISO 12185
56,0
60,0
EN ISO 13016-1 DVPE
0,015
ASTM E 1064
24,0
48,0
82,0
190
3,0
29,0
44,0
60,0
90,0
EN-ISO 3405
EN-ISO 3405
EN-ISO 3405
210
EN-ISO 3405
2,0
EN-ISO 3405
13,0
35,0
1,0
ASTM D 1319
ASTM D 1319
EN 12177
ASTM 1319
Report
Report
Report
minutes
480
EN-ISO 7536
mm
mgml
mgkg
mgl
Report
EN 1601
0,04
EN-ISO 6246
10
EN ISO 20846
EN ISO 20884
Class 1
EN-ISO 2160
5
EN 237
28.7.2008
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 19989
Parameter
Phosphorus content 5
Ethanol 3
Unit
mgl
vv
Limits 1
Minimum
Maximum
4,7
1,3
5,3
Test method
ASTM D 3231
EN 1601
EN 13132
1 The values quoted in the specifications are true values. In establishment of their limit values the terms of ISO 4259 Petroleum
products Determination and application of precision data in relation to methods of test have been applied and in fixing a
minimum value, a minimum difference of 2R above zero has been taken into account in fixing a maximum and minimum value,
the minimum difference is 4R R reproducibility. Notwithstanding this measure, which is necessary for technical reasons, the
manufacturer of fuels shall nevertheless aim at a zero value where the stipulated maximum value is 2R and at the mean value in
the case of quotations of maximum and minimum limits. Should it be necessary to clarify whether a fuel meets the requirements
of the specifications, the terms of ISO 4259 shall be applied. 2 The fuel may contain oxidation inhibitors and metal deactivators normally used to stabilise refinery gasoline streams, but
detergentdispersive additives and solvent oils shall not be added. 3 Ethanol meeting the specification of EN 15376 is the only oxygenate that shall be intentionally added to the reference fuel. 4 The actual sulphur content of the fuel used for the Type 1 test shall be reported. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 308 |
03612cc5-c30c-44cc-be20-762ce37f8625 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.14209v1 | 2,021 | [
"population",
"growth",
"economic",
"countries",
"billion"
] | arxiv.org | Among individual countries, India will undergo the largest growth by 2050 in the baseline scenario (an increase of 366 million relative to 2015), followed by Nigeria (+139 million), Pakistan (+137 million), Ethiopia (+115 million), and Tanzania (+72 million) (Figure 4). The populations of thirty-seven countries are anticipated to shrink by 2050, countries whose current populations account for nearly a third of today's global total, including China (-89 million), Japan (-13 million), Russia (-10 million), Germany (-9.5 million), and Italy (-7.1 million). We have demonstrated a simple yet robust method for forecasting human population change, that is based on its empirical and theoretical relationships established with GDP per capita. Our method incorporates modelselection uncertainty and weighted forecasting, and it allows less-developed countries to "learn" from the experience of richer countries to ensure plausibility. Although not mechanistically causal, the model is intuitive, transparent, replicable, and anchored to historical data. The baseline scenario, which follows the GDP growth pattern in the business-asusual projection of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2, predicts a world population of 9.2 billion by 2050 and 8.5 billion by 2100, with a peak at 9.3 billion in 2062. In this scenario, the populations of all regions but Sub-Saharan Africa and all but the low-income group peak and decline this century. The distribution of population across nations and regions would change radically -in particular, currently Notably, the baseline forecast is markedly lower than the mid-range projections of the UN, which predicts 9.7 billion by 2050 and 10.9 by 2100, without a peak this century [1], and are instead more in line with that of IIASA and other earlier calculations [e.g., 29], which predicts 9.2 billion by 2050, a peak at 9.4 billion around 2070, and a 2100 population of 9.0 billion [12]. Given that we based our forecasting method on GPD-growth expectations, the accuracy of our baseline scenario depends on how closely SSP2 approximates future trends in world GDP, as well as the assumption that the historical relationships between population growth and GPD will continue to hold. The fact that our projection under this scenario resembles that of IIASA may in part be an artifact of similar assumptions of future socioeconomic development and IIASA's use of projected education, which is correlated with GDP, to predict population growth [39]. Our central finding is that the rate of economic growth will have substantial effects on 21st-century population trajectories. This results from the recurrent historical observation that countries consistently reach a stable equilibrium of low birth and death rates at higher income levels -which is embodied in the model as fixed fertility rates after a GDP per capita of $30,000. Without any economic growth after 2020, population is modelled to grow to 9.9 billion in 2050 and 15 billion in 2100, without a peak. With 50% higher annual growth than the baseline, the world population grows to 9 billion by 2050, peaks in 2056, and reaches, in 2100, a population about the same size as today, at 7.8 billion. We also find that GDP variations have an effect primarily at lower levels of income (Figure 3), which makes Sub-Saharan Africa the region with the most marked sensitivity to GDP growth rates (Figure 4). In short, how much the global population will grow this century depends greatly on realized levels of socioeconomic change, most especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic development is likely to be a causal driver of the demographic transition, as outlined in the introduction, via a slew of socio-economic mechanisms and interrelationships. As such, it is likely that policies and emergent societal changes driving economic development will result in lower population growth. However, economic development on its own is not the sole reason that population growth slows. Its partial dependencies, including education and family planning, also act to drive a slowdown in population growth [9,40,41].While growing economies are better able to fund these services, they can also be expanded independently of economic development. Female empowerment and gender equality have also been identified as important factors at the intersection of demographic and economic change [25,42]. The environmental consequences of different economic futures are ambiguous. Lower population, all else being equal, lowers environmental impacts [10]. However, low population, as our results suggest, is associated with higher per-capita incomes, which drive increased per-capita environmental impacts such as greenhouse-gas emissions [43]. Economic growth is also bidirectionally associated with innovation [44], and could as such lead to development and deployment of less environmentally destructive technologies [45]. Since these trends offset each other, the net effect is not clear. Our methodology has an arguable advantage over other approaches to population projection in being simple and largely phenomenological and is therefore easily understood and grounded in real-world data. Equally, however, our conclusions come with qualifications. First, caution is merited in interpreting the projections beyond 2050, given that our model parameterization is based on 65 years of data whereas the end year of our forecast is 85 years into the future. Second, while our method for drawing on richer countries' historical experience in creating the models for poorer countries makes our forecasts far more plausible (without it, some countries may see negative fertility rates, for example) compared to timeseries models fitted only to historical trajectories, this does involve the assumption that poor countries will follow generally in the footsteps of countries with higher GDP levels. That said, this is the sort of assumption that is virtually unavoidable in any population forecast and is also invoked, within a Bayesian framework, in the UN forecasts [37,46]. It may appear that some of our GDP scenarios are unrealistic, thereby undermining the plausibility of the population trajectories they predict. However, since we set a floor on fertility rates after a GDP per capita of $30,000, even seemingly unlikely GDP trajectories do not necessarily generate implausibly low population projections. | 87b8c744-5130-4ccb-8099-068778e5250d | 3 |
0365e41f-3f13-400a-98ea-b9f13c57d0f2 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/carbon-budget-delivery-plan_19fa3072ff04d7abab9199e50abfb92c.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Economy-wide",
"policy",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"energy",
"support"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | We manage this by planning on taking one project to FID this Parliament and two projects in the next Parliament, legislating in 2022 for the Regulated Asset Base, setting up Great British Nuclear and taking forward Sizewell C. Further action to mitigate risk includes work on a nuclear siting consultation as a first step towards a new National Policy Statement for nuclear; implementing the Action Plan published last month for reforming the planning process for all nationally significant infrastructure; and exploring the potential for streamlining the planning process further. In addition, the government has launched Great British Nuclear (GBN) which will be funded to lead delivery of our programme of new nuclear projects. The first priority for GBN is to launch a competitive process to select the best small modular reactors (SMR) technologies. We will also be exploring the research and development of advanced modular reactors (AMRs) and fusion. 7. Currently the UK relies heavily on unabated gas to provide flexibility in the electricity system. Reducing emissions in the power sector will also depend on bringing forward flexible technologies that are capable of replicating the role of unabated gas in the electricity system. These include technologies such as power CCUS, hydrogen to power, and energy storage. To boost confidence and funding clarity for CCUS we are taking forward Track 1 negotiations including one power CCUS project; setting out plans for Track 2 and expansion of Track 1 clusters; and setting out a longer-term vision to give investors, industry and regulators clarity on our 2030s approach. For hydrogen to power we intend to consult on the need and potential design options for market intervention and we will develop appropriate policy to enable investment in large scale long duration storage by 2024. We are also taking forward actions set out in the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan. This includes legislating for enabling powers in the Energy Security Bill and consulting on proposals for a Secure and Smart 8. Power BECCS is a technology that can deliver both low carbon generation to support the decarbonisation of the power sector, as well as negative emissions. To support the deployment of power BECCS the government is developing
Power BECCS business models to incentivise negative emissions and power 9. Industry is a major source of CO2 emissions. Industrial sectors in 2021 produced 18% (76 Mt CO2e) of UK emissions, with just over half of these emissions concentrated in specific ‘clusters’ – geographical areas with large concentrations of industry. We set out a plan to decarbonise industry in the Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy (2021) and in the Net Zero Strategy. 10. Our ambitions are stretching to achieve. To de-risk delivery we are looking at what could be delivered with further government action on resource and energy efficiency, fuel switching and CCUS. We increased our ambition in the Net Zero Strategy to capture and store industrial emissions (from 3 MtCO2 per year to 6 MtCO2 by 2030, and to 9 MtCO2 per year by 2035); are now committed to delivering more fuel switching to low carbon alternatives, with our initial ambition to replace around 20 TWh of fossil fuels per year by 2030 – potentially increasing to 50 TWh per year by 2035; and decarbonising the iron and steel sector in the 2020s and early 2030s. We are also developing proposals for industry through the Energy Efficiency Taskforce, as part of the 15% reduction in energy use target, which will increase delivery confidence for industrial energy efficiency and resource efficiency. 11. A lot of our efforts are focused on major industrial clusters, which account for just over half of total industry emissions, and less on support for remaining emissions in more ‘dispersed’ industrial sites. To address this, we have launched the Local Industrial Decarbonisation Plan (LIDP) to allow industries outside industrial clusters to develop strategic plans to decarbonise. Plans will be reviewed to ensure they continue to present value for money and are delivering on the carbon savings expected. 12. Many industries continue to highlight carbon leakage as a risk preventing investment. We are addressing this by ensuring there is a clear plan for carbon leakage mitigation that gives industry confidence to invest ahead of upcoming 13. The delivery of the industrial decarbonisation pathway is heavily reliant on new and emerging technologies, alongside significant investment. This is a long-term package that will be adapted as our understanding of the technical and economic potential for industrial decarbonisation continues to develop. 14. We have an ambition to have up to 10GW low carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030, subject to affordability and value for money, with at least half of that coming from electrolysis. Growing the sector from an extremely low starting point naturally entails challenges in either high hydrogen or high 15. Hydrogen production alone will not generate emissions savings, but we expect it to enable emissions savings in several sectors including industry, power, transport and potentially buildings by replacing high-carbon fuels used today. 16. Policies intended to meet this stretching 2030 ambition and contribute towards CB6 carry delivery risks, some of which are inevitable given pace and scale of deployment. We have higher certainty in the delivery and funding of some policies in the near term, having launched the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund, Hydrogen Production Business Model, and the Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard. Confidence should grow as government and industry action provides clarity on long term funding, production, and legislating for Transport and Storage 17. Up to 50% of the 2030 hydrogen production ambition depends on Carbon Capture Use and Storage (CCUS), which carries delivery risks which could materially affect the successful delivery of the associated carbon savings for 2030. Progress on Track 1, Track 1 Expansion and Track 2 plans provide significant mitigation for these risks. 18. The oil and gas sector continues to make good progress in decarbonising in line with North Sea Transition Deal (NSTD) for upstream; and steady progress on the midstream gas approach. | f1206e39-e30b-4828-a2d4-296506ac6fd1 | 44 |
0369d366-329e-44e3-ae9a-254053d1ce1c | 2,025 | [
"greenhouse gas emissions inventory",
"prague",
"energy efficiency",
"national action plan",
"trade"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | The basic sources of data for compilation of greenhouse gases projections were the following documents: 1. Greenhouse gas emissions inventory of the Czech Republic 2017, CHMI, Prague, April 3. National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency for the Czech Republic (NEEAP IV), Ministry of Industry and Trade, February 2016. | 263d3cb9-8d0f-4539-92ec-525f3c7a9aa2 | 0 | |
036a4497-c30b-4430-b334-e65fe6126295 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | presented in IPCC categories, which is consistent with the reporting format used within this submission to the UNFCCC, but we recommend that these estimates should only be considered
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 743 1A1a 205,265 56,239 54,578 57,920 3.0% -73% -75% -70% 1A1b 17,866 11,101 9,626 12,660 13.7% -38% -62% -15% 1A1c 16,419 12,745 12,485 13,046 2.2% -22% -37% -7% 1A2a 3,653 1,169 1,114 1,225 4.8% -68% -74% -62% 1A2b 4,371 695 660 731 5.1% -84% -103% -66% 1A2c 12,331 5,093 4,831 5,358 5.2% -59% -67% -51% 1A2d 4,694 1,322 1,246 1,400 5.8% -72% -83% -62% 1A2e 7,885 4,110 3,897 4,327 5.2% -48% -55% -41% 1A2f 6,695 2,520 2,237 2,812 11.4% -62% -86% -40% 1A2g 35,986 28,728 27,394 30,060 4.6% -20% -28% -12% 1A3a 1,895 906 730 1,083 19.5% -52% -74% -31% 1A3b 111,756 100,592 98,854 102,376 1.8% -10% -12% -8% 1A3c 1,474 1,567 1,321 1,816 15.8% 6% -17% 29% 1A3d 7,711 4,921 4,046 5,784 17.7% -36% -55% -18% 1A3e 99 131 110 152 16.2% 32% 6% 59%
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 744 1A4a 28,683 19,119 18,503 19,746 3.3% -33% -43% -26% 1A4b 80,540 68,554 65,854 71,311 4.0% -15% -20% -10% 1A4c 5,077 5,928 4,074 7,775 31.2% 17% -34% 63% 1A5b 5,349 1,584 1,469 1,698 7.2% -70% -78% -62% 2B3 17,729 - - - n/a -100% -100% -100%
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 745 3F 261 - - - n/a -100% -100% -100% 4 273 153 51 360 101.4% -44% -182% 58%
UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 746 4F - - - - n/a n/a n/a n/a 817,297 430,594 420,684 441,909 2.5% -47% -53% -43% very similar but not identical to the emission estimates in the inventory. The Executive Summary of this NIR and the accompanying CRF tables present the agreed national GHG emissions and removals reported to the UNFCCC. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 136 |
036c3827-8047-43d9-9b48-887b91aa7779 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2024/united-kingdom-biennial-transparency-report-btr1_0e77f9e4d928e6e9d64ea26cd95945e1.pdf | 2,024 | [
"climate",
"change",
"emissions",
"energy",
"government"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The UK is the sole funder of the Risk-informed Early Action Partnership (REAP)398, an initiative launched in 2019 that brings together relevant actors from the development, humanitarian and climate communities on the Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) agenda. REAP provides international analysis, evidence, learning, coordination, and debate, to integrate and expand a systemic shift towards acting earlier to reduce the impacts of disasters, with the target of making 1 billion people The UK recognises that SIDS are on the frontline of climate change and are uniquely climate and economically vulnerable. The UK’s Small Island Developing State Capacity and Resilience (SIDAR) programme, and the Sustainable Blue Economies programme, both launched in 2022, will support access to climate finance and the development of prosperous ocean-based economies. The UK supports Least Developed Countries (LDCs) • Chairing the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiative (CREWS), 399 • Supporting the Least Developed Countries Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR)400 programme since 2020. The government is also assisting in building resilience locally, the Weather and Climate Information Services (WISER)401 programme enables communities and governments to better anticipate and prepare for climate shocks and stresses, reducing their impact and protecting lives, homes and livelihoods. To date, WISER has helped to avoid over £200 million worth of losses in East Africa through application of climate information and helped to improve the resilience of over 8 million people who use WISER services. Additionally, WISER in the Middle East and North Africa aims to deliver transformation in the generation and use of co-produced weather and climate services to support decision making at local, national, and 3.21.1 Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) Thematic target 6 - The UK has been a leading supporter and contributor to several climate finance programmes internationally that have embedded gender inclusion within their design and combine both gender mainstreaming and gender focussed programming. For 400 Supporting the LDC Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) 401 Weather and Climate Information Services (WISER)
The UK has been the leading supporter to date of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Climate Finance Network (CFN), which has a dedicated workstream on Gender and Social Inclusion and Climate Change Finance and supports the network’s countries in integrating gender and social inclusion into climate change planning and budgeting processes. The UK has also worked to build women's and girl's climate resilience through investment in more inclusive core and shock-responsive social protection. Through the Better Assistance in Crisis (BASIC) and Gender-responsive Social Protection (GSP) programmes we are providing technical assistance and expertise to support partners on how to ensure social protection systems and interventions can respond to climate risks and the differential needs of women and girls, in the COVID-19 3.22 Strengthening scientific research and knowledge related (i) Climate, including research and systematic observation and early warning systems, to inform climate services and decision-making; (ii) Vulnerability and adaptation; (iii) Monitoring and Research and information sharing are integral to building capability. Increased awareness of climate risks will improve risk management plans and enable the public, businesses and other organisations to make more informed decisions. This is why the government is supporting and funding several innovative research Under the UK’s COP26 Presidency, we launched the Adaptation Research Alliance (ARA)402, a global coalition of over 180 organisations across the spectrum – from research to action – from 60 economies. The ARA supports action-oriented research that informs adaptation solutions and reduces risks from climate change at the scale and urgency demanded by the science. The Climate Adaptation and Resilience (CLARE) programme403 is a UK-Canada framework research programme on climate adaptation and resilience, aiming to enable socially inclusive and sustainable action to build resilience to climate change and natural hazards in Africa and Asia-Pacific. Bridging critical gaps between science and action, CLARE develops new tools and supports partner governments, communities, and the private sector to use evidence and innovation to drive effective solutions to the climate challenge, whilst building the capacity of both those carrying out the research and those using the resulting 402 403
3.22.1 Policy innovation and pilot projects. The government has committed to support world-leading science and evidence, such as the UK Climate Projections and jointly fund a £15 million UK Research and Innovation/Defra programme to support the research and innovation needed to As part of UK Research and Innovation's 'building a secure and resilient world’ and ‘building a green future’ strategic themes, the Maximising UK Adaptation to Climate Change (MACC) programme will identify the skills, standards and data provision needed to increase adaptation capability across government and wider society. The MACC programme will build capacity, knowledge, and skills that will offer practical and scalable solutions to meet the UK’s challenges in the face of a changing climate and put the UK at the forefront of climate adaptation strategies at both the local and national level. The programme will also fund transdisciplinary research to collaborate and facilitate two-way transfer of knowledge between research, policy and other end users to drive transformation, helping the UK to adapt to climate change, focusing on four • theme societies’ exposure and vulnerability to extreme climate hazards • theme adaptation solutions • theme future resilience and decision making • theme enablers of adaptation UK government investment in climate services helps to provide information for the public and businesses. Evidence from a range of studies suggests that weather and climate services, including early warning systems, can lead to economic benefit-cost ratios of around 9:1, arising from the information used to improve decision making.404 Supported by this investment, the Met Office Hadley Centre delivers world-leading evidence on climate variability to better inform decision-making, including the UK Climate Projections. | 2ae0b548-ef04-451f-aba3-617d0f3c41f8 | 219 |
0375e9fc-46db-4869-9df3-b95287baf390 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 1. 2 OJ L 375, 27.12.2006, p. 223. 9. mono fuel vehicle means a vehicle that is designed to run
primarily on one type of fuel
28.7.2008
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 1993
10. mono fuel gas vehicle means a mono fuel vehicle that pri-
marily runs on LPG, NGbiomethane, or hydrogen but may
also have a petrol system for emergency purposes or starting
only, where the petrol tank does not contain more than
15 litres of petrol
21. secondary air means the air introduced into the exhaust sys-
tem by means of a pump or aspirator valve or other means
that is intended to aid in the oxidation of HC and CO con-
tained in the exhaust gas stream
11. bi fuel vehicle means a vehicle with two separate fuel stor-
age systems that can run part-time on two different fuels and
is designed to run on only one fuel at a time
12. bi fuel gas vehicle means a bi fuel vehicle that can run on
petrol and also on either LPG, NGbiomethane or hydrogen
22. driving cycle, in respect of vehicle OBD systems, consists of
engine start-up, driving mode where a malfunction would be
detected if present, and engine shut-off
23. access to information means the availability of all vehicle
OBD and vehicle repair and maintenance information,
required for the inspection, diagnosis, servicing or repair of
the vehicle. 13. flex fuel vehicle means a vehicle with one fuel storage sys-
tem that can run on different mixtures of two or more fuels
24. 14. flex fuel ethanol vehicle means a flex fuel vehicle that can
run on petrol or a mixture of petrol and ethanol up to an
85 ethanol blend E85
15. flex fuel biodiesel vehicle means a flex fuel vehicle that can
run on mineral diesel or a mixture of mineral diesel and
biodiesel
16. hybrid electric vehicle HEV means a vehicle that, for the
purpose of mechanical propulsion, draws energy from both
of the following on-vehicle sources of stored energypower
a a consumable fuel
b battery, capacitor, flywheelgenerator or other electrical
energypower storage device
17. properly maintained and used means, for the purpose of a
test vehicle, that such a vehicle satisfies the criteria for accep-
tance of a selected vehicle laid down in section 2 of Appen-
dix 1 to Annex II
18. emission control system means, in the context of the OBD
system, the electronic engine management controller and any
emission-related component in the exhaust or evaporative
system which supplies an input to or receives an output from
this controller
19. malfunction indicator MI means a visible or audible indi-
cator that clearly informs the driver of the vehicle in the
event of a malfunction of any emission-related component
connected to the OBD system, or of the OBD system itself
20. malfunction means the failure of an emission-related com-
ponent or system that would result in emissions exceeding
the limits in section 3.3.2 of Annex XI or if the OBD system
is unable to fulfil the basic monitoring requirements set out
in Annex XI
deficiency means, in the context of the OBD system, that up
to two separate components or systems which are monitored
contain temporary or permanent operating characteristics
that impair the otherwise efficient OBD monitoring of those
components or systems or do not meet all of the other
detailed requirements for OBD
25. deteriorated replacement pollution control device means a
pollution control device as defined in Article 311 of Regu-
lation EC No 7152007 that has been aged or artificially
deteriorated to such an extent that it fulfils the requirements
laid out in Section 1 to Appendix 1 to Annex XI of UNECE
Regulation No 83
26. vehicle OBD information means information relating to an
on-board diagnostic system for any electronic system on the
vehicle
27. reagent means any product other than fuel that is stored
on-board the vehicle and is provided to the exhaust after-
treatment system upon request of the emission control
system
28. mass of the vehicle in running order means the mass
described in point 2.6 of Annex I to Directive 200746EC
29. engine misfire means lack of combustion in the cylinder of
a positive ignition engine due to absence of spark, poor fuel
metering, poor compression or any other cause
30. cold start system or device means a system which tempo-
rarily enriches the airfuel mixture of the engine thus assist-
ing the engine to start
31. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 6 |
037a6468-4fc7-4447-aff1-afbe10444b63 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/642542ae60a35e000c0cb148/nature-markets.pdf | 2,023 | [
"nature",
"additional",
"markets",
"page"
] | www.gov.uk | These can enable potential buyers and sellers to readily identify opportunities and prices in the market, allow aggregation of credits for sales (enabling smaller farmers and land and coastal managers to enter the market) and reduce the costs of doing business. The UK government and relevant domestic regulators will consider the outcomes of market integrity initiatives, such as the Integrity Council on Voluntary Carbon Markets (IC-VCM) and Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative (VCMI) and consult on next steps, seeking views on the role of specific government and regulatory interventions to enable the growth of high-integrity voluntary markets, maximising synergies between carbon and nature markets where appropriate. To highlight best practice guidance for gathering and reporting environmental data, in the third quarter of 2023 the UK government will test with stakeholders updates to the Environmental Reporting Guidelines (ERG), which provide voluntary environmental reporting guidance for UK organisations. Supporting market development through Nature markets are at an early stage and the scale of market expansion HMG is looking to achieve, as well as the levels of innovation taking place, mean that there is great potential for learning. We are committed to policy development based on continuous learning, and to sharing lessons to support markets to grow faster and in As set out above we will take a phased approach to market development. We will undertake regular reviews to assess the effectiveness of policy and identify further steps required, and will engage on any changes, new policies or regulation to enable market actors to respond in good time before any changes take effect. We will provide a further update within 12 months. To inform this work and future support for market development, we will continue to support and learn from innovation, and gather the evidence we need to inform policy development. Key innovative programmes are the ELM Tests and Trials programme; the Landscape Recovery pilots; and the Natural Environment Investment Readiness Through the first round of Landscape Recovery pilots, Defra is working closely with 22 projects that consist of farmers, land managers, and other organisations to develop innovative long-term agreements. These agreements will leverage both public and private investment to deliver ambitious environmental outcomes. The second round of Landscape Recovery will take forward up to 25 projects. The ELM Tests and Trials have provided a space to test mechanisms and innovative approaches to supporting the blending of public and private finance. Our tests and trials look at a range of challenges and opportunities, including how to set payment rates for environmental outcomes; evaluating the role of intermediaries; trialling governance models and examining contract structures. The Natural Environment Investment Readiness Fund (NEIRF) is funding the development of a pipeline of nature projects suitable for private sector investment. 86 NEIRF projects have been supported to trial new nature markets and monetise revenues from a range of ecosystem services. Projects collaborate in a Community of Practice coordinated by the Environment Agency, regularly sharing learning, and lessons will also be shared through public facing platforms such as the Green Finance Institute (GFI) Hive initiative and the Ecosystems Knowledge Network. Green Finance Institute (GFI) Hive’s Investment Readiness Toolkit The GFI Hive works with the finance sector, government, academia, environmental NGOs and land managers to identify and unlock barriers to private investment in nature restoration, nature-based solutions and nature-positive outcomes in the UK. It acts as a knowledge hub on private investment in nature to share learning, best practices and investment appetite. The Investment Readiness Toolkit is an online framework that takes nature-based project developers and enterprises along a path to ‘Investment Readiness’. The eight stages are shown below, and can be explored through an interactive website with an explanation of each stage, a checklist of activities developers should consider, useful links and case studies for to each milestone. The toolkit has been developed based on learning from projects across the UK, including those in the Natural Environment Investment Readiness Fund, and is updated regularly as this learning develops and as case studies are added. See We are committed to ensuring that market policy builds on a strong evidence base, and to monitoring and analysing the operation of markets as they grow to ensure that we are taking the right approach. We will gather and generate evidence to ensure that market schemes (for example credit issuers), market infrastructure (for example data systems) and rules (for example for stacking) are designed in ways that will best meet our principles and achieve our vision. We will also regularly evaluate individual schemes and the operation of the market as a whole, to assess whether incentives are working to produce high levels of investment and deliver maximum improvements to nature. Details of notable upcoming evaluations are provided in Annex 2. An important part of monitoring market development will be to understand the social impacts that nature markets may have. These impacts are likely to be different for different stakeholders, for example both the Rock Review and ELM Tests and Trials
for the ELM programme have found barriers to tenant farmers being able to engage We also recognise that our partners have knowledge and experience that will help us shape priorities. We will work closely with the Devolved Administrations to further develop our approaches in support of a UK-wide market. | 108b6a50-5829-4eca-ab6e-5c261dbf61c9 | 10 |
038bf7f2-a854-4b21-a351-2e017b349699 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | As regards data scope and limitations, the CTS covers all cattle births, movements and deaths in Great Britain from 28 September 1998; all farmers must use the system for all bovine animals for the beef to be traceable and hence the CTS data are highly complete (it is essentially a census) except for instances where animals may be in transit or at vets or market on specific days. The CTS does not cover Northern Ireland which has a separate tracing system in place; the Inventory Agency obtains equivalent cattle data from Northern Ireland government. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 361 |
038cc29e-65c1-49e4-827a-8bc8490102e6 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1118383/ccus-roadmap.pdf | 2,022 | [
"ccus",
"carbon",
"support",
"business",
"industry"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity Carbon capture and storage is “a necessity, not an option” for the UK’s ambition to transition to net zero by 2050 The UK is well placed to lead in CCUS globally o A worldwide reputation as an international centre of • Extensive experience from the oil, gas and • Substantial CO2 storage potential and industrial infrastructure e.g. gas network The UK is a first mover; we will support the establishment of at least two low carbon CCUS clusters by the mid- 2020s and a further two by 2030 through which we aim to 2CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity
■ Most active and deepest capital ■ 2nd in G20 for ease of doing business ■ 0% dividend withholding tax rate, as part of wider competitive tax regime Agreement post EU exit allows zero tariff market access with the EU ■ Further UK Free Trade Agreements enable exports to the rest of the world ■ Super-Deduction - A new 130% first- year capital allowance for qualifying The UK has one of the world’s most attractive 3CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity
■ Global UK is in the top 5 the largest potential CO2 storage ■ Project Funding for hydrogen production projects will be announced later this year and CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity
Industrial clustersUK Gov. funding Critical activities and milestones on a path to developing the UK CCUS sector Track-1 Cluster Sequencing process Track-1 negotiations with transport and storage companies and emitters Second Cluster Sequencing development, launch, negotiations and construction Announcement of shortlisted CO2 emitters that will proceed to negotiations Launch £140m Industrial Decarbonisation & Hydrogen Revenue Support scheme Publication of T&S, ICC and power CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity
CCUS is crucial to decarbonisation in the UK CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity 6 The role of CCUS in the UK’s transition to net zero We will ensure a second lease of life for the North Sea in low-carbon technologies Delivering on our £1bn commitment to 4 CCUS clusters by 2030, with the first two sites selected in the North East and North West currently proceeding through By 2050, emissions associated with industry could need to fall by around 90% compared to 2018. Industrial CCUS will be fundamental to this The North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA) are the regulator for the storage of CO2 on the UK Continental Shelf. When it receives an application for a storage permit, the NSTA is required by law to ensure (amongst other requirements) that the storage complex and surrounding area have been sufficiently characterised and assessed to ensure there is no significant risk of leakage. Power CCUS can provide non-weather dependent, dispatchable low carbon generation. This will be vital alongside system flexibility and energy storage to support a fully decarbonised The North Sea Transition Deal will commit to deliver investment of up to £14-16bn by 2030 in new energy technologies, of which £2-3bn is allocated to CCUS, £2-3bn to electrification and
The UK’s world class skills and infrastructure are gearing up to the transition capabilities from existing UK industries international centre of engineering excellence and world leading in the oil, gas, and petrochemicals sector infrastructure projects and investing in shared offshore infrastructure ■ Deep knowledge of subsurface 7CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity
Government and industry working together Collaborating to deliver CCUS in the UK What we are delivering What we look to industry to deliver ■ Set ambitious capture targets to support our long term ambition to get to net zero by 2050 ■ Set up the Cluster Sequencing process to establish CCUS deployment in the UK to decarbonise industrial clusters ■ Launched funding streams to support CCUS deployment ■ Establish two operational industrial clusters by the ■ The sector will invest £2-3bn to build the Transport & Storage infrastructure to help capture 20-30MtCO2 per year of carbon ■ Incentivising scale up and promoting reliability through developing investable business models to provide long term revenue certainty and addressing ‘cross chain’ risk, and creating a regulated asset base ■ Initial drafting of CCUS Network Code, guided by government and driven by industry, enabling the development of network ■ Support the development of the CCUS Network Code ■ Support the government to develop business models ■ Developing our green jobs and skills offer and reforming the skills system to ensure the development of key capabilities ■ Identify and support the rapid growth of competitive new capabilities to meet future energy needs ■ Create skilled, long-term jobs and a diverse workforce, demonstrating how they will fill any skills gaps Supply chains ■ Published supply chain roadmap setting out how government and industry can work together to harness the power of a strong, industrialised supply chain ■ Working through the Energy Supply Chains Taskforce and CCUS Council to identify UK supply chain strengths ■ Build up robust transparent supply chains, with emphasis on local skills and capacity development ■ Share information on supply chain development CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity 8
Establishing a long term CCUS market CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity 9 What we have done What we are doing What we committed to Cluster as Track-1 clusters with ■ Selecting the projects that will ■ Work with industry to achieve one net zero industrial cluster by ■ Announced Cluster Sequencing eligible projects (power ■ Engaging with industry on the ■ Support Track-1 clusters to be Deploying CCUS in the UK through industrial clusters
What we have done What we are doing What we committed to ■ Announced £1bn CIF to support the ■ Committed up to £40m of the CIF to support design work for offshore storage and onshore infrastructure through Industrial Decarbonisation Challenge, which is providing up to The final design of the CIF will develop alongside the Cluster Sequencing process, the design of the business models and the finalisation of related £1bn CIF to support the capital costs of strategic CCUS infrastructure, helping to create ‘SuperPlaces’ in areas such as the North East, the Humber, North West, Southern England, Scotland and Set up the £140m IDHRS scheme to fund our new hydrogen and industrial carbon capture business models We will announce a funding envelope in 2022 that will enable us to award the first contracts to CCUS-enabled hydrogen and industrial carbon capture £140m to accelerate hydrogen projects and industry adoption of carbon Consulted on the design of the NZHF and split the funding in 4 strands We are aiming to open the first funding window for Strands 1 and 2 in Spring 2022, with a potential of a further funding window in 2023/24. We intend to open strand 3 in summer 2022 Up to £240m, delivered between 2022 - 2025, to support new H2 production in Providing capital and revenue funding to support CCUS deployment Establishing a long term CCUS market CCUS Investor Capturing Carbon and a Global Opportunity 10
What we have done What we are doing What we committed to ■ Developed the DPA which builds on the UK’s expertise in Contracts for Difference for renewable energy. The DPA aims to provide long term revenue certainty and a stable investment environment for developers ■ Publishing DPA full contract in Spring 2022 and consulting to further understand industry perspectives. Engaging industry later in 2022 with a call for evidence for future policy ■ A competitive allocation process in the 2020s for the next phase of Power CCUS deployment. Support at least one Power CCUS project for delivery decarbonised power system by 2035 ■ Developed the TRI business model which supports stable investment by providing investors with a clear sight of the long-term revenue model for accommodate different potential network designs and growth profiles Working towards confirming a regulator and establishing a licensing regime. Developing economic licences, T&S industry. | f79c4fb7-86f4-456c-b0f2-0901a99263ab | 0 |
038db4b3-3705-4cc9-bc7f-7749c71e766a | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/?uri=CELEX:51999PC0296 | 2,000 | [
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | The efficiency requirements of the present proposal have been based on cost/benefit analysis and on discussions with industry. Moreover in December 1998 CELMA declared that manufacturers are happy with the proposed levels.(19) Study on \"Cost Benefit Analysis of the Implementation of Minimum Efficiency Standards for Fluorescent Lamp Ballasts\" carried out by the Building Research Establishment, United Kingdom (Final Report September 1996).(20) The study recommended a scenario with the following implementation schedule: ban on ballast class D from 1 January 1998 followed by bans on ballast class C and B2 from 1 January 2003. Industry endorsed the following scenario: a ban of ballast class D from 1 January 1998 followed by bans on ballast class C from 1 January 2003 and of ballasts class B2 from 1 January 2008.To minimize the impact on manufactures, a phased approach is foreseen, associated with long transition periods before the entry into force of each level of minimum efficiency requirements. The first level of the present proposal is envisaged to phase out class D (\"high-loss\") ballasts and to come into force one year after the adoption of the Directive (assuming adoption by 1.1.2001, it will come into force on 1.1.2002). A one-year transition period is judged consistent with the small investments and adaptations needed to meet the first step. After three years (1.1.2005) a second efficiency step is envisaged to come into force, by which the class C (\"conventional\") ballasts will be phased out. As these ballasts represent the bulk of the actual market, considerable time has been allowed for this step. In particular, taking into account that manufacturers agreed to such a step during the beginning of 1996 (21), this represents a very long transition time. The third and final step of the proposal will then be implemented after a further three years (1.1.2008) and will be based on the then present market situation, in particular on the price of electronic ballasts (classes A1, A2, A3 ) and the most efficient magnetic ballast on the market (class B1). As the market might change considerably in response to the introduction of the first two levels, it is proposed to analyse the technical and market situation again at the time of the entry into force of the second level.(21) \"We would like to fix our attention on an hypothesis of a realistic timing for a gradual conversion to more energy efficient ballasts. | 32052901-ad2a-47ed-b5cf-9f7be7d4370f | 5 |
03921c9c-efc8-4c57-bfd6-0fc5928f0436 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Transport",
"Co-benefits",
"Cycling",
"Climate Finance",
"Public Transport",
"Freight",
"EVs",
"Shipping",
"Aviation",
"Walking",
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Reducing the embodied emissions associated with transport, for example, the materials used in construction and the manufacture of vehicles, is being informed by the Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy, and Defra’s upcoming review of the End-of- Life Vehicles Regulations. In Defra’s 2021 Waste Prevention Programme, government also set out plans to explore means of increasing reuse, repair and remanufacture, in addition to design considerations such as light weighting, to further reduce waste and emissions in respect of road vehicles. | b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77 | 28 |
039833fa-8975-45be-9f8f-ead1858e97d9 | https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-review-and-autumn-statement-2015-documents/spending-review-and-autumn-statement-2015 | 2,015 | [
"government",
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"spending",
"million",
"year"
] | www.iea.org | SME
house builders – The government will halve the length of the planning guarantee and amend planning policy to support small sites, while ensuring protection for existing gardens. Section 106 – The government will bring forward proposals for a more standardised approach to viability assessments, and extend the ability to appeal against unviable section 106 agreements to 2018. Quality of decision making – To support decision-making in line with local plans and the principles in the National Planning Policy Framework, the government will bring forward proposals to strengthen the performance regime, by lowering the threshold for the quality of decisions to 10% of all major decisions overturned on appeal. Wider circumstances, such as the status of the local plan and whether appeals relate to this, will be taken into account. Planning conditions – The government will review the operation of the deemed discharge of planning conditions. Right to Buy pilot – The government will launch a pilot of Right to Buy with five housing associations, to inform the design of the final scheme. Warm Home Discount – The government will extend the Warm Home Discount to 2020-21 at current levels of £320 million a year, rising with inflation (
CPI
). Domestic energy efficiency supplier obligation – The government will implement a domestic energy efficiency suppler obligation for 5 years from April 2017, with a value of £640 million per year, rising with inflation (
CPI
). Flood Reinsurance Scheme – The Flood Reinsurance Scheme has now been designated and will be consolidated into Defra’s accounts. The scheme will ensure affordable home insurance for those at high flood risk from April 2016, subject to approval from financial regulators. (11)
Further education loans – The government will extend further education tuition loans to include those aged 19-23 studying for a Level 3 or 4 qualification, and for those aged 19 and over studying for a Level 5 or 6 qualification. Equivalent or Lower Qualification bar – The government will enable people to retrain in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics by removing the restriction on accessing tuition fee loans for a second degree in these subjects from 2017-18. Part Time Maintenance Loans – The government will introduce a generous new system of maintenance support for higher education students wishing to study part time by 2018-19 and will consult on the detail. Repayment threshold – The government will freeze the student loan repayment threshold for Plan 2 graduates for 5 years from April 2016. Postgraduate Taught Masters Loans – The government will lift the age cap for new postgraduate loans, so they are available to all those under 60, and reduce the repayment rate from 9% to 6% of income over £21,000. Loans will be introduced from 2016-17. Health education reform – Students studying nursing, midwifery and allied health subjects from September 2017 will be moved on to the standard student support system, with the details subject to consultation. The cap on the number of student places universities can offer for these subjects will be removed. This annex provides further details of the projections of public expenditure that result from decisions made in the Spending Review and Autumn Statement. All real terms numbers included in this document have been calculated on the basis of whole economy inflation, as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (
GDP
) deflators used by the Office for Budget Responsibility (
OBR
) in their November forecast. These are set out in their ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’ November 2015 document. All projections for Annually Managed Expenditure (
AME
) are based on the
OBR
’s November forecast, adjusted for
AME
measures in the Spending Review and Autumn Statement. Some numbers in this document may not sum due to rounding. Table 1.A sets out provisional
RDEL
settlements including depreciation. Depreciation measures the reduction in value of assets over the course of a year. Departments calculate depreciation for
RDEL
budgets according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Formal depreciation budgets for departments will be set out at Main Estimates 2016. Table 1.B shows departmental administration budgets within
RDEL
. Administration budgets limit expenditure on running costs of central government which do not directly support front line public services, for example, business support services, the provision of policy advice, accommodation and office services. These represent limits within the overall
RDEL
settlements set out elsewhere in this document, rather than additional spending. The
OBR
’s assessment of the welfare cap is set out in Table 1.5. Table B.1 sets out a full list of expenditure items within the scope of the welfare cap. The Treasury will seek the approval of the House of Commons for any changes to the list of items of expenditure which fall within the scope of the welfare cap, including where a new welfare cap level and/or margin are being set. This annex sets out revisions to the government’s financing plans for 2015-16, which were previously updated on 8 July 2015. Further details of the revised remit for 2015-16, including progress against the remit to date, can be found on the Debt Management Office’s (
DMO
) website at www.dmo.gov.uk. The government’s debt management framework remains as set out in the Debt and reserves management report 2015-16. The updated financing arithmetic is set out in Table C.1. As set out in Chapter 4 of the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (
OBR
) November 2015 ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’ (
EFO
), the forecast for the 2015-16 central government net cash requirement (excluding
NRAM
plc, Bradford and Bingley and Network Rail) (
CGNCR
(ex
NRAM
,
B&B
and
NR
)) is £75.5 billion. This measure is used in the financing arithmetic as it reflects the forecast cash requirement of the Exchequer. | 7463dc04-a746-4d14-8058-2178fb06cb05 | 35 |
03a0d2e3-ce73-4c6b-b9ad-35d821c65a1a | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1011283/UK-Hydrogen-Strategy_web.pdf | 2,021 | [
"hydrogen",
"carbon",
"energy",
"production",
"support"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | We will also continue to foster collaborative international research and information exchange on the production and deployment of hydrogen as a global energy carrier, through our active membership of the International Energy Agency (IEA) Hydrogen Technology Collaboration Programme (Hydrogen TCP).89
Chapter 3: Realising economic benefits for the UK The development of a UK hydrogen economy fit for net zero presents unique opportunities for investment in UK projects, associated infrastructure, supply chain companies, technologies and innovation. We will work to create an attractive environment to secure the right investment in UK projects, with benefits to UK business and communities. We are confident that UK strengths and assets, including potential for rapid scale up across the domestic value chain, coupled with our strategic and policy approach, will create the right conditions to unlock the significant scale of private investment that will be needed to develop and grow the UK hydrogen economy. The development of other clean growth energy industries can give a sense of the scale of investment needed to develop and grow new low carbon sectors such as for example, according to Wind Europe90 over the ten years to 2020 the UK leveraged €56 billion (around £47 billion) in our world-leading offshore wind industry, almost half of all European investment in the sector. As a start, the Ten Point Plan outlined that over £4 billion of private investment could be unlocked over the 2020s, positioning the UK hydrogen sector to deploy at scale in the 2030s and supporting our ambitions in the context of the growing global market. Alongside this strategy, we are consulting on the primary means to stimulate deployment of – and investment in – hydrogen projects through the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund and the proposed Hydrogen Business Model. The new UK Infrastructure Bank91 launched in June this year will provide leadership to the market in the development of new technologies including hydrogen, particularly in scaling early-stage technologies that have moved through the R&D phase. The Bank will have an initial £12 billion of capital, and will invest in local authority and private sector infrastructure projects, as well as providing an advisory function to help with the development and delivery of projects. Through these investments the Bank will ‘crowd-in’ private investment to accelerate our progress to net zero whilst helping to level up across the UK. The government has also established a new Office for Investment (OfI), which will support high value investment opportunities into the UK which align with key government priorities
– including the hydrogen sector and associated infrastructure – to drive economic recovery and growth across the UK, as well as advancing R&D. We will work closely with the OfI to support the aims and direction set out in this strategy. We will also continue to champion the UK hydrogen sector, technologies and projects through our world-class UK trade networks, promoting opportunities for Through these and our ongoing engagement and policy activity, we will continue to work with the investment community to support investment across the hydrogen value chain and its supply chains, with a view to ensuring that the UK hydrogen sector remains a 3.5 Realising export opportunities The green industrial revolution has created a once-in-a-generation opportunity for the UK, as well as globally. We will capitalise on our strengths, skills, capabilities, technologies, innovation and investment to position UK companies to springboard into the expanding Our vision is maximise the investment, growth and export potential of the green industrial revolution. We want to see a lasting and sustainable clean energy sector that can exploit global clean growth opportunities such as those associated with low carbon hydrogen. This will, in turn, support the broader sustainability of the sector and Analysis suggests that around a quarter of UK jobs in the hydrogen sector, and around 30 per cent of economic opportunity, could be driven by exports by 2030, with these growing in relative importance by 2050. The UK is already an exporter of fuel cell and electrolyser technologies, and our world class engineering, procurement and construction management (EPCm) services sector is well geared to support international opportunities
Chapter 3: Realising economic benefits for the UK as the global hydrogen economy grows. Our regulatory framework and decades of experience in gas management and safety are strengths from which the rest of the world can learn and which we are well geared to support internationally. While our focus in the near term will be on securing domestic deployment of both electrolytic and CCUS-enabled hydrogen projects, we expect that through this UK companies will be increasingly well-positioned to seize opportunities in other markets. We are already working through UK Export Finance, the UK’s export credit agency, to support UK hydrogen companies to seize such opportunities – with £2 billion earmarked to finance clean growth projects overseas to create export opportunities for British businesses. UKEF is able to provide favourable financing terms for clean energy projects, as well as working capital and contract bond support for exporting SMEs in the clean growth sector. New trading relationships will offer further avenues for our businesses to experience the benefits of exporting. We will seize the opportunities for the UK hydrogen sector presented by Global Britain as we advance new Free Trade Agreements. To help make the most of these opportunities, we will look to work with countries that, like the UK, have an established oil and gas sector that can transition to a low carbon future through hydrogen, sharing learning and establishing common investment and We will also look to position the UK so that it is able to seize opportunities to export hydrogen itself. A further export opportunity will lie in ammonia produced from low carbon hydrogen, building on trade links that exist for high carbon ammonia today. To put the UK in a position of strength to unlock and benefit from these opportunities for the longer term, we will work to identify any necessary requirements, such as certification, and any constraints, for instance around ports and infrastructure. | 96babf55-7373-4dee-b481-d10889d10207 | 34 |
03a181b0-20c7-414b-8d10-e8520a705683 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.01721v1 | 2,025 | [
"fire",
"wildfire",
"data",
"population",
"eaton"
] | arxiv.org | This integrated pipeline allows for the day-by-day tracking of fire dynamics and their cascading impacts on ecosystems, buildings, and human services. Unlike seasonal or post hoc damage assessments, this workflow provides emergency managers with temporally precise and spatially explicit insights to support real-time decision-making and post-disaster resource allocation. The results highlight several ways Los Angeles and other wildfire-prone cities can translate a tri-environmental perspective into practice. First, emergency protocols must be timed and tailored to local demographics. Eaton's older population requires evacuation support and medical continuity, while Palisades' cultural diversity demands multilingual alerts and targeted outreach. Land-use policies should reflect localized risk: in Eaton, where business corridors face high losses, fire-resistant standards must apply to shops and mixed-use buildings-not just homes. In Palisades, where public spaces lie within the burn zone, fire-hardening measures like ember-resistant roofs, redundant water, and fire-safe landscaping are essential. Real-time data integration is also key: daily VIIRS detections and short-term spread models should feed into municipal dashboards to enable proactive deployment of personnel, air support, and traffic control. Second, equity must underpin each intervention. Wildfire exposure in WUI neighborhoods is uneven, and the residents with the least capacity to evacuate, retrofit, or insure their homes often face the highest hazard. To reduce this disparity, cities should expand fuel-management subsidies, low-income insurance incentives, and community-led preparedness programs. However, such strategies only work when vulnerability is defined through a multidimensional lens. By layering demographic characteristics with exposure to natural and built environment threats, cities can more accurately identify the most at-risk streets, facilities, and populations. Third, the study highlights the importance of integrating high-resolution impact data into long-term resilience planning. Instead of relying solely on post-fire damage surveys or coarse county-level statistics, municipalities should adopt spatially disaggregated assessment tools like the tri-environmental framework used here. This enables planners to evaluate not only where fire has occurred, but also which infrastructure and communities are repeatedly at risk, allowing for more adaptive zoning, strategic retrofits, and targeted investment in both physical and social resilience. This study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the spatial resolution of VIIRS data (375 meters) limits its ability to capture detailed fire behavior at the neighborhood or parcel level. Although kernel density estimation improves the continuity of daily fire perimeters, it cannot fully represent small-scale ignition dynamics or intensity variations within complex urban terrain. The dasymetric mapping approach also assumes static population distribution based on land use, which may not reflect actual daily population shifts due to commuting, tourism, or evacuation. Similarly, our analysis treats all buildings and points of interest equally, without accounting for differences in functional importance, for example, between a home, a business, or a hospital. Exposure is also used as a proxy for impact, which overlooks important mitigating factors such as fire suppression efforts, structure type, or existing defensible space. In addition, the study is geographically limited to two urban WUI areas in Los Angeles. While Eaton and Palisades provide valuable contrast in topography and demographics, the findings may not fully represent wildfire dynamics or vulnerabilities in other settings. Broader generalization would benefit from applying the framework to a wider range of locations, including rural or lower-income urban peripheries with different infrastructure and social conditions. Future studies could also enhance the model by integrating higher-resolution fire detection, mobility data, and functional weighting of critical infrastructure. Despite these limitations, the tri-environmental framework offers a scalable and replicable structure for advancing urban wildfire impact analysis and informing more targeted and inclusive adaptation strategies. This study presents a tri-environmental framework that integrates daily satellite fire detections, natural, built, and social environments data to assess wildfire impacts in Los Angeles's Eaton and Palisades WUI zones. By revealing day-by-day shifts in flame fronts, quantifying direct losses to land, roads, buildings, and community services, and pinpointing which age, income, and racial groups are placed at greatest risk, the framework demonstrates that wildfire is simultaneously an ecological, infrastructural, and social crisis whose effects vary block by block. These results show that generic, city-wide strategies are inadequate; effective planning must match interventions-evacuation support, land-use zoning, fuel management, and equitable recovery funds-to the unique natural, built, and demographic profiles of each neighbourhood. Because the workflow relies on globally available satellite feeds and open data, it can be readily replicable to other WUI regions and expanded with real-time mobility streams, critical-infrastructure weights, or machine-learning spread models. As climate change and urban expansion intensify wildfire threats, such integrated, high-resolution approaches will be essential for designing communities that are not only fire-adapted but also socially just. | 4649f18e-9adb-40ea-89f9-25c4bd2cb8bb | 5 |
03a90f1e-84f2-41c8-8c2a-bfa126cf9b8e | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 4.2.2.3. The production of a series shall be deemed to conform or not to conform on the basis of a sampling test of the
vehicles once a pass decision is reached for all the pollutants or a fail decision is reached for one pollutant, accord-
ing to the test criteria applied in the appropriate appendix. When a pass decision has been reached for one pollutant, that decision shall not be changed by any additional tests
carried out to reach a decision for the other pollutants. If no pass decision is reached for all the pollutants and no fail decision is reached for one pollutant, a test shall be
carried out on another vehicle see Figure I.4.2. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 61 |
03aa0e4c-c5b8-42f4-ae45-c79241ef4478 | https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30146/documents/174873/default/ | 2,022 | [
"change",
"government",
"climate",
"behaviour",
"evidence"
] | parliament.uk | • Adoption of low carbon (e.g. electric cars and heat pumps) by individuals and businesses would achieve 45 per cent of emission reductions. | 97670d98-0334-481c-acbc-cc321a917f87 | 98 |
03aa32a3-9f69-448b-a549-6ec62853e9cb | https://www.gov.uk//government/publications/environment-agency-2020-data-on-regulated-businesses-in-england | 2,021 | [
"datasets",
"2020",
"regulation",
"environment",
"growth",
"compliance",
"waste",
"installation permits",
"pollution inventory",
"pollution incidents",
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"risk assessment",
"regulatory",
"permits",
"compliance ratings",
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] | gov.uk | Find out more about our position on enforcement and sanctions. Waste crime
The waste crime summary dataset attached to this page contains details of the numbers, types and activities associated with illegal waste sites, large-scale illegal dumping and illegal waste exports. The data covers each financial year from 2009 where available to the end of March 2021. The waste investigations dataset on data.gov.uk contains information about our waste crime investigation work and outcomes. The dataset covers January 1997 to March 2021. The illegal dumping incidents dataset on data.gov.uk contains all incidents of illegal dumping fly-tipping reported to us. Illegal dumping means the illegal deposit of liquid or solid waste on land, not covered by a permit or exemption. The dataset covers January 2011 to March 2021. Use of this data
Weve made the data on this page available to members of the public for information. Weve published each dataset under either the open government licence or the Environment Agency conditional licence. Each dataset states the licence its published under. If you use the information you must meet the conditions of the relevant licence. | ededf9b9-da0c-45ca-ba15-66e9894d586c | 2 |
03b091b9-2e51-46dd-8f66-670030f9da63 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31998L0069 | 1,998 | [
"Transport",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | To this end, those vehicle types whose parameters described below are identical are considered to belong to the same engine-emission control/OBD system combination. Engine:
combustion process (i. e. positive-ignition, compression-ignition, two-stroke, four-stroke),
method of engine fuelling (i. e. carburettor or fuel injection). Emission control system:
type of catalytic converter (i. e. oxidation, three-way, heated catalyst, other),
type of particulate trap,
secondary air injection (i. e. with or without),
exhaust gas recirculation (i. | 282d51c7-9418-4d78-8dce-aec1567a8b80 | 69 |
03b57f06-0be8-4c91-a172-5560e864d03f | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.07352v1 | 2,020 | [
"responsibility",
"node",
"decision",
"nodes",
"agent"
] | arxiv.org | The current climate crisis and its associated effects constitute one of the essential challenges for humanity and collective decision making in the upcoming years. An increase of greenhouse gas (GHG) 1concentrations in the atmosphere attributable to human activity leads to a warming of Earth's surface temperature by reducing the fraction of incoming solar radiation that is diffused back into space. An elevated mean earth surface temperature is however not a priori something reprehensible. Rather, it is the resultant effects that carry enormous dangers. Among these are the increased risk of extreme weather events such as storms and flooding, the rise of sea-levels or the immense losses of biodiversity, which have repercussions not only for the physical integrity of the planet but which pose direct threats to human life. 2Naturally, the public debate around this issue frequently invokes the question of responsibility: Who carries how much backward-looking responsibility for the changes already inevitable, who is to blame; and who carries how much forward-looking responsibility to realise changes, who has to act? 3 As the following citation from Mike Huckabee, twice candidate in the US Republican presidential primaries, shows, the concepts of both backward and forward responsibility is used throughout the political spectrum: "Whether humans are responsible for the bulk of climate change is going to be left to the scientists, but it's all of our responsibility to leave this planet in better shape for the future generations than we found it." [22] Existing work. The existing body of work regarding this question can roughly be divided into two categories, via the perspective from which this question is addressed. On the one side there are considerations focusing on applicability in the climate change context, computing tangible responsibility scores for countries or federations, with the aim of shaping the actions being taken and a lesser focus on conceptual elegance and consistency [6,30]. On the other side there is considerable work in formal ethics, aiming at understanding and formally representing the concept of responsibility in general with a special focus on rigour and well-foundedness, making it harder to account for messy real world scenarios (in realistic computation time) [5,8,13,21]. It will be useful to highlight certain aspects of these works now. In the former set of works, and particularly also in public discourse, the degree of backward responsibility of a person, firm, or country for climate change is simply equated to cumulative past GHG emissions, or a slight variation of this measure [14]. Certainly, this approach has one clear benefit, namely that it is easy to compute on any scale, and also extremely easy to communicate to a non-scientific audience. Similarly, certain authors assume a country's degree of forward responsibility to be proportional to population share, gross domestic product or some similar indicator, specifically in the debate about "fair" emissions allowances or caps [36,34]. However, unfortunately, such ad hoc measures violate certain properties that one would ask of a generalised responsibility account. 4In the latter body of work, a principled approach is taken. Starting from considerations regarding the general nature of the concept of responsibility, formalisms are set up to represent these. These comprise causal models [13], game-theoretical representations [46,8] or logics [12,39]. A vast number of different aspects have been included in certain formalisations, such as degrees of causation or responsibility, relations between individuals and groups, or epistemic states of the agents to name but a few. Generally, these are discussed using reduced, well-defined example scenarios and thought experiments capturing certain complicating aspects of responsibility ascription. Additionally, there are investigations into the everyday understanding of the various meanings of the term 'responsibility' [43] as well as empirical studies regarding agents' responsibility judgements in certain scenarios, showing a number of asymmetry results [32]. However, we are here not concerned with mirroring agent's actual judgements, but rather with a normative account, so we will not go into detail about these. Research question. The present paper places itself in the category of a principled and formal approach, but aims at keeping in mind the practical applicability in complex scenarios. Also, we want to relocate the space of discussion in the formal community by proposing a set of responsibility functions that, rather than cautiously distributing responsibility and tolerating under-determination (or voids), distribute responsibility somewhat more generously, evading certain forms of under-determination, but sometimes resulting in what might be seen as over-determination. The "correct" function is probably somewhere in between, and we think it is helpful to examine the space of possible solutions from several ends. It might be useful to add that our work is normative, not descriptive. We aim at representing ways in which responsibility should be ascribed, not the ways in which people in standard discussion generally do ascribe it or are psychologically inclined to perceive. We introduce a suitable framework that is able to represent all relevant aspects of a decision scenario. In some core aspects this is an extension of existing frameworks, in others we deviate from the previous work. Subsequently, we will suggest candidate functions for assigning real numbers as degrees of responsibility (forward-as well as backward looking) that have certain desirable properties. Deliberation regarding which climate abatement goal is to be reached but also who will contribute how much in the joint effort to mitigate climate change is often carried out in the political sphere, with various voting mechanisms in place. It is therefore particularly interesting to determine measures of responsibility when the deliberation procedure is given by a specific voting rule. We will address this question for a set of voting scenarios and our proposed responsibility functions. Method. We will follow an axiomatic method as it is used in social choice theory in order to enable a well-structured comparison between different candidates for responsibility functions [40]. | 73b7bf70-74dc-4359-a3f0-d7b51c191698 | 0 |
03bb9f11-8c1f-40f8-b710-3706d8429160 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-national-communication-nc-nc-8-biennial-reports-br-br-5_288d5f885869447df3e9910829b567a3.pdf | 2,022 | [
"climate",
"energy",
"support",
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"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Fiscal Implemented Grants of up to £12,000 were available to buy equipment to support farm efficiencies such as animal handling, energy efficiency, storage and management of nutrients – all of which contribute to lowering The scheme offered a maximum 40% grant contribution (from £12,000 to £50,000) towards capital investments in equipment and machinery which have been pre-identified to specifically support famers to address and safeguard nutrient management and improve water, soil and air quality by reducing the impacts Fiscal Implemented A total of £22m was made available through the last three rounds of the SPG, with the last funding window having closed in March 2021. 142 8th National Communication Chapter 3 Policies and Measures 143 Name of Mitigation Action Sectors affected GHG affected Objective and or activity affected Type of Brief Description Start Year of Implementing Entity or Entities Estimate of mitigation impact by gas (for a particular year, not cumulative in ktCO2 eq.) Land Use and waste Information The WAHWF sets out our plan for continuing and lasting improvements in standards of animal health and welfare for kept animals, whilst also helping to protect public health and contributing to tackling the climate emergency.Our goal is for all livestock farms in Wales to use Animal Health Planning as an integral part Implemented Improving the health status of farmed animals can significantly reduce their carbon footprint, particularly when managed alongside actions to optimise feeding and breeding of animals for longevity – health benefits accrue most if animals are correctly fed, Land Use and waste Information The Red Meat Development programme has three strands crucial to the red meat sector’s future competitiveness, success and sustainability. From farm to fork, the projects contribute to an efficient red meat industry, leading to less wastage and therefore a reduction in greenhouse gases emitted from the supply chain. Implemented Hybu Cig Cymru are delivering the five year, £9.2m Red Meat Development Programme funded by the EU Rural Development Programme, which comes to an end in 2023. Identifying optimal genetics is crucial for the long term sustainable objective for improving the overall performance of any farming business, and offers both economic and environmental benefits enabling lambs to reach market specification sooner and with less inputs, thus improving a farm business's carbon footprint. Land Use, waste and Cross Cutting Information Development Programme is a £6.5m, five year programme (2014-2020) delivered by the Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board (AHDB). It delivers two distinct projects, Herd Advance and Strategic Dairy Farms which aim to increase the performance, health and resilience of the Welsh dairy sector. Implemented Healthy animals help protect the productivity and production levels of farmers, reduce capital losses, minimise negative trade impacts as well as reducing pollution and CO2 emissions.With funding available until 2023, AHDB Dairy will embark on several additional work Farming Connect Land Use, waste and Cross Cutting Information Contracted from October 2015 until August 2022, Farming Connect is a £28m programme, providing subsidised independent, tailored business support and technical advice. The Advisory Service, an element of the wider Farming Connect Programme, provides advice on how to achieve optimum results from livestock, which in turn helps Implemented Outcomes from projects and trials are shared widely to raise awareness amongst famers of the importance of emission reduction activities, changing behaviours and improving farming practices. Also available through Farming Connect is the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Interactive Farm – a tool developed to demonstrate different examples of how a typical Welsh farm could reduce its greenhouse gas emissions (demonstrated as carbon dioxide equivalents, CO2e) while also increasing profitability (either through saving money Agriculture Bill Agriculture Information Welsh Government will introduce the Agriculture Bill to create a new system of farm support that will maximise the protective power of Regulatory Implemented It is proposed that this new system will reward farmers who take action to meet the challenges of responding to the climate and nature emergencies, supporting them to produce food in We will also seek to replace the time limited powers in the Agriculture Act 2020 which we took to provide continuity and some much needed stability for our farmers as we left the EU. Land Use, waste and Cross Cutting Information The proposed SFS will provide support to farmers – both financial and advisory – which will be targeted at outcomes not currently rewarded by the market. It is proposed the fundamental change to the current Basic Payment Scheme will be the level of payment being linked to the outcomes delivered by a farmer through undertaking a range of management Planned The proposal is to go beyond an income foregone/costs incurred model and reflect the value of environmental goods provided through future payments. It is also proposed outcomes from existing good practice requiring continued maintenance should be recognised and rewarded as well as creation of new outcomes. This will ensure active farmers who are working to benefit the environment are supported. transition schemes Agriculture Information announced a package of support for farmers, foresters, land managers and food businesses worth over £227 million over the next three financial years to support the resilience of the rural economy and our natural environment. Funding will be made available for a transitional scheme to provide financial support to farmers who are converting their operations to organic farming. The Horticulture Development Scheme (the indicative budget allocation for this application window, between 4 April and 27 May, is £1.5m) and Horticulture Start Up Schemes (an Expression of interest window for the new Horticulture Start Up scheme will open on 23 May 2022 and close on 25 June 2022) are part of the transition scheme package. Additional investment in the rural economy will be announced over the next three years, as we continue the transition to the Sustainable Farming Scheme, promoting the sustainable production of food, and support the rural economy on the path to a net zero, nature positive Wales. | e6994b55-18ee-49c8-92db-2261135aea96 | 47 |
03bde0ed-a79d-458c-9094-4466d01bcf2a | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.10644v1 | 2,025 | [
"firms",
"losses",
"carbon",
"emissions",
"banks"
] | arxiv.org | The systemic losses on the sub-networks are relatively small in comparison with losses on the full network, as some links spreading the contagion on the latter are not present in the former mentioned (see Fig. S7). FIG. S7. Direct and supply chain contagion adjusted losses of firms and banks after the carbon price shock on sub-network. These results are produced in the similar was as the ones in Fig. 3. The sub-network, W s , with 203 592 firms is derived from W by removing links smaller than EUR 25K (see Tab.I). In panel (a) x-axis shows carbon prices and the y-axis shows losses of the supply chain network (SCN) and of the banks, in red and blue colors respectively, quantified across 100 scenarios. The x-axis is log-scaled. Dashed vertical line indicates EU ETS II price cap of 45 EUR/t. The direct production losses, Λ dir and the respective loan write offs of banks, L dir are denoted by the dotted red and blue lines respectively. The contagion-adjusted losses involving General Leontief production function incurred by the SC network, Λ GL , and by banks, L GL , are given by the red and blue solid lines. The results are qualitatively similar to the results obtained on the full network, with the systemic risk materializing in the 30 EUR/t scenario. At this price the sub-network SCN, W s , suffers contagion-adjusted losses Λ GL = 36%, and L GL = 19%. Panel (b) shows production, Λ GL , (x-axis) and financial, L GL , (y-axis) losses at 45 EUR/t scenario disaggregated to NACE1 sectors. The scatterplot is in log-log scale. Each circle denotes a sector and its size indicates estimated carbon emissions. Note, that emissions here are slightly smaller than in Fig. 3, as many firms are dropped. Colors distinguish sectors A-J and L, and sectors K and M-U are aggregated into one category (orange circle). Production and financial losses are in the same units as in panel (a). Thus all x-coordinates add up to 0.36 and all y-coordinates add up to 0.19. We see, that in this case the biggest production and financial contagion-adjusted losses stem from sectors C-Manufacturing, H-Transportation and G-Wholesale, while sector L-Real Estate Activities remains relatively unaffected. Note, that on the full network it accounted for almost 17% of the total financial losses, while on the sub-network it causes less than 3% of the banks' equity losses. This demonstrates, that by applying threshold on network's links we drop some important connections, that transmit the shock. In this case -to the real estate sector. Direct financial losses account for only 1% of bank equity losses, while indirect losses are substantially higher due to the failure of a systemically important firm. The CCPR-induced risk categories reveal the carbon risks of loans that default in the 45 EUR/t pessimistic scenario. The colors indicate the risk categories of firms, based on the CCPR ratio, which reflects the carbon price at which each firm would become unprofitable when carbon costs exceed profits at a given price level. Specifically, we show 10, 45, 100, 500 and 1000 EUR/t in pink, yellow, red, purple and grey colors respectively. Firms that would only become unprofitable at prices above 1000 EUR/t are shown in blue, while non-emitting firms are categorized in green. Panels (b) and (c) show these contagion-adjusted losses in 45 EUR/t pessimistic scenario additionally disaggregated to 20 banks. x-axes show ids of 20 banks and y-axes show contagion-adjusted losses of these banks with respect to their own equities. In Fig. S8 we study the systemic financial losses in 45 EUR/t pessimistic scenario in detail (see the caption for description of the figure). The carbon costs-to-profit ratio carbon risk categories classify loans (firms) to several groups (various colors in the left bar the plot of panel (a)) each of them indicating at which carbon price, π, a firm , i, would default on its loan, i.e. CCPR i (π) > 1. In the presented scenario, the loans of directly defaulting firms and loans in risk categories 10 and 45 combined coincide, as both represent loans to firms with a CCPR ratio greater than 1 at a carbon price of 45 EUR/t. The disaggregation of indirect losses indicates that the majority of loans defaulting from supply chain contagion originate from firms with minimal climate risk. The light-blue segment represents loans to firms that would remain profitable even at a carbon price of 1000 EUR/t. Nevertheless, the supply chain contagion initiated by a carbon shock of just 45 EUR/t imposes additional stress on these firms, leading to their indirect default. Additionally, 3 percentage points of indirect losses stem from non-emitting firms. This implies that carbon risk of firms based solely on firm-level information given by the CCPR doesn't fully reflect firms' exposure to the climate transition risk. Supply chain contagion can amplify carbon risk of emitting firms, passing it on to non-emitting firms or those with low carbon risk. In such cases, a firm's credit risk is impacted by production losses resulting from climate-related supply chain disruptions. Furthermore, the financial viability of firms may also be threatened by increased production costs due to higher supplier prices driven by carbon costs. Now, we analyze the 45 EUR/t scenario, in which a systemically important firm fails, from the perspective of individual banks. Specifically, we are interested in how much the banks' direct losses are amplified and whether these losses originate from firms with low or high climate transition risk. We demonstrate these bank-level losses in panels (b) and (c) of Fig. S8. x-axes show ids of 20 banks and y-axes show contagion-adjusted losses of these banks with respect to their own equities. Contagion-adjusted losses of banks number 7 and 20 are equal to almost 100% of own equities. Banks number 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 19 write off loans worth more than 50% of own equities. The rest of the banks have losses smaller than 40% of own equities. | 54018bb6-b4ca-4daf-a2af-62348528342b | 14 |
03c21c0e-3cc3-4692-8fd1-755b1f185456 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31998L0069 | 1,998 | [
"Transport",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | New sections 2.13, 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16 are added to read as follows:
2.13. OBD an on-board diagnostic system for emission control which has the capability of identifying the likely area of malfunction by means of fault codes stored in computer memory. 2.14. In-service test means the test and evaluation of conformity conducted in accordance with section 7.1.7 of this Annex. 2.15. Properly maintained and used means, for the purpose of a test vehicle, that such a vehicle satisfies the criteria for acceptance of a selected vehicle laid down in section 2 of Appendix 3 to this Annex. 2.16. Defeat device means any element of design which senses temperature, vehicle speed, engine RPM, transmission gear, manifold vacuum or any other parameter for the purpose of activating, modulating, delaying or deactivating the operation of any part of the emission control system, that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use. Such an element of design may not be considered a defeat device if:
I. the need for the device is justified in terms of protecting the engine against damage or accident and for safe operation of the vehicle,
or
II. the device does not function beyond the requirements of engine starting, or
III. conditions are substantially included in the Type 1 or Type VI test procedures. 5. | 282d51c7-9418-4d78-8dce-aec1567a8b80 | 10 |
03c5df30-7b0f-4101-b0a3-e5faf30bfb62 | http://aei.pitt.edu/1184/1/enegy_supply_security_gp_COM_2000_769.pdf | 2,000 | [
"General",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency",
"Energy efficiency",
"Renewables",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch"
] | aei.pitt.edu | 87
In addition, we should keep a watchful eye on the development of oil and gas
resources in the Caspian sea basin and in particular on transport routes to open up
oil and gas production. b
Strengthening supply networks
To improve Europes energy supply, it is not sufficient to ensure the steady procurement of
energy sources at reasonable prices and on a long-term basis. It is also necessary to have a
supply network with security guarantees. The way in which energy is transported is of
fundamental importance for the security of supply. For instance, the European Union imports
90 of its oil by sea. Consequently, it is committed to strengthening the rules and regulations
on ships ban on single hull and should restore its supply balance by shifting the emphasis
towards oil pipelines. The construction of new oil and gas pipelines will make it possible to import oil and gas
from the Caspian Sea basin and the southern Mediterranean, thereby improving security of
supply by diversifying geographic sources of supply. Hence the emphasis in technical
assistance programmes such as MEDA and TACIS on improving energy infrastructure. In this context, in the MEDA framework, financing should be available for refining ideas
and feasibility studies concerning regional infrastructure networks which aim to link
national networks among themselves South-South, or to link these up to transeuropean
networks Transmediterranean. By giving them the label Euro-Mediterranean
partnership66, it would be possible to give an additional dimension to large regional
projects. the INOGATE6768 and TRACECA69 programmes are indispensable
Likewise,
instruments to open up resources in particular countries Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan. In particular, the European Union should ensure that the provisions of the Energy Charter
and those of the protocol concerning transit are implemented as soon as possible, mainly
by the applicant countries and the NIS. Special attention must also be given to the
INOGATE umbrella agreement. that, within the Union, bottlenecks
For imports of electricity, there should be better interconnections between the networks of
the Member States and those of the Union with the applicant countries and Russia. This
should be removed by constructing
means
infrastructure currently lacking. All the Member States would thus be able to benefit from
new sources of supply. | 38718611-1d0b-4acc-9e32-dcd1a80039ac | 94 |
03d0d82b-dd06-470b-bd35-52b80bc7a769 | https://www.gov.uk//guidance/energy-savings-opportunity-scheme-esos | 2,014 | [
"ESO",
"Phase 4",
"Compliance",
"Action Plan",
"Progress Updates",
"ESOS Assessment",
"Energy Efficiency",
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] | gov.uk | No remedial actions will be considered for action plans submitted up until 5 March 2025. ESOS latest updates
Phase 4 changes
The following changes announced in the previous governments response to the ESOS consultation will not go ahead for Phase 4
Following delays to the introduction of Phase 3 legislation and guidance, and in order to give sufficient time for such a major change to ESOS, the new government has decided to postpone the introduction of net zero requirements until Phase 5. The following changes announced in the previous governments response to the ESOS consultation are intended to go ahead for Phase 4, subject to parliamentary time and scrutiny
Further details of these changes will be provided in due course. These changes and full guidance, as well as the necessary changes to the Manage your ESOS reporting system are planned to be in place by early 2027 in advance of the notification of compliance deadline for Phase 4, which is 5 December 2027. Publication of new PAS standards
On 7 February the British Standards Institution BSI published two new standards which were referenced in the government response to the ESOS consultation
Participants will be able to use these standards on a voluntary basis for ESOS compliance. Further guidance on voluntary use of these standards will be published in due course. The existing competency standard, PAS 512152014 Energy efficiency assessment Competence of a lead energy assessor Specification, will continue to be used as the competency standard for ESOS lead assessors for Phase 4. The new PAS 51215-22025 competency standard can be used on a voluntary basis by organisations wanting to determine whether an assessor is suitable to carry out an assessment according to PAS 51215-12025. ESOS action plan
If you were required to submit a notification of compliance for the third compliance period deadline 5 June 2024, you must also submit an action plan and progress updates during the subsequent relevant compliance period. If you did not qualify for ESOS for the third compliance period, you do not need to complete an action plan or progress updates in the subsequent compliance period. For details about ESOS action plans, see Section 12 in the full guidance. The action plan must be signed off by a board level director or equivalent, and submitted via the Manage your ESOS reporting system by the action plan deadline. For the third compliance period this deadline was 5 December 2024, which has now passed. If you have not yet submitted an action plan, you can still submit this using the Manage your ESOS reporting system. No remedial actions will be considered for action plans submitted up until 5 March 2025. Start your action plan now
Annual progress updates
Following submission of the action plan, you must submit an annual progress update against your action plan commitments in the 2 subsequent years. The deadline for submitting an annual progress update is 12 months after the action plan deadline, and then 12 months after the submission deadline for the first progress update. For the third compliance period, the deadlines are 5 December 2025 and 5 December 2026. The progress update must be signed off by a board level director or equivalent, and submitted via the Manage your ESOS reporting system. For full details of ESOS annual progress updates, see Section 13 of the guidance. About the Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme ESOS
ESOS is a mandatory energy assessment scheme for organisations in the UK that meet the qualification criteria. The Environment Agency is the UK scheme administrator. Organisations that qualify for ESOS must carry out ESOS assessments every 4 years. These assessments are audits of the energy used by their buildings, industrial processes and transport. The ESOS audit is designed to identify tailored and cost-effective measures to allow participating businesses to save energy and achieve carbon and cost savings. The audit costs are estimated to be significantly outweighed by the savings from implementing the recommendations. For full details of how to comply with ESOS requirements see
The guidance works alongside the legislation to help participants understand the requirements, but the ultimate source of ESOS requirements is the legislation. Find out if you qualify for ESOS phase 3
ESOS applies to large UK undertakings and their corporate groups. It mainly affects businesses but can also apply to not-for-profit bodies and any other non-public sector undertakings that are large enough to meet the qualification criteria. Your organisation qualified for the third compliance period ESOS phase 3 if, on 31 December 2022, it met the ESOS definition of a large undertaking. Corporate groups qualify if at least one UK group member meets the ESOS definition of a large undertaking. UK registered establishments of an overseas company will also need to take part in ESOS regardless of their size if any other part of their global corporate group activities in the UK meet the ESOS qualifying criteria. For organisations very close to the qualification threshold or which have substantially increased or decreased in size in recent years, read the full guidance on complying with ESOS. This includes additional information on how to assess if you qualify. Public sector organisations do not usually need to comply with ESOS. For more information on organisations that do not need to comply, see section 1.2 of the full guidance on complying with ESOS
Large undertakings
For the qualification date for the third compliance period of ESOS 31 December 2022 a large undertaking is any UK company that either
A person is employed by an undertaking if they are
An employee is a person employed under contracts of service. Their contracted hours and status full time or part time are irrelevant to their classification as an employee. | 803af79a-11af-4193-86b7-80c158cfe305 | 1 |
03d2fa0a-2ddd-45ac-a43d-e20bc01b530d | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/energy-act-2023_87896593a3bea76cf3ac89af17aba308.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Energy",
"Carbon Capture and Storage",
"section",
"regulations",
"person",
"force",
"document"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | 21 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) 22 (1) In this Part, “designated document” means a document that— (a) is maintained in accordance with the conditions of a code manager licence,
Schedule 18 – Heat networks regulation Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (b) is designated for the purposes of this Part by or in accordance with the (a) designate or provide for the designation of different documents for different (b) provide for the time from which a designation has effect; (c) provide for the modification of a designated document and its reissuing in (d) revoke or provide for the revocation of a designated document; (e) provide for a designated document otherwise ceasing to be a designated (3) The regulations may provide for a document that is designated to make provision by reference to material (including standards, specifications or requirements) contained in other documents that are published from time to time. (4) The regulations may, in particular, make provision about the cases in which the designated document may be modified by the Regulator. I692 Sch. 18 para. 22 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) Prohibition on performing the function of a code manager 23 (1) The regulations may, in relation to England and Wales and Scotland, prohibit a person from performing the function of code manager in relation to a designated document, except as permitted by virtue of a code manager licence (see paragraph 25). (2) A reference in this Part to a person performing the function of code manager in relation to a designated document is a reference to a person making arrangements, with persons to whom sub-paragraph (3) applies, under which the person is responsible for the governance of the designated document. (3) This sub-paragraph applies to the person who holds a heat network authorisation where a condition of the authorisation requires the person to comply with the designated document in question. I693 Sch. 18 para. 23 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) 24 (1) The regulations may, in relation to England and Wales and Scotland, make provision about selecting a person to be a code manager in relation to a designated document. (2) Regulations made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) may, in particular, make provision about the procedure for selecting a person, including provision for determining which procedure to apply in a particular case. Schedule 18 – Heat networks regulation Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. (See end of Document for details) (3) Regulations made by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may include provision for the payment of a fee by a person seeking to be selected to be a code manager. (4) Regulations made by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may provide for the Regulator to make provision by regulations about those matters. (5) Regulations made by the Regulator by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) are to be made I694 Sch. 18 para. 24 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) 25 (1) The regulations may, in relation to England and Wales and Scotland, provide for the Regulator, where a person is selected to be the code manager in relation to a designated document, to issue a licence (a “code manager licence”) to the person which authorises the person to perform the function of code manager in relation to (2) The regulations may make provision as to the period for which a licence may be in (3) In this Part , references to the licensed code manager, in relation to a designated document, are references to the person who is authorised by a code manager licence to perform the function of code manager in relation to the designated document. I695 Sch. 18 para. 25 in force at Royal Assent, see s. 334(2)(l) 26 (1) The regulations may make provision about the contents of a code manager licence. (2) Regulations made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) may, in particular— (a) provide for the Regulator to determine and publish conditions to be included in each code manager licence or in each code manager licence of a particular (b) provide for the Secretary of State to determine and publish conditions to be included in each code manager licence or in each code manager licence of (c) provide for consultation on, and publication of, the conditions proposed to (d) make provision about the inclusion in a code manager licence of conditions that are special to that licence; (e) make provision about including conditions that meet objectives or other criteria specified in the regulations. (3) Regulations made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) may, in particular, provide for the following sorts of conditions to be included in a code manager licence— (a) conditions about the nature of the governance arrangements that the licensed code manager may enter into with persons who hold a heat network authorisation (see paragraph 14(3)(b));
Schedule 18 – Heat networks regulation Document 2024-10-14 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Energy Act 2023. | 4808927e-67c0-4e83-803d-e07fd0d4a019 | 172 |
03d58bb1-6ec6-4804-8f11-b750c53359b4 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 3.2. The following checks shall be carried out checks on air filter, all drive belts, all fluid levels, radiator cap, all vacuum
hoses and electrical wiring related to the antipollution system for integrity checks on ignition, fuel metering and
pollution control device components for maladjustments andor tampering. All discrepancies shall be recorded. The OBD system shall be checked for proper functioning. Any malfunction indications in the OBD memory shall
be recorded and the requisite repairs shall be carried out. If the OBD malfunction indicator registers a malfunction
during a preconditioning cycle, the fault may be identified and repaired. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 246 |
03d996e1-deb0-4825-8443-639ace9a2e40 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/64a54c674dd8b3000f7fa4c9/offshore-wind-investment-roadmap.pdf | 2,023 | [
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Regulatory reform for our network Launched the Offshore Transmission Network Review in 2020 to review the way that the offshore transmission network is designed and delivered, consistent with the ambition to deliver net zero Published a recommended design for the connection of offshore in scope wind farms to 2030 (Holistic Network Design), outlining a single, integrated network connecting 23GW of offshore wind projects, the first step towards more centralised, strategic network planning. Preparing a Holistic Network Design Follow Up Exercise, outlining a single, integrated network connecting a further 21GW of offshore wind projects. Ofgem published its decision on accelerating onshore transmission investment. This decision streamlines regulatory and funding approvals and will initially apply to £20billion of investment. Appointed Electricity Networks Commissioner to advise by June 2023 on how the development process for transmission infrastructure can be reduced, initially by three years but ultimately by a half. Offshore Wind Sector Deal – industry and government collaboration to drive low-cost, low-carbon energy, and the productivity andcompetitiveness of the UK supply chain. Developed and delivered in partnership with the Offshore Wind Sector Council. Established the Offshore Wind Acceleration Taskforceand appointed the UK’s Offshore Wind Champion to spearhead the work to accelerate new offshore wind projects. 8Offshore Wind Net Zero Investment Leading the way to net zero Photo by Shaun Dakin on Unsplash
A planning system that supports deployment Taking forwardmeasures to streamline the planning process and accelerate deployment of offshore wind as previously announced in the British Energy Security Strategy. These include the creation of a Fast Track consenting process for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. Published a cross-government Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) Action Plan, which sets out how the government will reform the NSIP consenting process to ensure the planning system can deliver for the future, which offshore wind projects will benefit from. Updating the Energy National Policy Statements (NPS): work is ongoing to amend the NPSs to ensure they reflect the importance of energy security and net zero, the role of offshore wind in delivering them and strengthen the priority of renewable energy infrastructure.Revised NPSs will be reconsulted upon and published in due course. Putting legislation in place to streamline the offshore wind consenting through the Energy Bill, we will introduce the Offshore Wind Environmental Improvement Package, including regulations to adapt environmental assessments for offshore wind, enable strategic compensation and introduce Marine Recovery Funds. Non legislative changes involving the development of Offshore Wind Environmental Standards and Implementing a new Fast Track consenting process via powers in the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill, as reforms set out in the NSIP Reform Action Plan, which offshore wind projects which meet the necessary quality criteria will be able to benefit from. 9Offshore Wind Net Zero Investment Leading the way to net zero Photo by Shaun Dakin on Unsplash
10Offshore Wind Net Zero Investment Leading the way to net zero Photo by Shaun Dakin on Unsplash Government support for offshore wind investment Eight freeports in England, two green freeports in Scotland and two freeports in Wales, including measures such tax relief, business rates retention, customs, regeneration, innovation and trade and Capital allowance As announced in the 2023 Spring Budget, Government is introducing a series of economy-wide capital allowance measures from which offshore wind projects can benefit. Investment zones extended across the UK. The Investment Zone programme, designed to empower local places and grow the economy, will further benefit from a new package of tax reliefs as announced in Spring Budget. These tax reliefs will bring forward new investment by reducing the cost of doing Innovative floating offshore wind demonstration programme– with £31 million government funding and £30 million of industry match funding. Supporting the Floating Offshore Wind Centre of Excellence– providing £2 million additional funding Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult (OREC). OREC delivers products and services with industry in research, innovation, testing innovation and supply chain growth. Joule programme – £5 million to OREC and the National Composites Centre to incorporateadvanced composites into next generation wind turbine components. Windfarm Mitigation for UK Air Defenceradar competition – £14.15 million in Phase 3, building on
11Offshore Wind Net Zero Investment Leading the way to net zero Photo by Shaun Dakin on Unsplash Government support for offshore wind investment Our policies and proposals for growing the offshore wind sector in line with our 50GW ambition could support up to 90,000 direct and indirect jobs. We are supporting Ins titutes of Technologyacross England with £120 million for institutes specialising delivering high technical education and developing green skills. We are reforming the skills system through Local Skills Improvement Plans. We have instituted a Lifetime Skills Guarantee supporting workers gain the skills they need to transition to the green economy, including through targeted support for retraining. In England, DfE is investing an additional £3.8 billion in skillsby 2024-25. This includes funding for programmes to support green skills, including apprenticeships, T levels and Skills Bootcamps. Free Courses for Jobs supports eligible adults to gain high value Level 3 (A level-equivalent) qualifications, many of which can help them to transition to or specialise in roles in the green economy. The Green Jobs Delivery Group has been established as the central forum through whichgovernment and industry are working together to accelerate the supply of a skilled workforce for our low carbon sectors and hydrogen is included as part of the group's workplan. The North Sea Transition Dealhas developed an integrated People and Skills Plan to ensure the highly skilled oil and gas workforce with skills transferability to adjacent energy sectors can be deployed to develop our offshore wind industry. Provisions such as Skills Bootcamps, Free Courses for Jobs, Higher TechnicalQualifications and apprenticeships will upskill more workers to lower carbon emissions. | 99b7da14-2e39-4040-9e7c-c1a9c0e4b21a | 1 |
03dbef73-e7d8-4cee-83ab-74d57e552162 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/finance-act-2020_c9466068e740c31be6b3860aa3962da6.pdf | 2,020 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | “relevant information” means information of a kind specified under “relevant time” means any time— (a) after the time when the information is provided under section 54 or (if earlier) the last time by which the information may be provided in accordance with that section, and (b) before the giving of a direction under section 56 in relation to the group. (1) This section applies where the threshold conditions are met in relation to a group for (2) The responsible member must deliver a DST return— (a) for the accounting period, and (b) for each subsequent accounting period, subject to subsection (3). (3) An officer of Revenue and Customs may, on the application of the responsible member, direct that the duty to deliver a DST return does not apply in relation to an accounting period specified in the direction or subsequent accounting periods. (4) Such a direction may be given only if it appears to the officer that the threshold conditions will not be met in relation to the group for any accounting period beginning with the specified accounting period. (5) Nothing in a direction under subsection (3) prevents the further application of this section to the group, in any subsequent accounting period in which the threshold (6) Schedule 8 contains provision about DST returns, enquiries, assessments etc. 57 Meaning of “group”, “parent” etc (1) In this Part “group” means— (i) is a relevant entity (see section 58), and (ii) meets condition A or B (see subsections (2) and (3)), and (b) each subsidiary (if any) of the entity mentioned in paragraph (a). (2) Condition A is that the entity— (a) is a member of a GAAP group, and (b) is not a subsidiary of an entity that— (ii) itself meets condition A. (3) Condition B is that the entity is not a member of a GAAP group. Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (a) references to the “parent” of a group are to the entity mentioned in (b) references to a “member” of a group are to an entity mentioned in (c) “subsidiary” has the meaning given by the applicable accounting standards. (5) In this section “GAAP group” means a group within the meaning of the applicable (6) For the meaning of “the applicable accounting standards” see section 64. 58 Section 57: meaning of “relevant entity” (1) In section 57 “relevant entity” means— (b) an entity the shares or other interests in which are listed on a recognised stock exchange and are sufficiently widely held. (2) Shares or other interests in an entity are “sufficiently widely held” if no participator in the entity holds more than 10% by value of all the shares or other interests in the entity. (3) The following are not relevant entities— (d) a Northern Ireland department; (e) a foreign sovereign power. (a) “participator” has the meaning given by section 454 of CTA 2010; (b) “recognised stock exchange” has the meaning given by section 1137 of CTA (c) the reference to shares or other interests being listed on a recognised stock exchange is to be read in accordance with section 1137 of CTA 2010. (5) For the meaning of “company” see section 72. 59 Continuity of a group over time (1) In this Part, this section applies for the purpose of determining whether a group at any time (Time 2) is the same group as a group at any earlier time (Time 1). (2) The group at Time 2 is the same group as the group at Time 1 if and only if the entity that is the parent of the group at Time 2— (a) was the parent of the group at Time 1, and (b) was the parent of a group at all times between Time 1 and Time 2. 60 Treatment of stapled entities (1) This section applies where two or more entities—
Document 2023-04-25 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (a) would, apart from this section, be the parent of a group, and (b) are stapled to each other. (a) the entities were subsidiaries of another entity (the “deemed parent”), and (b) the deemed parent were within section 57 (1)(a) (conditions for being the (3) For the purpose of this section, an entity (A) is “stapled” to another entity (B) if, in consequence of the nature of the rights attaching to the shares or other interests in A (including any terms or conditions attaching to the right to transfer the interests), it is necessary or advantageous for a person who has, disposes of or acquires shares or other interests in A also to have, dispose of or acquire shares or other interests in B. Accounting periods, accounts etc 61 Accounting periods and meaning of “a group’s accounts” (1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part. (2) A group’s first accounting period— (a) begins with 1 April 2020, and (b) ends with the first accounting reference date to occur after that date or, if This is subject to subsection (4) (rule for groups coming into existence after 1 April (3) Any other accounting period of a group— (a) begins immediately after the end of the previous accounting period, and (b) ends with the first accounting reference date to occur after it begins or, if earlier, one year after it begins. (4) In the case of a group formed after 1 April 2020, its first accounting period— (a) begins with the date on which it is formed, and (b) ends with the first accounting reference date to occur after that date or, if earlier, one year after it begins. | ca3b9b92-77db-4231-8c6a-3d8df4630cf3 | 18 |
03e1154d-b5a5-4b95-9c6c-e382bd0f079f | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.10642v1 | 2,025 | [
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] | arxiv.org | LSTMs are specifically designed for sequential data and are capable of learning long-range dependenciesthrough memory cellsthat maintain internal states over time. At eachtime step t = 1 , . . ., T, the state s c j ( t ) of memory cell c j evolvesthroughthe interaction ofinput and output gates, which regulate the flow ofinformation. This gating mechanism allowsthe network to retain or discard information selectively, thus effectively mitigatingthe vanishing gradient problem that affects standard Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) and limitingtheir ability to model longterm dependencies. The update rule for the internal state is:
�
s c j ( t ) = s c j + y [in] [j] ( t ) · g
�� u w c j ,u y [u]
u
, s c j = 0 ,
where g ( · ) is anonlinear activation function that controls how newinformation is incorporated into the memory and y [u] denotesthe output of unit u at the previoustime step. The input and output gate activations are defined as:
�
�
y [in] [j] ( t ) = fin j
�� u win j ,u · y [u]
u
�� u w out j ,u · y [u]
u
; y [out] [j] ( t ) = f out j
,
where win j ,u , w out j ,u ∈ Rare trainable connection weights determiningthe influence ofinput u on the respective gate unit j and fin j and f out j are activation functionsthat control the openness of the input and output gates. The output of the memory cell isthen given by:
y [c] [j] ( t ) = y [out] [j] ( t ) · h ( s c j ( t )) ,
where h ( · ) is an output activation function applied to the internal state. 5 If the corrected parameters ˜ A i and ˜ B violate the stability condition (i.e., at least one eigenvalue of the companion matrix lies within or on the unit circle), the biasterms are progressively shrunk by a factor δ < 1 until stability is restored. SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) values were employed to enhance the LSTM model interpretability and elucidate the contribution ofindividual predictors. SHAP is grounded in cooperative game theory and assigns each feature an importance score correspondingto its average marginal contribution across all possible subsets of features. This yields explanationsthat are both locally accurate and globally consistent, effectively integratingthe strengths of global attribution methods, such as Permutation Importance, and local interpretability tools like LIME. Differently from Permutation Importance, SHAP is robust to multicollinearity, as it evaluates conditional expectations rather than marginal perturbations. Moreover, it avoidsthe instability and inconsistency that may affect LIME’s local surrogate models. Despite its computational cost, SHAP’s additive nature and sound theoretical grounding make it especially well-suited for interpreting complex, nonlinear architectures such as LSTMs. 3.3 Performance evaluation criteria
Forecasting models were trained on the first 338 weekly observations (approximately six and a half years) and evaluated on a hold-out test set consisting of the final 52 weeks. | 8efa7839-ca65-4475-877d-8918de68361b | 11 |
03e47f07-5677-4bd2-8df8-d67ddd90a81d | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/uk-net-zero-strategy-build-back-greener_807a7bbb4df0326606e1552618bffc6f.pdf | 2,021 | [
"zero",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | This change will impact on the extent and condition of natural capital assets and the ecosystem services they provide. The direction of impact (positive or negative) and its magnitude will depend on how and where land conversion happens. A systemic and spatial approach to land use, that considers net zero, socio- environmental objectives, and various socio- economic factors such as population and economic growth, is necessary to enact land use changes that delivers net zero as well as environmental outcomes in line with the 25 Year Environment Plan. Such an approach enables trade-offs to be managed among different objectives while facilitating win-win outcomes- for instance with flood protection Net Zero Build Back Greener
84. Over the last decade there have been changes in the underlying costs of energy bills, which have been mitigated through energy efficiency measures, helping consumers to use less energy. Electricity prices have trended upwards due to rising network costs and support for low carbon infrastructure and vulnerable households. Gas prices have fluctuated due to international wholesale gas prices, which in recent months have been 85. Government energy saving schemes have been targeted towards low-income or vulnerable households, and the retail energy price cap has helped protect those customers on default energy tariffs. Steps have also been taken to protect industries most exposed to the UK’s relatively higher industrial 86. The policies set out in the Net Zero Strategy will help insulate consumers from the over-reliance on fossil fuels which they face today, and help to shield households, business, and the wider economy from the destabilising effects of this reliance. 87. How electricity and gas bills will change on the path to net zero depends on factors such as technology costs, patterns of consumer energy use and the government’s gradual approach to rebalancing where social and policy costs fall. The nature of costs in a smart, clean energy system will be different. The largest part of the electricity bill is currently the cost to energy suppliers from buying power. This cost has traditionally been determined by the underlying price of gas or coal, but this is changing. Gas will continue to play a role in setting the electricity price for some years to come but, over time, will do so less frequently, as more and more low carbon generation (such as wind and solar) connect to the electricity system - consistent with the commitment to a fully decarbonised power system by 2035. This will help put downward pressured on wholesale electricity prices. 88. Patterns of energy consumption will also change. Most households and businesses are likely to increase their use of electricity, but reduce gas and petrol/diesel consumption, as they shift to low carbon forms of transport and heating (such as electric vehicles and heat pumps). It is essential to ensure that price incentives are fair and help support this transition away from relying on 89. It will remain the case that households and businesses who install energy saving measures will reap significant savings. 90. As we progress towards net zero, the Government is committed to ensuring the costs of decarbonising the energy system are fair and affordable for all energy users. We are considering both the benefits and the costs of different pathways holistically across the economy and will work with industry and 91. The impact of decarbonisation on progress in tackling fuel poverty will be determined by changes in electricity and fuel prices, and higher energy efficiency in the housing stock. In particular, policies to improve energy efficiency in homes - such as the Social Housing Decarbonisation Fund, Home Upgrade Grant, Energy Company Obligation and proposals on Minimum Energy Efficiency Standards - will help to improve the building performance for the homes of those in or at risk of fuel poverty. The Warm Homes Discount will support fuel poor homes through reduced bill costs. Fuel poverty is a devolved matter. In England we are committed to our target for fuel poor households, as far as reasonably practicable, to be living in a home rated EPC Band C or better by 2030. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own fuel poverty targets and are also working to improve the energy efficiency of
BEIS’ Dynamic Dispatch Model (DDM) has been used to generate technically feasible pathways that are consistent with achieving the NDC in 2030, the sixth carbon budget in 2033-37 and net zero in 2050.55 This model was developed by BEIS and is used for all power sector analysis within the department. This includes the Modelling 2050 – Electricity System Analysis report that was published with the Energy White Paper and the Energy 56 It was also used for the power sector analysis in the CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget report although the CCC used their own assumptions and off-model adjustments for this.57 Assumptions for the Northern Ireland power sector demand and emission pathway are based on the CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget advice. The DDM relies on many exogenous assumptions and inputs, and results can be sensitive to changes in these assumptions. This includes using electricity demand from UKTM and other sectors analysis and evidence on different technologies costs and characteristics from BEIS’ generation costs report. 58 Both full pathway runs and single year analysis is used to underpin the strategy set out in the power sector chapter. Distribution Network outcomes are modelled in the Distributions Networks Model (DNM). The DNM conducts electricity power flow analysis across 10 representative regional networks to estimate future distribution network constraints (thermal violations and voltage imbalances). The results of the constraint analysis are then fed into a separate investment model to calculate reinforcement costs up to 2050. Investment costs for power plant generation capacity and flexible assets are calculated from the DDM based on technological costs assumptions. Transmission and Distribution Network costs have been calculated separately. The costs for networks provided are in Allowed Revenues terms. | 23d06bea-fd9c-4b53-9b9a-c35258d49ad9 | 113 |
03e79e1b-f2e1-46bf-9f6f-5573137f7d1b | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-reports-br-br-3-national-communication-nc-nc-7_dabcc5bcde8c5a69cb06295558ac6b22.pdf | 2,017 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Each Party included in Annex II shall provide information on the implementation of Article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol, in particular information on what new and additional financial resources have been provided, in what way these resources are new and additional, and how that Party has taken into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of 42. Each Party included in Annex II shall provide information on its contribution to the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism. 43. Any Party included in Annex I that has provided funding for the adaptation fund established in accordance with decision 10/CP .7 shall report on its financial contributions to this fund. In doing so, the Party shall take into account the information reported in accordance with paragraph 6 of decision 10/CP .7. | c6207828-d0f1-4adb-9ed1-c6b8e81a528f | 192 |
03e898d6-7dd8-4a1f-b68c-7b8058e56757 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.01704v1 | 2,025 | [
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] | arxiv.org | This key result suggests that, in our calibration, the bulk of the welfare gains can be captured by a simple, well-designed tax on cumulative emissions, and that adding further complexity to the tax base yields diminishing returns. Related Literature. This paper is related to three strands of literature: (i) studies analyzing global warming through the lens of OLG models, (ii) research on optimal taxation with het-erogeneous agents, and (iii) the growing literature on solving dynamic economic models using machine learning techniques. (i) Examples of OLG models with environmental concerns include Burton (1993), Heijdra et al. (2006), Karp and Rezai (2014), Kotlikoff et al. (2021a), Karp et al. (2024), and Kotlikoff et al. (2024), who incorporate clean and dirty energy sectors, but abstract from climate uncertainty. Multiple studies, including Weitzman (2012), Golosov et al. (2014), Barnett et al. (2020), and Kotlikoff et al. (2021b), emphasize the importance of accounting for climate risks in optimal policy design. Our paper is most closely related to Kotlikoff et al. (2021b), who study optimal Pareto-improving taxes in an OLG model with climate uncertainty. While we abstract from modelling clean and dirty energy sectors separately, we expand on their work by proposing a global solution method to compute the Pareto-optimal state-dependent carbon taxes in an OLG model with climate uncertainty. (ii) We contribute to the literature on optimal Ramsey problems in quantitative, heterogeneousagent models. Dyrda and Pedroni (2023), Bhandari et al. (2013), andFeng et al. (2024) analyze optimal fiscal policy in incomplete-markets models with heterogeneous agents. Itskhoki and Moll (2019) analyze the Ramsey optimal development policy. Nuño and Thomas (2020) find the Ramsey optimal monetary policy. Douenne et al. (2024) are probably closest to our work in that they consider optimal policy in a model with climate change. The main difference between these papers and our work is that we focus on simple tax rules and only search for tax rules that are optimal within this small set. This simplifies the computational analysis, allows us to solve for optimal policy in much more complex environments, and makes an interpretation of our results much more straightforward. (iii) Finally, we also contribute to the rapidly growing literature on using machine learning techniques to solve dynamic stochastic models. 5 We combine methods developed in Scheidegger and Bilionis (2019), Azinovic et al. (2022), andChen et al. (2025). Conceptually, our workflow resembles that of Friedl et al. (2023): they (i) use DEQNs to solve a stochastic planner's problem and (ii) fit a Gaussian-process surrogate to the social cost of carbon, which they then exploit for parametric uncertainty quantification (Harenberg et al., 2019). Our framework departs from theirs in three key ways. First, we work with a stochastic overlapping-generations (SOLG) model instead of a representative-agent setting. Second, rather than treating structural parameters such as risk aversion as pseudo-states, we embed the coefficients of the carbon-tax and transfer rules directly in the state vector and solve for the resulting policy functions with a single DEQN run. Third, we construct GP surrogates for the SWF, not for the social cost of carbon, and embed this surrogate in an optimizer to recover welfare-optimal tax and transfer schedules. Organization of the Article. Section 2 introduces a SOLG framework with an explicit climate externality. Section 3 explains our choice of key parameters and functional forms of the model. Section 4 develops a generic, machine-learning-based procedure for computing Paretoimproving policies in heterogeneous-agent economies with various sources of uncertainty. Section 5 illustrates the method's performance through a series of numerical experiments, and Section 6 concludes. We consider a stochastic OLG economy with climate change caused by industrial emissions, which leads to a decrease in future total factor productivity. There is an infinite time-horizon, t = 0, . . ., and exogenous Markovian shocks realize every period. The economic block consists of 12 overlapping generations of selfish agents, in which each period spans five calendar years; households enter the economy at age 20 and exit at age 80 (Kotlikoff et al., 2021b). A representative firm produces a single consumption good using capital and labor as inputs and emitting CO 2 during the production process. We assume exogenously declining stochastic carbon intensity dynamics. The climate block is represented by a reduced-form, cumulative-emissions emulator (Dietz and Venmans, 2019). 6 Climate damages follow the convex specification of Weitzman (2012), augmented with stochastic tipping points in the spirit of Kotlikoff et al. (2021b). We outline the model in the following steps: Section 2.1 presents the firm block, Section 2.2 explains household behaviour, Section 2.3 details the role of the government, Section 2.4 describes the climate module, and Section 2.5 defines the competitive equilibrium. The representative firm produces consumption good Y and emissions e t at each time t:
Production is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function, where α represents the elasticity of substitution of capital, K, L, and δ are capital, labour, and depreciation, respectively. µ denotes abatement, and Φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a mitigation cost function. κ is the exogenous carbon intensity of production and Ω(T AT ) are damages arising from climate change, where T AT denotes current average temperature. Firms take as given a carbon tax rate τ t and maximize profits:
The carbon intensity (κ t ) follows an exogenous time-varying stochastic process. In the calibration, our objective will be to capture the uncertainty in CO 2 emissions and account for the possibility that emissions remain elevated over the next 100 years. We assume an abatement function of the form Φ(1 -µ) = 1 -θ 1 µ θ 2 t in the spirit of Nordhaus (2017). Abatement is restricted to be 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Unabated emissions lead to an increase in atmospheric temperature, which triggers damages that reduce output. We employ a damage function as in Weitzman (2012) and follow Kotlikoff et al. (2021b) by enhancing damages with stochastic tipping:
where T AT t is atmospheric temperature and T P t is the tipping point which follows a random walk. | 9bc34662-2c39-4234-bcc8-171baca3f65b | 1 |
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The Party reported in its NIR (p.357) an explanation of the poultry manure management practice and the final destination of the manure. Manure types going to incineration are assumed to be broiler and turkey litter and the reported quantities incinerated are converted to a proportion of the total manure for these poultry categories on the basis of estimated manure output per bird. Quantities quantities exported from Northern Ireland to England incinerated are deducted from the AD prior to the calculation of emissions from manure spreading on Include in the NIR references for all assumptions made for managed manure N applied to grassland and cropland, whether it be a published reference, a reference or report under preparation, or simply Resolved. The Party provided in its NIR (pp.364– 365) references for the sources of data underpinning the assumptions applied in the United Kingdom inventory regarding managed manure N applied to grassland and cropland. Section 5.10 Include in future annual submissions a summary of how the country-specific N2O EFs for sheep urine and dung were determined, including references. Resolved. The Party reported in its NIR (p.367) a summary of how the country-specific N2O EFs for sheep urine and dung were determined. According to 11.1), the N2O EF for sheep excreta is 50 per cent of the value of the EF for cattle excreta. This EF is supported, for sheep urine, by mean EF values in the 2019 Refinement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines (vol. 4,
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 523 category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section of the value of the EF for cattle dung (0.04 per cent for sheep compared with 0.13 per cent for cattle). On the basis of this information, the United Kingdom derived N2O EFs for sheep urine and dung by halving the country-specific values for cattle urine and dung Provide in the NIR an explanation and further supporting evidence for the classification of organic soils in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) as unmanaged and explain why the areas of organic soils in overseas territories and Crown dependencies are not included as a contributing source to N2O emissions from the cultivation of organic soils Addressing. Peat organic soils occur in the Falkland Islands and Isle of Man but not in the other Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. Emissions from the drainage and rewetting of organic soils on the Isle of Man were reported in this years inventory submission, with text included in the NIR text. There is a longer term research project into organic soils and emissions in the Falkland Islands (funded through the UK Government Darwin Initiative project DPLUS083), the results of which will feed into the Report emissions from overseas territories and Crown dependencies in the respective categories (3.A (enteric fermentation), 3.B (manure management), 3.D (direct and indirect N2O emissions from agricultural soils), 3.G (liming) and 3.H (urea Resolved. The documentation boxes in the CRF for categories 3.A-H have been updated to transparently clarify that the data for OTs and CDs are reported Provide an explanation in the NIR for the discrepancies between areas of organic soils reported Resolved. The Party reported in its NIR (pp.368 and grassland. The area of grassland on organic soils
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 524 category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section and non-intensive/semi-natural grassland condition categories, hence the differences in areas of organic soils reported in CRF tables 4.B, 4.C and 4(II). Calculate SOC change values for each soil type, under each land-use category and for each devolved administration and use those values to calculate SOC changes associated with land-use changes. Addressing. The implementation of the land-use tracking vector approach will enable the UK to move towards resolving this issue, by analysing areas of stable land-use. This needs to be combined with an updated assessment of SOC estimates by land use type to ensure that the most accurate and robust soil information is used in the inventory modelling. Both of these items have been proposed for addition to the Implement methodological changes to avoid any artefact trends in SOC changes in mineral soils associated with land-use changes or identify how the accumulation of land that has undergone a land-use change but not yet reached a new equilibrium, rather than a change in the rate of land-use changes, contributes to the trend in total SOC changes Addressing. Work has been commissioned to explore the effect of an extended land use change time series (beginning in 1900 vs beginning in 1950) on the resulting soil carbon stock change from 1990 onwards. Results of this will be reported in the 2024 Include information in the NIR on the verification of all carbon stock changes estimated using tier 3 methods and/or models (CARBINE, C-Flow and BSORT Addressing. The results from the second cycle of the NFI are not yet available, but will be used as part of verification efforts once the data has been analysed. Estimate and report carbon stock changes in biomass from forests not used for timber production in accordance with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines (vol. 4, chap. 4) owing to biomass losses associated with harvesting and/or gathering (e.g. fuelwood) or provide transparent information justifying that such losses are
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NIR 2023 (Issue 1) Ricardo Energy & Environment Page 525 category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section Provide in the NIR verification information consistent with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines (vol. 1, chap. 6.10, p.6.19) on estimates of emissions and/or removals prepared using tier 3 models, in accordance with paragraph 41 of the UNFCCC Annex I inventory reporting guidelines, and continue the model soil carbon stocks and flux verification exercise and report Addressing. | 70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69 | 416 |
03fe52a7-94d7-4538-88a8-bcedfa201701 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0628 | 2,005 | [
"Transport",
"Electricity and heat",
"Renewables"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 4. Research priorities - transport biofuels
The main area of research is second-generation biofuels made from various biomass resources and wastes, e.g. bioethanol, biodiesel, DME. The technical feasibility of converting cellulose material (straw/wood) and organic wastes into bioethanol and biodiesel has been demonstrated. But costs need to be brought down and technology needs to be further developed and demonstrated for commercial-scale production (over 150 000 tonnes a year). If this can be done, second-generation biofuels should offer three major advantages:
- they will secure a higher market share for biofuels by allowing the use of a wider range of raw material;
- the cultivation process (if any) could be less environmentally intensive than for ordinary agricultural crops;
- this lower intensity will be reflected in lower greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation. Second-generation biodiesel production has a fourth advantage: the fuel is of better quality than conventional diesel[57]. The price of these fuels will depend on technical developments and the price at which the raw material can be obtained. At this stage there is no reason to assume that they will be substantially cheaper than first-generation biofuels. The Commission plans to substantially increase its support for the development of second-generation biofuels through its research budgets. ANNEX 13 Results of consultation
This Communication and the impact assessment published alongside it take into account the results of extensive consultations. These began with the Commission s analysis of the various policies affecting biomass and an extensive public consultation campaign using all possible means, such as a public questionnaire via the Internet, numerous meetings with stakeholders, and bilateral meetings with Member States that have developed national Biomass Action Plans and with biomass experts. The main conclusion drawn from the consultations was that the Commission should push strongly on all fronts, at EU level and national level, in order to overcome the non-technical barriers facing biomass. Several more specific conclusions can be drawn from the consultation process:
- Sufficient biomass resources are available in the Union to meet the needs for an additional 80 mtoe per year by 2010 without major effects on forest products industries and food production. Energy crops can make a significant contribution while providing a new market outlet for agriculture and contributing to rural development. Any shortfalls can be addressed by imports. - There are competitive, reliable and efficient European technologies to convert biomass resources into energy vectors (electricity, heating or cooling and biofuels for transport). Nevertheless, RTD work on biomass (supported by appropriate national and EC funds) has to be intensified in order to meet new challenges. - European (as well as international) solid and liquid biofuels markets are in their infancy and have to be developed further to commodity level. In order to develop them successfully, work on standards and norms has to be accelerated. - Biomass is generally more expensive than comparable fossil fuel energy. However, in some areas (such as household heating by pellets and industrial CHP based on residues) biomass is already competitive. - There is an urgent need to start a professionally managed campaign to inform European citizens more fully about the benefits of biomass. This information barrier, as well as the absence of more effective representation of biomass at all levels, is also due to the lack of a strong European biomass association with industrial involvement. - The main problem that appears to be holding back the penetration of biomass on the energy markets is the lack of demand. The only way to increase demand is through appropriate policies implemented at national level. - Biomass is the only renewable energy source that does not suffer from intermittency problems and can potentially provide energy for heat, power and transport from the same installation. - Biomass in the form of solid, liquid or gaseous biofuels is the only renewable energy source that can directly replace solid, liquid and gaseous fossil fuels, either fully or in blends of various percentages, in which case often there is no need for equipment modifications. - Biomass is the only renewable energy source that cannot be found free; it necessitates a long chain of activities such as planting, growing, harvesting, pre-treatment (storage and drying) and upgrading to a fuel and, finally, mechanical, thermochemical or biological conversion into an energy carrier (power, heat or biofuels for transport). Therefore, biofuels (with the exception of untreated municipal waste) always have an associated cost that has to be borne by the final user. - Since land availability is limited there could come a point in the future when biomass for energy will have to compete with food, materials, bio-chemicals and carbon sinks. However, this point in time is beyond 2020, and if international trade in biomass fuels becomes effective could lie beyond 2050. | 4d97d3b3-afe5-45f2-8123-6e37d1fdc0fe | 78 |
03ff1402-5f6d-4396-ab3b-9ac3b3d3beaa | 2,025 | [
"urban europe",
"green chemistry",
"innovation projects",
"players",
"mechanical engineering"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | At the same time, under the impetus of the Marchal Plan, the Mecatech (in 2006) and GreenWin (in 2010) clusters were created with the aim of supervising players in technological development and supporting research and innovation projects in the field. mechanical engineering and in the field of green chemistry. Likewise, it participated in the “Urban Europe” call and in the “Hydrogen-Fuel Cell” JTI. Figure 20 - Walloon public expenditure for energy research and development by type (1999-2017) | 9ef3eecb-7297-40a0-802d-c75fc82757a1 | 0 | |
04001b0f-4fe9-4c32-ba87-60dd25f9f1c4 | http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st03/st03740-re01.en08.pdf | 2,009 | [
"Transport",
"Renewables"
] | register.consilium.europa.eu | The reports by the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council
referred to in Article 7b7, Article 7c2, Article 7c9, Article 7d4 and 5 and the
first subparagraph of Article 7d6, as well as the reports and information submitted
pursuant to in the first and fifth subparagraphs of Article 7c3 and Article 7d2,
shall be prepared and transmitted for the purposes of both Directive 2009EC and
this Directive. ____________________
OJ L 30, 31.1.2009, p. 16. OJ L 154, 21.6.2003, p. 1. OJ please insert number of the directive referred to in recital 8. PE-CONS 3740108 REV 1
PAWfc
DG I
49
EN
7
in Article 8, paragraph 1 shall be replaced by the following
1. Member States shall monitor compliance with the requirements of Articles 3 and 4,
in respect of petrol and diesel fuels, on the basis of the analytical methods referred to
in European standards EN 2282004 and EN 5902004 respectively. 8
the following Article shall be inserted
Article 8a
Metallic additives
1. The Commission shall conduct an assessment of the risks for health and the
environment from the use of metallic additives in fuel and, for this purpose, develop
a test methodology. It shall report its conclusions to the European Parliament and to
the Council by 31 December 2012. 2. Pending the development of the test methodology referred to in paragraph 1, the
presence of the metallic additive methylcyclopentadienyl manganese
tricarbonyl MMT in fuel shall be limited to 6 mg of manganese per litre from
1 January 2011. The limit shall be 2 mg of manganese per litre from 1 January 2014. PE-CONS 3740108 REV 1
PAWfc
DG I
50
EN
3. The limit for the MMT content of fuel specified in paragraph 2 shall be revised on
the basis of the results of the assessment carried out using the test methodology
referred to in paragraph 1. It may be reduced to zero where justified by the risk
assessment. It cannot be increased unless justified by the risk assessment. Such a
measure, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive shall be adopted
in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in
Article 114. 4. Member States shall ensure that a label concerning the metallic additive content of
fuel is displayed at any point where a fuel with metallic additives is made available
to consumers. 5. 6. The label shall contain the following text Contains metallic additives. The label shall be attached to the place where information indicating the type of fuel
is displayed, in a clearly visible position. The label shall be of a size and font that is
clearly visible and easily legible. PE-CONS 3740108 REV 1
PAWfc
DG I
51
EN
9
Article 9 shall be replaced by the following
Article 9
Reporting
1. The Commission shall submit by 31 December 2012, and every three years
thereafter, a report to the European Parliament and the Council accompanied, where
appropriate, by a proposal for amendments to this Directive. That report shall in
particular take account of the following
a
the use and evolution of automotive technology and, in particular, the
feasibility of increasing the maximum permitted biofuel content of petrol and
diesel and the need to review the date mentioned in Article 33
b Community policy on CO2 emissions from road transport vehicles
c
the possibility of applying the requirements of Annex II, and in particular the
limit value for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, to non-road mobile
machinery including inland waterways vessels, agricultural and forestry
tractors and recreational craft
d
the increase in the use of detergents in fuels
PE-CONS 3740108 REV 1
PAWfc
DG I
52
EN
e
the use of metallic additives other than MMT in fuels
f
the total volume of components used in petrol and diesel having regard to
Community environmental legislation, including the objectives of
Directive 200060EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of
water policy and its daughter directives
g
the consequences of the greenhouse gas reduction target set in Article 7a2 for
the emissions trading scheme
h
the potential need for adjustments to Articles 26, 27 and 7a2b in order to
assess possible contributions for reaching a greenhouse gas reduction target of
up to 10 by 2020. These considerations shall be based on the potential for
life cycle greenhouse gas emission reductions from fuels and energy within the
Community, taking into account in particular any developments in
environmentally safe carbon capture and storage technologies and in electric
road vehicles, and the cost effectiveness of means of reducing those emissions,
as referred to in Article 7a2b
PE-CONS 3740108 REV 1
PAWfc
DG I
53
EN
i
the possibility of introducing additional measures for suppliers to reduce
by 2 life cycle greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy, in comparison
with the fuel baseline standard referred to in Article 7a5b, through the use
of credits purchased through the Clean Development Mechanism of the
Kyoto Protocol under the conditions set out in Directive 200387EC, in order
to assess further possible contributions for reaching a greenhouse gas reduction
target of up to 10 by 2020, as referred to in Article 7a2c of this Directive
j
an updated cost-benefit and impact analysis of a reduction in the maximum
permitted vapour pressure for petrol for the summer period below 60 kPa. 2. At the latest in 2014, the Commission shall submit a report to the European
Parliament and the Council relating to the achievement of the greenhouse gas
emission target for 2020 referred to in Article 7a, taking into account the need for
consistency between this target and the target referred to in Article 33 of
Directive 2009EC, concerning the share of energy from renewable sources in
transport, in the light of the reports referred to in Articles 238 and 239 of that
Directive. | 2fa2bb5b-29b7-44c6-b6e0-944c288ed7be | 31 |
04058bcb-643a-4f46-90e0-ee023afd7331 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2504.01162v1 | 2,025 | [
"MANILA24 Workshop",
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"Climate Modeling",
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"Knowledge Discovery",
"Scientific Research",
"Interdisciplinary Research",
"Climate Change."
] | arxiv.org | PAPER
Information Retrieval for Climate Impact
Report on the MANILA24 Workshop
Maarten de Rijke
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
[m.derijke@uva.nl](mailto:m.derijke@uva.nl)
Bart van den Hurk
Deltares
The Netherlands
[bart.vandenhurk@deltares.nl](mailto:bart.vandenhurk@deltares.nl)
Flora Salim
UNSW Sydney
Australia
[flora.salim@unsw.edu.au](mailto:flora.salim@unsw.edu.au)
Alaa Al Khourdajie, Nan Bai, Renato Calzone, Declan Curran, Getnet Demil, Lesley Frew, Noah Gießing, Mukesh Kumar Gupta, Maria Heuss, Sanaa Hobeichi, David Huard, Jingwei Kang, Ana Lucic, Tanwi Mallick, Shruti Nath, Andrew Okem, Barbara Pernici, Thilina Rajapakse, Hira Saleem, Harry Scells, Nicole Schneider, Damiano Spina, Yuanyuan Tian, Edmund Totin, Andrew Trotman, Ramamurthy Valavandan, Dereje Workneh, Yangxinyu Xie [∗]
Abstract
The purpose of the MANILA24 Workshop on information retrieval for climate impact was to bring together researchers from academia, industry, governments, and NGOs to identify and discuss core research problems in information retrieval to assess climate change impacts. The workshop aimed to foster collaboration by bringing communities together that have so far not been very well connected – information retrieval, natural language processing, systematic reviews, impact assessments, and climate science. The workshop brought together a diverse set of researchers and practitioners interested in contributing to the development of a technical research agenda for information retrieval to assess climate change impacts. 1 Introduction
Human-induced climate change, including more frequent and intense extreme events, has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people, beyond natural climate variability. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading international body for assessment of climate change. Approximately every six years, the IPCC releases an assessment report on the different aspects, drivers, and impacts of climate change based on an assessment of the literature. The IPCC report has contributions from three different working groups. In particular, Working Group II (WGII) of the IPCC “assesses the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerabilities related to climate change, from a world-wide to a regional view of ecosystems and biodiversity, and of humans and their diverse societies, cultures and settlements. ∗ Affiliation not shown for all authors due to space limitations (see Appendix A for details). It considers their vulnerabilities and the capacities and limits of these natural and human systems to adapt to climate change and thereby reduce climate-associated risks together with options for creating a sustainable future for all through an equitable and integrated approach to mitigation and adaptation efforts at all scales”. Fully using the available knowledge on emerging climate change impacts is key to informing global policy processes as well as regional and local risk assessments and on-the-ground action on climate adaptation. The exponential growth in peerreviewed scientific publications on climate change is pushing manual expert assessments to their limits. While literature aggregated on the level of continents or world regions might be useful to the global policy process, informing concrete climate adaptation typically requires localized and contextualized information on climate impacts. Tracking the effectiveness and progress of adaptation actions has proven difficult – any attempt to track adaptation progress will need to be capable of rapidly handling large and varied datasets and literature sources, while acknowledging highly localized and contextualized information. This workshop report brings together researchers from the information retrieval, natural language processing, systematic review, and climate science communities in an attempt to develop an agenda to advance information retrieval for climate impact assessment. We begin by dissecting the problem: what is the information need addressed by the IPCC WGII? We then switch to methodologies, and in particular systematic reviews. We review different resources available (and/or needed) to support information retrieval for climate impact, including test sets and implementations. We then address the question of how to make new technological advances in information retrieval work as part of the IPCC WGII assessment workflow. The paper concludes with abroader perspective. To remain focused, our discussion and analysis is centered around IPCC WGII and its mission – we believe, however, that many of our questions and suggestions have the potential to contribute to the workflows of other IPCC working groups and task forces. 2 The Information Need
The IPCC aims to provide governments at all levels with scientific information that they can use to develop climate policies. The IPCC is divided into three working groups (WGs). WGI deals with the physical science basis of climate change, WGII with climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, and WGIII with mitigation of climate change. The IPCC does not conduct its own research, run models, or make measurements of climate or weather phenomena. Its role is to assess the scientific, technical and socio-economic literature relevant to understanding climate change, its impacts, future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation. Author teams assess all such information from any source that is to be included in the report. As pointed out in the introduction, approximately every six years, the IPCC releases a series of reports on the different aspects of climate change based on large-scale assessment of all the latest literature. In early 2022, as part of the IPCC’s sixth assessment report, the IPCC released the report of WGII on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, which “assesses the impacts of climate change, looking at ecosystems, biodiversity and human communities at global and regional levels. It also reviews vulnerabilities and the capacities and limits of the natural world and human societies to adapt to climate change”. The report covers ecosystems, sectors, sustainable development goals, and regions, an integrated technical summary, and a summary for policymakers. The AR6 WGII report pulls together evidence and findings from more than 34,000 journal papers and reports; it is written by 270 authors from 67 countries. | 35b8c024-1d6c-4178-be43-da52ad2ecfd6 | 0 |
040b7f6b-dc2a-48ca-bde7-839bc3f1f53f | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf | 2,020 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Under the Balanced Pathway interconnector capacity increases to 18 GW by 2050. However, until the power systems in the rest of Europe become fully decarbonised, there is uncertainty around the carbon intensity of imported electricity. Balanced Net Zero Pathway (2020-50) Other category includes agriculture, aviation, direct air capture, shipping and F-gases. 2050, reflecting electrification
137 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero The transition to a near-zero emission electricity system will have several • 2020s – Deploying low-cost renewables at scale and developing the markets for gas CCS and hydrogen, with some new build nuclear. • 2030s – Transitioning to a completely low-carbon system by displacing unabated gas with low-carbon alternatives by 2035, alongside ramping up deployment of zero-carbon generation to keep pace with electrification of end-use sectors and increasing potential for demand-side flexibility via electric vehicles, heat pumps, and hydrogen production. • 2040s – Running a near-zero emission electricity system, with variability in renewable generation managed through flexible demand, medium- and long-term storage, and use of dispatchable low-carbon generation. The result is that generation under the Balanced Pathway is completely low- BEIS (2020) 2018 UK greenhouse gas final figures. BEIS (2020) 2019 UK greenhouse gas provisional figures; CCC analysis. Rate of reduction in carbon intensity accelerates from 2025, reflecting a rapid expansion of low-carbon Balanced Pathway falls rapidly transition to a full low-carbon
Chapter 3: Sector pathways to Net Zero 138 Balanced Net Zero Pathway (2020-50) fossil fuel generation includes coal and gas. Variable renewables include wind and solar. Firm power includes nuclear. Dispatchable low-carbon generation includes gas CCS, BECCS and hydrogen. b) Alternative routes to delivering abatement in the mid -2030s In addition to the Balanced Pathway, we have developed four exploratory scenarios. The overall approach to these is set out in Chapter 1. These scenarios explore alternative ways of reaching near-zero emissions from electricity generation over the period to 2050. They have a similar pathway for emissions but reflect different levels of electrification across the economy, as well as different technology mixes to generate that electricity. Across the exploratory scenarios, electricity demand ranges from 350 to 370 TWh in unabated fossil fuel use after
139 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero exploratory scenarios (2010-50) BEIS (2020) Digest of UK Energy Statistics; CCC analysi s. Excludes demand from electrolysis using surplus electricity generation. That accounts for an additional 65- 290 TWh in 2050, depending on the scenario. These ranges for electricity demand reflect different patterns and levels of electrification in other • Headwinds. This scenario has the least amount of electrification across the economy, and therefore the lowest demand level. Cars and vans are electrified, as in all the scenarios, and in this scenario heat and industrial processes in manufacturing are partially electrified, in total adding 245 TWh of electricity demand by 2050. • Widespread Engagement. In this scenario Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) are also electrified, but a switch towards active travel and public transport moderates transport demand. A greater proportion of manufacturing and most heat energy demand is electrified. Together this leads to 310 TWh of new electricity demands by 2050. • Widespread Innovation. This is a scenario with widespread electrification, as a result of low electricity costs. Heating, surface transport (including HGVs), and manufacturing and construction electrify extensively. In addition, there are new demands from Direct Air Capture and to a lesser extent from agriculture and aviation. Overall, these sectors add 375 TWh of electricity
Chapter 3: Sector pathways to Net Zero 140 • Tailwinds. This scenario is similar to Widespread Innovation, but with a lower degree of electrification of heating and surface transport. There is an additional 315 TWh of new demand by 2050. Onto these different demand levels, we overlay scenarios for future low-carbon technologies. The range for carbon intensity under these scenarios is less than 50 gCO2/kWh in 2030, 10-15 gCO2/kWh in 2035, and 1-2 gCO2/kWh in 2050. These compare to a carbon intensity of 220 gCO2/kWh in 2019. Decarbonisation is similar across our scenarios over the 2020s, with variable renewables reaching 65-70% of electricity generation in 2030. However, the pace of low-carbon deployment and the mix of generation technologies in the • Headwinds. This scenario has the lowest share of variable renewables in 2050, with a greater role for dispatchable low-carbon generation and – Past 2030, the share of renewable generation increases to around 75%. Nuclear also meets some of the growth in the 2030s, while dispatchable low-carbon generation plays an increasingly important role, meeting 20% of demand by 2050. Unabated gas generation is phased out by 2040, later than in the Balanced Pathway. – At this level of variable renewable generation, there could be 70 TWh of surplus electricity production. Most of that could be used to produce green hydrogen, with installed electrolyser capacity of 10 • Widespread Engagement. In this scenario there is a greater emphasis on variable renewables and dispatchable low-carbon generation. – Despite higher levels of demand, this scenario sees the renewable share of generation grow to 85% by 2050. Dispatchable low-carbon generation and nuclear play a consistent role in providing about 15% of generation in total. In this scenario, hydrogen plants or storage solutions are particularly important to ensure security of supply. – The surplus electricity that stems from variable generation can help produce 95 TWh of green hydrogen in 2050. In order to capture that there is 10 GW of installed electroyser capacity in 2030 and 100 GW in • Widespread Innovation. This scenario has the highest share of variable renewable generation, reaching 90% in 2050. | 083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7 | 38 |
04106ce8-5a66-41ea-a25e-ed492643fd70 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R0851 | 2,023 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Other low-carbon technologies and fuel switch",
"Renewables"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | ;
(f)
point 6.3 is replaced by the following:
6.3. Specific emissions targets from 2025 onwards
6.3.1
Specific emissions targets for 2025 to 2029
Specific emissions target = (specific emissions reference target (øtargets EU fleet-wide target2025)) ΠZLEV factor
where:
specific emissions reference target
is the specific emissions reference target of CO2 determined in accordance with point 6.2.1;
øtargets
is the average, weighted on the number of new light commercial vehicles of each individual manufacturer, of all the specific emissions reference targets determined in accordance with point 6.2.1;
ZLEV factor
is (1 + y x), unless this sum is larger than 1,05 or lower than 1,0 in which case the ZLEV factor shall be set to 1,05 or 1,0, as the case may be;
where:
y
is the share of zero- and low-emission vehicles in the manufacturer's fleet of new light commercial vehicles calculated as the total number of new zero- and low-emission vehicles, where each of them is counted as ZLEVspecific in accordance with the following formula, divided by the total number of new light commercial vehicles registered in the relevant calendar year:
ZLEVspecific = 1
x
is 17Â % in the years 2025 to 2029. 6.3.2
Specific emissions targets for 2030 to 2034
Specific emissions target = specific emissions reference target (øtargets - EU fleet-wide target2030)
where:
specific emissions reference target
is the specific emissions reference target for the manufacturer determined in accordance with point 6.2.2;
øtargets
is the average, weighted on the number of new light commercial vehicles of each individual manufacturer, of all the specific emissions reference targets determined in accordance with point 6.2.2;
EU fleet-wide target2030
is as determined in point 6.1.2. 6.3.3
Specific emissions targets for 2035 onwards
Specific emissions target = specific emissions reference target (øtargets - EU fleet-wide target2035)
where:
specific emissions reference target
is the specific emissions reference target for the manufacturer determined in accordance with point 6.2.3;
øtargets
is the average, weighted on the number of new light commercial vehicles of each individual manufacturer, of all the specific emissions reference targets determined in accordance with point 6.2.3;
EU fleet-wide target2035
is as determined in point 6.1.3. . (*1) The share of zero- and low-emission vehicles in the new passenger car fleet of a Member State in 2017 is calculated as the total number of new zero- and low-emission vehicles registered in 2017 divided by the total number of new passenger cars registered in the same year. ; | 8c61c8d0-fc6c-478d-9006-4918824d70a1 | 18 |
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] | ecolex.org | These Regulations amend the Carbon Accounting Scheme (Scotland) Regulations 2010 so as to reflect the change of name of the relevant account in the UK Registry referred to in the Carbon Accounting Regulations 2009. They also concern 3 a method for determining whether a carbon unit is to be credited to or debited from the net Scottish emissions and what information is to be included in the register. | b6c57b8c-8976-444f-a273-678443f14b9a | 0 |
04247fc0-6363-4bfa-8024-0cae867afa14 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_e2ed2f6c199088dc30a95fddf6e84c72.pdf | 2,023 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"energy",
"emission"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | In 1990, the majority of these emissions came from the production of solid fuels; however, these emissions have decreased significantly, due to the closure of all UK deep coal mines (by 2015). Another notable trend arises from the reductions in leakage of methane from the natural gas distribution network. | 70afacf8-8641-4466-819d-f4db8cad9d69 | 249 |
042d94af-9678-44e7-a77b-709e66370bc9 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/?uri=CELEX:51999PC0296 | 2,000 | [
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 2. The Member State shall immediately inform the Commission of any such measure, indicating the reasons for its decision. The Commission shall make this information known to the other Member States. Article 8
1. Member States shall adopt and publish the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive within a year of its adoption. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof. Member States shall apply these provisions on the expiration of a period of one year counting from the date of adoption of this Directive. When Member States adopt these provisions, these shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference at the time of their official publication. The procedure for such reference shall be adopted by Member States. 2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive. | 32052901-ad2a-47ed-b5cf-9f7be7d4370f | 42 |
0432a4b5-cd3a-4c5a-864e-e6ff5bb9ff0b | https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/7867/documents/81700/default/ | 2,021 | [
"climate",
"development",
"committee",
"respondents",
"international"
] | parliament.uk | International Development Committee report and survey on UK climate action Congratulations to you and your team on the successful conclusion of the COP26 meeting in Glasgow . I appreciated what a huge undertaking this has been and how much hard work must have gone into it. Please find herewith a copy of our report on Global Britain in UK climate action and international development around COP26. You may be aware that we have been conducting an inquiry examining, ahead of COP26 in November, the progress the Government has made putting climate change at the c entre of aid policy. During the inquiry we heard from academics, NGOs , and civil society org anisations in developing countries, as well as people involved in this and previous COPs. You may not have had time to look at our Report in the run up to COP26 but I hope that you will now be able to read and engage with our recommendations and the evidence we took. We made recommendations on how UK aid for climate change should be targeted to help the people whose everyday lives are affected by it. We also made recommendations on the UK stopping funding of fossil fuel projects, making it easier for low - and middle -income countries to access climate funds , and ensuring programmes in those countries build and develop local expertise. All these themes will be familiar to you from the discussions that took place in Glasgow. During our inquiry we wanted to engage with young people and ran a survey to see what they thought about climate change and development issues . Annexed to this letter is a summary of the key findings. While the findings are not unexpected, I feel they are interesting and important, and I hope you will take a brief moment to read
International Development Committee What we learned from our survey into young people and climate change The International Development Committee conducted a survey as part of the inquiry into COP26, development and climate change between July and October 2021. We asked young people to respond to a serie s of questions about their knowledge of climate change, their measures to tackle climate change and UK climate action and received 996 responses. We are pleased that so many young people have taken the time to engage with the survey. • Out of 996 respondents, 564 respondents were aged 15 or under and 426 respondents stated that they were 16 or above. (6 respondents did not indicate • Most respondents (739) said that they recycled paper and electronic equipment, 604 said that they walked or cycled whenever possible, 489 said that they used as little plastic as possible and 380 respondents stated that they chose environmentally-friendly products, even if they might be more expensive • A majority (614 respondents) said that the UK was not doing enough to help • Over a third of respondents (396) stated that the UK as COP President should put more pressure on the top greenhouse gas emitters to reduce their level of emissions. Just over a quarter of respondents (258) stated that the UK should focus on more sharing of knowledge and best practice on how to tackle climate change during its presidency. Nearly one in five respondents (197) would like the UK to focus on the provision of more money for tackling climate change whilst around one in twelve respondents (120) would like the UK to focus on the provision of more power to communities to decide how to tackle clima te
International Development Committee
International Development Committee
International Development Committee
International Development Committee
International Development Committee You can find out more about the work of the Committee on its webpage. The Committee agreed a report on Global Britain in UK climate action and international development around COP26 that is available on the website, along with all the written and oral evidence taken during the inquiry. You can watch any of the oral evidence sessions on Parliamentlive.tv. You can follow the work of the Committee | 5c38108f-c6dd-4c7a-ba7c-f4d69e030189 | 0 |
0444ffff-03b0-4179-905b-8b9c3966343f | https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/schedule/1/crossheading/membership | 2,008 | [
"of- u.k.",
"maximum number",
"climate change policy",
"northern ireland",
"economic analysis"
] | legislation.gov.uk | Membership U.K. 1 (1) The Committee shall consist of- U.K. (a) a person appointed by the national authorities to chair the Committee ("the chair"), and (b) not less than five and not more than eight other members appointed by the national authorities. (2) The national authorities must consult the chair before appointing the other members. (3) In appointing a member, the national authorities must have regard to the desirability of securing that the Committee (taken as a whole) has experience in or knowledge of the following- (a) business competitiveness; (b) climate change policy at national and international level, and in particular the social impacts of such policy; (c) climate science, and other branches of environmental science; (d) differences in circumstances between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and the capacity of national authorities to take action in relation to climate change; (e) economic analysis and forecasting; (f) emissions trading; (g) energy production and supply; (h) financial investment; (i) technology development and diffusion. (4) The Secretary of State may by order amend sub-paragraph (1)(b) so as to alter the minimum or maximum number of members of the Committee. (5) Such an order may only be made with the consent of the other national authorities. (6) Any such order is subject to negative resolution procedure. 2 U.K. The national authorities may, after consulting the chair, appoint one of the members as deputy to the chair ("the deputy chair"). | f9ef1813-8d8b-40de-bbaa-1fb584375e8a | 0 |
0446ebbd-8ebe-464b-9152-83b8361c05c0 | https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/strategy-for-environment-natural-resources-and-agriculture-research-2022-2027-lex-faoc207114/?type=legislation&xsubjects=Mineral+resources&page=36 | 2,021 | [
"energy",
"development",
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"management",
"protection",
"water",
"measure",
"environment",
"consist",
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] | ecolex.org | The Strategy for Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture Research 2022-2027 (the Strategy) sets out how the vision of the Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture Research Programme (the Programme) will be achieved, the mechanisms to fund research, and the operational changes to governance and reporting mechanisms which will be made during the next cycle. The Strategy extends funding research on topics not previously included in the Programme, these include: air quality; the circular economy; and land reform. | fc2087c2-b127-4d64-ae16-f629c881ce7e | 0 |
044e9c86-d8ea-49e0-b388-3327c5cdabf5 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/financial-services-and-markets-act-2023_932920a8d8da4ed5a2456d9109b47a62.pdf | 2,023 | [
"Finance",
"changes",
"force",
"section",
"financial",
"services"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (4C) For the purposes of this section, the exemption relating to functions conferred on the FCA mentioned in paragraph 11 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 (exemption from application of listed GDPR provisions) does not (4D) Where representations are made to the FCA by a Committee of the House of Commons or the House of Lords or a Joint Committee of both Houses in accordance with subsection (2)(e), the FCA’s account mentioned in subsection (4) must also describe how the FCA has considered the representations made by that Committee in making the proposed rules.” (2) In section 138J of FSMA 2000 (consultation by the PRA), after subsection (4) insert— “(4A) The PRA must include, in the account mentioned in subsection (4), a list of the respondents who made the representations, where those respondents have consented to the publication of their names. (4B) The duty in subsection (4A) is not to be read as authorising or requiring such processing of personal data as would contravene the data protection legislation (but the duty is to be taken into account in determining whether particular processing of data would contravene that legislation). Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) CHAPTER 3 – Accountability of regulators Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes (4C) For the purposes of this section, the exemption relating to functions conferred on the PRA mentioned in paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 (exemption from application of listed GDPR provisions) does not apply. (4D) Where representations are made to the PRA by a Committee of the House of Commons or the House of Lords or a Joint Committee of both Houses in accordance with subsection (2)(e), the PRA’s account mentioned in subsection (4) must also describe how the PRA has considered the representations made by that Committee in making the proposed rules.” (3) In section 104 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (consultation requirements), after subsection (5) insert— “(5A) The Payment Systems Regulator must include, in the account mentioned in subsection (5), a list of the respondents who made the representations, where those respondents have consented to the publication of their names. (5B) The duty in subsection (5A) is not to be read as authorising or requiring such processing of personal data as would contravene the data protection legislation (but the duty is to be taken into account in determining whether particular processing of data would contravene that legislation). (5C) In this section “data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3 of that Act). (5D) Where representations are made to the Payment Systems Regulator by a Committee of the House of Commons or the House of Lords or a Joint Committee of both Houses in accordance with subsection (3)(d), the Payment Systems Regulator’s account mentioned in subsection (5) must also describe how the Payment Systems Regulator has considered the representations made by that Committee in making the proposed requirement.” I137 S. 53 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I138 S. 53 in force at 29.8.2023 by S.I. 2023/779, reg. 4(mm) Schedule 8 makes provision about the provision of cash deposit and withdrawal services in the United Kingdom or a part of the United Kingdom. I139 S. 54 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(c)
90 Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) PART 3 – Performance of functions relating to financial market infrastructure CHAPTER 3 – Accountability of regulators Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes 55 Wholesale cash distribution Schedule 9 makes provision about persons involved in wholesale cash distribution (as that term is defined in the Schedule). I140 S. 55 in force at 29.8.2023, see s. 86(2)(d) 56 Recognised senior managers and certification Schedule 10 amends FSMA 2000 to make provision about the performance, by senior managers and others, of functions in relation to activities carried on by recognised bodies (within the meaning of Part 18 of that Act) of types specified by the Treasury. I141 S. 56 in force at Royal Assent for specified purposes, see s. 86(1)(e) 57 Central counterparties in financial difficulties Schedule 11 makes provision for a special resolution regime for central counterparties where all or part of its business has encountered, or is likely to encounter, financial I142 S. 57 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 86(3) I143 S. 57 in force at 29.8.2023 for specified purposes by S.I. 2023/779, reg. 4(nn) I144 S. 57 in force at 31.12.2023 in so far as not already in force by S.I. 2023/1382, reg. 8(a)
Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29) PART 5 – Insurers in financial difficulties CHAPTER 3 – Accountability of regulators Document 2025-04-01 This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 01 April 2025. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. | 60620217-7ea8-4d25-b12c-cbbb5bd7a3f3 | 41 |
044fa627-0654-4d02-a1ae-ab73d013059c | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-national-communication-nc-nc-8-biennial-reports-br-br-5_288d5f885869447df3e9910829b567a3.pdf | 2,022 | [
"climate",
"energy",
"support",
"emissions",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Programmes supported by the UK may work across all three areas of action Some examples of UK activities in each of these areas are detailed below (not exhaustive): The Risk Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP) brings together an unprecedented range of stakeholders across the climate, humanitarian and development communities with the aim of making 1 billion people safer from disaster by 2025. REAP does not create a new funding mechanism or directly implement ground-level projects, however, seeking instead to enable coherence, alignment and complementarity of existing initiatives, while learning together what new initiatives are needed to make 1 billion people safer. The Coalition for Climate Resilient Investment develops and pilots practical tools, solutions and financial instruments to support a more efficient integration of physical climate risks in investment decision-making. The Least Developed Countries Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE AR) has been supported by the UK since April 2020 and works closely currently with
Chapter 6 Financial Assistance and Support for Technologies 353 6 ‘frontrunner countries’ from the LDC Group at UNFCCC to transform the way that climate finance is accessed, managed and targeted with an objective that at least 70% of climate finance will support local level actions by 2030. This supports the LDC Vision that by 2030 all their (currently 46) countries will be climate resilient by 2030 and will reach net zero by 2050. 6.4.6 nature, land use, and oceans The UK supports a combination of climate mitigation and adaptation through cross-cutting activities that deliver protection and restoration of nature, both terrestrial and marine, and Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest finance (LEAF) is an ambitious financing mechanism that is mobilising public and private finance for tropical forest protection using high integrity voluntary carbon markets. Companies providing finance must commit to deep emission cuts in their own value chains, while emissions reductions generated by reduced deforestation are independently verified using the stringent ART/TREES standard. So far, LEAF has mobilised $1bn (£700m) in results-based finance and is poised to grow to become one of the largest ever public-private efforts to protect tropical forests. The UK has committed £200m for results-based finance and technical assistance. Mobilising Finance for Forests (MFF) is a new £150 million (2021-2036) UK blended finance programme aimed at increasing private sector investment in activities which protect and restore forests, whilst reducing deforestation associated with unsustainable land use practices over 15 years. It was launched in March 2021 and has already disbursed £100 million to the delivery partner (the Dutch Finance Institution FMO), who are responsible for selecting funds and projects aimed at creating value from standing forests and/ or incorporating forest protection and restoration into sustainable forms of agricultural production. The majority of the capital will be invested in existing sustainable land use funds, while some is reserved for direct investment in projects in tropical forest regions. MFF made its first investment in November 2021 into the Green Fund to issue debt to projects in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Indonesia, Liberia, and Gabon. The Biodiverse Landscapes Fund programme is providing £100m over seven years from 2021/22, mostly through international climate finance, to strengthen protection of six critical ecosystems across the KAZA region (Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe), the Western Congo Basin, Madagascar, the lower Mekong, Mesoamerica and Ecuador and Peru. As well as reducing carbon emissions, it will help half and reverse loss of biodiversity and support sustainable livelihoods from resources in protected areas. The Biodiverse Landscapes Fund (£100m over seven years from 2021/22) which aims to deliver biodiversity protection and conservation, poverty reduction, and climate change mitigation and adaptation outcomes across six highly biodiverse landscapes worldwide. The six landscapes covered are Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, Mesoamerica, Congo Basin, Andes Amazon, Lower Mekong, and Madagascar. The UK’s Blue Planet Fund will deliver £500m (over five years) from 2021/22, mostly from international climate finance to protect marine environments (addressing climate change and biodiversity loss) and reduce poverty. It will, for instance, provide technical assistance through the UK Ocean Country Partnership Programme, support conservation of coral reefs (Global Fund for Coral Reefs), strengthen investment in critical marine ecosystems such as mangroves through the Ocean Risk and Resilience Action Alliance. The UK is continuing to deliver a set of ongoing programmes funded from previous and current international climate
354 8th National Communication The UK Blue Carbon Fund, managed by the Inter-American Development Bank, aims to encourage the sustainable management of mangrove forests in target countries across Latin America and the Caribbean by developing and embedding operational blue carbon markets. It seeks to mobilise public and private sector investment to support mangrove protection and fund projects in areas such as sustainable aquaculture, coastal zone management and eco-tourism to tackle the main drivers of mangrove degradation. The Fund is projected to sequester or avoid 2.9 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions; protect or restore 5,570 hectares of mangrove forest; and protect or restore £48 million of ecosystem services. The £10.3 million Blue Forests Initiative (2016-2024), delivered by UK NGO Blue Ventures, works with local coastal communities in Madagascar and Indonesia to protect and restore mangrove habitat, create new sustainable livelihoods, support community health and women’s empowerment, and increase climate resilience. The programme is projected to protect over 180,000 hectares of mangrove forests; deliver over 7.7 million tonnes of carbon savings; benefit 86,000 people through sustainable livelihoods, and create successful models to increase the resilience of coastal communities that are replicable and scalable. The Low Carbon Agriculture for Avoided Deforestation and Poverty Reduction Programme in Brazil, through the Inter-American Development Bank, is restoring deforested and degraded land on small- and medium-sized farms in the Amazon, Atlantic Forests, Cerrado and Caatinga biomes, targeting the barriers experienced by farmers in accessing rural credit to support sustainable production. =The UK has contributed to the BioCarbon Fund, a multilateral project administered by the World Bank aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the land use sector through sustainable landscape management, whilst improving the livelihoods of forest communities. | e6994b55-18ee-49c8-92db-2261135aea96 | 152 |
04532d44-dfbf-4487-a043-98cfbf3a9f54 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The survey outputs contain information on trends in the use and application rates of nitrogen, phosphate, potash, sulphur, organic manures and lime onto crop and grassland. The survey seeks to identify the cropping patterns that influence fertiliser rates and dressing covers, including for key crops (e.g. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 366 |
04551536-a9e4-4e1c-bca2-0bb155e47ca7 | 2,025 | [
"15.1.1 forest area",
"sustainable energy supply",
"sustainable forest management",
"total investment",
"combat climate change"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | Table 3.1. National SDG targets aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions
National SDG Target
Indicator
Goal 7 Affordable and clean energy
7.2 By 2030, significantly increase the share of renewable energy in the 7.2.1 Share of energy generated by renewable energy sources
energy balance
in the total amount of energy
7.3 By 2030, double the energy efficiency rate
7.b By 2030, expand infrastructure and modernize technologies for a
modern and sustainable energy supply
Goal 9 Industrialization, innovation and infrastructure
9.4 By 2030, modernize infrastructure and reequip industrial plants to
make them sustainable through improved resource efficiency and
increased use of clean and environmentally sound technologies and
industrial processes
Goal 12 Responsible consumption and production
12.5 By 2030, substantially reduce waste through prevention, recycling
and reuse measures
Goal 13 Combat climate change
13.2 Include climate change response measures in the policy,
development strategy at the national level, paying special attention to
the measures implemented in the Aral Sea zone
Goal 15 Conserve terrestrial ecosystems
15.1 Ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of
ecosystems, including forests
15.2 Promote sustainable management of all types of forests, halt
deforestation, restore degraded forests and significantly scale up
afforestation and reforestation
7.3.1 Energy intensity calculated as the ratio of primary energy
consumption to GDP
7.b.1 Share of investment in energy in total investment in fixed
assets
9.4.1 Reduction of CO emissions per unit of value added
12.5.1 Increase the level of solid waste processing, %
13.2.1 Existence of comprehensive development programs and
strategies that include measures and actions aimed at reducing
GHG emissions and increasing the level of climate resilience
15.1.1 Forest area as a percentage of total land area
15.2.1 Progress towards sustainable forest management:
a) change in net forest area;
b) stocks of terrestrial biomass in forests;
c) proportion of forest area located in legally protected areas;
d) proportion of forest area for which a long-term forest
management plan has been developed; | 09346bdf-c350-4f8d-ab28-d7342e9df91f | 0 | |
0459267e-a576-4bf7-b0a4-4d2db285a23c | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/643583fb877741001368d815/mobilising-green-investment-2023-green-finance-strategy.pdf | 2,023 | [
"strategy",
"green",
"finance",
"published"
] | www.gov.uk | We intend to engage widely with stakeholders on our approach to these K P I s with a view to finalising our 11. The areas we envisage these K P I s potentially covering include topics such the quantity and quality of sustainability reporting and transition plans; consistency of finance flows with climate goals; the size of green finance markets; jobs and skills in green finance; and the competitiveness of the U K a s a global green finance centre. 12. The government will regularly assess the effectiveness of our policy within the Net Zero-aligned Financial Centre structure, through periodic monitoring of K P I s and appropriate policy adjustment, ensuring that Government is transparent and accountable for driving the transition of the finance sector. 2.2 Comparable and consistent information flows 13. The bedrock of financial markets is information. Market participants need consistent, comparable data and information to flow from the real economy into their decision- making. This allows asset owners to better understand which projects will have the greatest positive climate impact; it enables financial firms to lend or borrow money based on a timely and accurate assessment of climate and nature risks; and it empowers companies themselves to better tell their stakeholders how they will reach their climate and environmental objectives. Ultimately, more information should lead to more accurate pricing in markets. 14. The U K h as already taken a number of steps to ensure market participants have the data they need. This becoming the first G 2 0 country to require Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosure-aligned (T C F D ) disclosures across the economy; setting out a comprehensive approach to disclosure in the 2021 Greening A Roadmap to Sustainable Investing, and being the first government to fund and fully support the creation and progress of the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (T N F D ). The U K g overnment is committed to continuing on this path, and is creating an effective disclosure framework for sustainability information. We know
the importance of getting this right, balancing investor needs for information with the burdens of providing that information. 2.2.1 Sustainability Disclosure Requirements 15. Greening A Roadmap to Sustainable Investing (2021) set out the U K government’s long-term strategy to ensure investors and consumers are able to access the sustainability information they need 27. Our plan for Sustainability Disclosure Requirements (S D R ), a streamlined disclosure framework for sustainability information, is central to this. The S D R f ramework brings together new and existing sustainability reporting requirements for business, the financial sector and investment products. This will enable market participants to identify investment opportunities, ensuring that sustainability claims stand up to scrutiny and protect against consumer 16. A key aspect of the U K ’s disclosure framework has been the requirements aligned with T C F D r ecommendations. The T C F D i s an industry-led group, set up in 2015, tasked with developing a disclosure framework which could apply to any company in any geography, supporting them to consider and report on their climate risks and opportunities in a uniform way. 17. Given the positive market reaction to the framework and subsequent voluntary reporting, in our 2019 Green Finance Strategy we set an expectation that all listed companies and large asset owners should disclose in line with T C F D b y 2022. In addition, we set up a cross government and regulator taskforce to consider the appropriateness of mandatory disclosure requirements and coordinate thinking. The taskforce ultimately advised that mandatory disclosure requirements should be introduced to improve the quantity, quality and consistency of reporting, and in November 2020 the Government set out a commitment to introduce economy-wide 18. We have delivered on this commitment, becoming the first G 2 0 government to do a. New regulations on 28 October 2021, required listed companies with over 500 employees, alongside private companies and Limited Liability Partnerships (L L P s) with more than 500 employees and a turnover of over £500 million to disclose their governance, strategy, risk management and use of metrics and targets regarding climate risks and opportunities, within their annual Strategic Report. This must include the use of scenario analysis. These new requirements apply for accounting periods starting on or after 6 April 2022. b. As of the end of December 2021, the the F C A i ntroduced climate-related disclosure requirements aligned with the T C F D ’s recommendations for the following regulated premium listed companies, issuers of standard listed shares and global depositary receipts, asset managers, life insurers and F C A -regulated pension c. From 1 October 2021, the Government introduced requirements relating to occupational pension schemes reporting in line with the T C F D r ecommendations, to improve both the quality and governance and the level of action by trustees in identifying, assessing and managing climate risk. requirements were introduced in relation to the calculation and reporting of a metric which gives the alignment of the scheme’s assets with the goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to 1.5˚C above pre-industrial levels.30 19. The U K i s currently in the first full year of T C F D -aligned climate-related disclosure requirements cycle. T C F D r equirements will be a central part of the S D R f ramework as well as the foundation for the I F R S S ustainability Disclosure Standards (see Section 2.2.3). This provides U K fi rms with a firm footing as the U K r equirements evolve to take into account I F R S S ustainability Disclosure Standards. 20. Government has announced plans to implement T C F D r ecommendations in central government annual reports and accounts, with a three-year phased implementation extending to 2025-26. This will align central government climate-related disclosure with best practice in the private sector, improve climate-related risk reporting, and embed climate change into organisations’ decision-making processes. | 56ee4d88-2ab4-4059-810e-e3d833392a95 | 12 |
045a1c96-8a9b-41b2-9eb3-b2306f0b05d7 | 2,025 | [
"green competitiveness",
"technology development",
"st.",
"higher education",
"workplaces"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | 3.4 A diversified economy and green competitiveness 3.4.1 Innovation and technology development to find low-emission solutions Developing a green, competitive low-emission society that creates value and provides workplaces in Norway will require business and industry to focus on low-emission solutions and a robust research and innovation system that can support initiatives all the way from basic research to the market. Knowledge, skills, research and innovation are an essential basis for maintaining an innovative, competitive business sector in Norway. Research and technology development to promote the shift to a greener society is a very high priority and an important element of the Government's long-term plan for research and higher education 2015-2024 (Meld. St. 4 (2018-2019)). | dab1621e-03c1-4389-80ca-34588a29e8f8 | 0 | |
046af961-e7a7-4dd6-8bfa-3e9c1d4a7bca | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0563 | 2,004 | [
"Transport",
"Buildings",
"Electricity and heat",
"Industry",
"Appliances",
"Coal",
"Gas",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | To simplify the structure of minimum tax levels where possible, the minimum levels of taxation for some uses of motor fuels (see Table B in Annex I) are aligned with the minimum levels of taxation applicable to heating fuels (see Table C in Annex I). 6) Input used for electricity production
Taxation of energy products and electricity used to produce electricity is allowed to Member States aside the ETD, without the need to respect the minimum levels of taxation provided for in the proposal, for reasons of environmental policy. | 8c300c97-5de2-4886-9295-1daf8a0942e3 | 13 |
046d12e3-192b-4646-8675-e2203031cb89 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/the-sixth-carbon-budget_2cb9fc7e21801940b0a9c50cbe4bc1ad.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Waste",
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"Economy-wide",
"Energy",
"Adaptation",
"Carbon Pricing",
"Institutions / Administrative Arrangements",
"Energy Supply",
"Research And Development",
"Energy Demand",
"emissions",
"zero",
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"budget",
"costs"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The broad pathway is likely to be a transition from subsidised deployment in the near-term towards an international level playing field that does not require subsidy in the longer-run, although mechanisms such as contracts for difference may still have a role in removing risks Work towards the longer-term solution should begin immediately; the substantial time it will require to develop these solutions means they are on the critical path to decarbonisation. Most pressing is the development of improved metrics for carbon-intensity on which border tariffs or standards can be based, along with international negotiation and consensus building on these measures. Ultimately implementation of standards and tariffs is likely to be product-by-product rather than a single over-arching policy – clearly it will be important to ensure consistency while respecting specific circumstances. * These are typically referred to as border carbon adjustments (BCA); however, some stakeholders also use the term BCAs to encompass the application of standards at the border, which we treat separately. Therefore, we use the Border Carbon Tariff terminology for clarity. Chapter 6: A just transition to the Sixth Carbon Budget and Net Zero 294 We note that some of the policies above are more obviously applied to imports to provide a level playing field for UK producers, but they could also be applied to UK exporters. For example, border tariffs could also involve rebates to exports from UK firms that have reduced emissions without full taxpayer support. While the assessment above focuses on industry, the principles also apply to other trade-exposed sectors like agriculture. Future trade deals should ensure that UK standards are also applied to imported goods, and a level playing field is provided for UK producers operating to high standards. We also note that policies in other parts of the economy also affect trade-exposed sectors – it will be important to continue policies such as the exemptions and compensations for UK carbon price Similarly, for sectors like aviation and shipping, which are inherently international, the focus should be on developing international policy approaches (though as we set out in Chapter 10, UK influence and UK levers have an important role to play). Here, sectoral agreements are already in place (e.g. CORSIA for aviation) or possibly emerging (for shipping), but will need to strengthen significantly. A global shift is beginning, towards low-carbon industrial products. The UK should aim to be part of the manufacturing base for those products, and is well-placed given our access to plentiful low-cost CO2 storage sites under the North Sea and elsewhere, and our history of strong infrastructure provision engineering expertise. Government can maximise the UK’s potential by providing a clear and early low- carbon policy offer to manufacturers. There are challenges in developing policy to drive emissions reductions while maintaining competitiveness, but there are also opportunities and it is increasingly apparent that the low-carbon path is the most likely path to future success for UK industry. 295 Sixth Carbon Budget – The path to Net Zero 3. Fuel poverty, energy bills and other household costs The Climate Change Act requires us to advise on the likely impacts of our recommended budget on fuel poverty. That is part of a wider issue of fairness regarding the impact on energy bills, where any increases tend to be regressive. Our scenarios also imply broader potential costs and benefits for households. Our analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates that our scenarios imply growing and enduring savings in operating costs, alongside a major investment programme. To 2030 the largest cost increases affecting households are in the electricity sector and for decarbonising buildings. If these are paid fully through energy bills, then bills would rise to 2030 with likely regressive effects. Alternatively, an extension of and modest increase in existing Exchequer funding could be sufficient if backed Large savings are available for household in other areas, most notably in transport from the shift to electric cars, and significant benefits are available for health, well- being and access to the natural environment. However, even in areas where costs are likely to fall relative to today, the distribution of costs and savings could create both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ during the transition. Effective policy design, and continued monitoring and intervention should aim to limit increases in costs to those that are able to pay, while sharing the benefits a) Current energy bills and fuel poverty b) Future energy bills and fuel poverty c) Wider household costs and benefits a) Energy bills and fuel poverty Ofgem estimate an annual bill for dual-fuel households (using gas for heating and electricity for lights and appliances) of £1,170 in 2019. Around £150 of the bill was attributed to environmental and social costs, including the cost of low-carbon The impact of low-carbon policy costs on energy bills is regressive, making up a larger proportion of the household income of lower-income groups than higher- as most policy costs are currently recovered from use of electricity rather than gas. A household switching from a gas boiler to a heat pump for its heating would face an extra policy cost of over £100 a year on its energy bill, despite reducing its The Committee last published a detailed assessment of energy bills in 2017.30 That assessment concluded that improvements in energy efficiency had more than offset increased costs of funding low-carbon technologies such that overall bills had fallen in real terms since the Climate Change Act was passed in 2008. Chapter 6: A just transition to the Sixth Carbon Budget and Net Zero 296 We expected those offsetting effects to continue in the following years as efficient boilers, lights and appliances roll through the stock and as continued low-carbon investment adds further to low-carbon policy costs. percentage of total household income by Owen & Barrett (2019) Reducing inequality resulting from UK low-carbon policy. A household is considered to be fuel poor if it cannot afford to keep its home adequately warm at a reasonable cost, given its income (though definitions vary across the UK). | 083c769d-ace3-415a-9bbf-6c9f1540dcd7 | 90 |
046d3aa3-75a6-4f2d-a2b5-397936ba2d99 | https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/34189/documents/188122/default/ | 2,023 | [
"climate",
"government",
"resilience",
"national",
"infrastructure"
] | parliament.uk | This data is stored in the secure digital tool, CNI Knowledge Base, and enables the government to visualise and map the critical systems, interdependencies and networks that support the essential functions of UK CNI. It will also help identify areas of acute risk, as well as the impacts of cascading risks, including from climate change, and will ensure data driven risk analysis is used to inform policy decisions within government and by infrastructure operators. The criticalities process and CNI Knowledge Base are designed to provide the government a holistic, systems thinking approach to understanding the UK’s CNI resilience. It provides a common approach to map and define dependencies (both within a sector and cross- sector) and increases our visibility and understanding of the complexities of the UK CNI. Work to baseline an initial criticalities process is in its final stage. It will then become an iterative approach that is embedded into the wider government approach to CNI. This will help the government to keep up to date with changes to the UK infrastructure and manage cross-cutting risks to CNI. Using the geographical mapping feature in CNI Knowledge Base, and other analytical and modelling tools, LGDs will also be able to better understand the potential impacts of specific incidents and events through the interdependencies linked together on Knowledge Base. This will support work on climate risks, for example by considering the impact of forecasted extreme weather events or longer-term challenges such as coastal erosion to CNI in geographical regions. LGDs will then be able to provide CNI owners and operators with targeted, practical advice to equip them with the evidence needed to make informed decisions on adaptation and to build resilience. LGDs will seek assurance information for their sectors, with reference to regulators and regulatory powers as appropriate, to ensure owners and operators are increasing their resilience and are addressing risk. The government uses the Adaptation Reporting power provided for by the Climate Change Act 2008 to ask infrastructure providers and public bodies to report on how they are addressing current and future climate impacts in key sectors including transport, energy, water and ICT. The government will soon conduct a consultation for the fourth round of climate adaptation reporting (ARP4). The consultation will seek feedback on a range of issues, including whether reporting should remain voluntary or be made mandatory, and how interdependencies are handled, to further support the climate preparedness of infrastructure and overcome barriers to addressing interdependent risks. The final strategy for ARP4 will be published in 2023. Readiness for storms ahead? Critical national infrastructure in an age of climate Government Reponse 2. The Energy Bill is a vital opportunity to improve the resilience of the UK’s energy supply, so we are concerned by reports that the legislation may be dropped—even as reports suggest that the UK could face energy shortages this winter. If the Bill is passed, the Independent System Operator and Planner (ISOP) would be tasked with carrying out strategic planning and forecasting in relation to electricity and gas transmission. We would welcome the government’s assurances that the ISOP’s mandate will include planning for the impact of the changing climate on the UK’s energy supply. The government’s recently-announced review of energy regulation must also consider the extent to which the current regulatory regime allows for sufficient investment in resilience and adaptation, in line with the recommendations outlined in the final chapter of this report. (Paragraph 43) Response (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero) The government remains committed to all measures in the Energy Bill and, as announced on the 29th November, the Bill will continue its passage through the House of Lords. The Energy Bill will liberate private investment in clean technologies, bringing forward business models for industrial carbon capture and low carbon hydrogen production; protect consumers by establishing a Future System Operator; and reform the UK’s energy system so that it is efficient, safe and resilient. The current Electricity System Operator factors in the impacts of climate change on the resilience of its operations and in its forecasting through the Future Energy Scenarios. The Future System Operator (FSO - known in the Bill as Independent System Operator and Planner) will continue to plan for the impact of climate change on the UK’s energy supply. The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero are also actively considering what more the FSO can do to ensure resilience of the system to climate change. This will be underpinned by the FSO statutory objective to ensure security of supply and to enable the government to meet its net zero targets, as set out in the Energy Bill. Ofgem have ensured that the next electricity distribution price control (RIIO-ED21) will provide Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) with the framework and funding needed to manage climate risks by providing allowances to install resilience measures, requiring DNOs to submit climate resilience strategies as part of their RIIO-ED2 Business Plans and establishing an Energy Networks Association working group focused on climate resilience. Ofgem will also continue to enforce standards by setting targets for DNOs to meet in return for funding, including on reducing the likelihood of network failures under normal operating conditions, as well as severe weather events, and by setting outcome- based resilience standards through the Guaranteed Standards of Performance (GSoP). Over the coming months Ofgem will be determining further priorities for climate resilience action and will consider the recommendations of the JCNSS report as it develops next steps. The work will also be informed by reports such as the Climate Change Committee’s Independent Assessment of UK Climate Risk and the National Infrastructure Committee’s report on Resilient Infrastructure Systems. 1 controls-2021–2028-riio-2/network-price-controls-2021–2028-riio-2-electricity-distribution-price-control-2023–
Readiness for storms ahead? Critical national infrastructure in an age of climate Government Reponse 3. We welcome the development of the Cabinet Office’s ‘National Situation Centre’ (SitCen), which gathers and generates real-time data to inform the government’s crisis and emergency response work—including on weather patterns. | 7e770fc7-04fa-4978-87f9-094668c0dd63 | 1 |
046f08f6-e880-4c0b-9873-561c64ac4e7f | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf | 2,025 | [
"emissions",
"data",
"inventory",
"emission",
"used"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Reed, K.F., Moraes, L.E., Casper, D.P., Kebreab, E. (2015). Predicting nitrogen excretion from cattle. | 95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c | 431 |
0470abe5-70f5-4f97-a1f0-b7b8b14c9543 | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.07321v1 | 2,016 | [
"arctic",
"area",
"country",
"countries",
"resource"
] | arxiv.org | The area north of the Arctic Circle is known as the Arctic Region. Sea and glacier ice in the Arctic is rapidly melting making the Arctic waters more accessible for resource exploration and exploitation. Global demand for oil and gas is also increasing although there are attempts to switch to other energy sources. Increasing interest in the Arctic Region is driven by the volume of natural resources concentrated in the area and rapid development of new technologies allowing their exploitation. Apart from that due to ice melting fishing seasons are considerably extended by increased periods of open water, as are the opportunities for Arctic Shipping Routes which reduce transit distances between Europe and Asia, Asia and Northern America [13,15]. The five Arctic States -Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the USA -are limited to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles adjacent to their coasts. The waters beyond the EEZs are considered the "high seas" or international waters. The international waters are not owned by any country [19]. Today many counties apart from Arctic States are showing their interest to the region. The Arctic Council reflects international interests. It consists of Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. Moreover, twelve non-Arctic countries have been admitted as observers to the Arctic Council (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, India) [4]. "Upon ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a country has a ten-year period to make claims to an extended continental shelf which, if validated, gives it exclusive rights to resources on or below the seabed of that extended shelf area" [19]. Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russian Federation and the USA have already made several claims. The decision can have dramatic impact on countries economy. If the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf recognizes a zone as a part of the countries continental shelf, then no other country can have access to its mineral and fish resources. The situation raises the question of identifying areas of potential conflict of interests. This paper looks at the countries interests based on their agenda. The structure of the paper: Section 1 gives some information about the countries that have shown explicit interest in the Arctic Region. Section 2 describes the model analyzing mutual interests. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes. Arctic States include eight countries five of which have a direct access to the Arctic Ocean. In our research we focus on Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Russia and the United States as their EEZs capture Arctic waters. Non-Arctic countries under consideration are China, Japan and South Korea. Figure 1 illustrates the countries and Table 1 provides general information. According to International Energy Agency, Russia, USA and Canada are in the top five oil-producing countries. USA, Russia, Canada and Norway are also in the top six gas-producing countries in the world. Moreover, Russia, Norway and Canada are leading petrol and gas exporters. It is worth mentioning that five out of six Arctic States under consideration (except Iceland) have offshore mines. Exploiting more Arctic deposits can become a new source of income for these countries. Another source of profit in the Region is the maritime activity. To navigate through the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which lies within Russian EEZ, one must obtain official permission and pay a fee that includes inspection of the ship for ice navigation worthiness as well as the necessary icebreaker and pilotage support. In contrast, the Northwest Passage (NWP) does not have a formal transit system. It is due to the fact that navigation through NWP is extremely challenging. However, in light of ice-melting Canadian Government is interested in economic development of the area in the future [9,11]. Economic structure of Iceland and Greenland (Denmark) differs from that of the aforementioned countries. These two States are highly dependent on the fishing. Thus, preserving natural habitats and controlling the amount of capture is vital. In addition, increase in resource developments and cargo trafficking worsens the situation in terms of pollution making the States interested in controlling energy and maritime resources. Non-Arctic countries under consideration are China, Japan and South Korea. All three countries show growing interest in the Arctic Region. It concerns not only resources but also scientific research. Thus, Japan has a fifty-year-old history in polar research, Japan and China established Institutes specialized in such research in early 90s and early 2000s, respectively. Republic of Korea is also an active researcher and has had an operating Dasan Arctic research station on the Svalbard, Norway, since 2002 [12]. Although the countries base their involvement on UNCLOS it is in their best interest that international waters remain international. In contrast to Arctic States, peripheral actors can demand permission to exploit resources only if the area of exploitation does not belong to any country, thus, making it common heritage of mankind [19]. Over the last two decades China's, Japan's and Korean gas and oil import has increased. Large share of those resources comes from Middle East. In more detail, half of China's oil, about 85 percent of oil and one third of Japan's gas and 62% of oil and 53% of Korean gas are imported through the Malacca Strait. There are certain concerns about the energy import's vulnerability in a case of the Straits sudden shutdown. This makes the three countries interested in the Arctic deposits and routes. One more concern is the piracy. Rising threats has made ship-insurance exorbitantly costly. Some companies made a decision to sail around the southern tip of Africa to avoid risks of navigating towards the Suez Canal. Sailing through the NWP can become an economically attractive substitution [16]. We model countries preferences via utility functions. A utility function is a matrix with elements representing certain area as shown on Figure 2. For each area the utility of each resource is evaluated based on countries interest. | 9b38b68c-cc37-4d12-9b74-fd4c94724d32 | 0 |
0471ac66-27ef-42dd-8bd4-39f480b590a9 | 2,025 | [
"gas import capacity",
"power generation",
"gas supplies ireland",
"transportation infrastructure",
"new lng terminals"
] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | Strategic Goal 2: Ensuring the Security and Reliability of Gas Supplies Ireland has a well developed framework to ensure the adequacy of gas supplies and transportation infrastructure into the country. Recent years have seen substantial investment in the transmission network and the new pipelines recently completed [Mayo-Galway & South- North) will enable the indigenous gas find at Corrib to be brought to the market, assist in the development of an all-island gas network and enable more communities to benefit from the availability of natural gas. In light of global, EU and UK trends, natural gas will continue to play a vital role in the Irish fuel mix for some decades yet. Business as usual projections indicate that more than 70% of our electricity would be generated from natural gas by 2020. Our alternative scenario, with renewables contributing 33% by 2020, will see greater diversity in the fuel mix with gas contributing just under 50% to power generation. The UK is now the source of some 87% of our natural gas and the UK's own demand for imports is growing strongly. Norway will remain a significant supplier of gas to UK in the medium term. Ireland's location in Europe from the view-point of gas supply sources is becoming less peripheral. In the last 12 months the UK has achieved a significant increase in gas import capacity through accelerated infrastructure developments with resultant benefits for Ireland. Both Pipeline and LNG capacity has increased significantly. These include the Langeled pipeline from Norway, the new pipeline from the Netherlands and new LNG terminals at Milford Haven. Further expansion of LNG capacity and gas interconnection is underway in the UK and Europe which will benefit Ireland in terms of security of wholesale gas supplies within this regional market. | 0ac1270a-3d17-4f80-91ff-8a3dc7ad6b79 | 0 | |
047257dc-929c-4997-b557-fabb66dd8158 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/decarbonising-transport-a-better-greener-britain_0e5fa97fb3d78e19b69ccf8f78fdd0cc.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Transport",
"Co-benefits",
"Cycling",
"Climate Finance",
"Public Transport",
"Freight",
"EVs",
"Shipping",
"Aviation",
"Walking",
"transport",
"zero",
"emissions",
"emission",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | GHG emissions from transport have been broadly flat for the last 30 years, even as those of other sectors have declined. Better engine efficiency has been made up for by increasing numbers of journeys; the growth of electric and hybrid vehicles has been made up for by the growth in diesel and petrol SUVs. | b1244f11-6485-47b2-ba2a-c8a54f51cd77 | 6 |
0472dc79-2960-40e9-b39e-c484707b3f7b | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0394:FIN:EN:PDF | 2,000 | [
"Electricity and heat",
"Transport",
"Energy service demand reduction and resource efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 5.2.2. At national level
To achieve the full potential benefits of the Cardiff process and related efforts in terms of
environmental and sustainable development improvements on the ground, efforts to improve
integration at EU level need to be backed by commitments and action at national level. For instance, stringent implementation by Member States of the directives on Environmental
Impact Assessment EIA32 and on Strategic Environmental Assessment SEA33 is key to
advancing environmental integration through projects, plans and programmes at national
level. Furthermore, a regular exchange of good integration practice at national, regional and
local level could help put integration into effect. There is a wealth of experience at all levels,
notably in the framework of local Agenda 21 initiatives, which should be pooled and made
more widely accessible. The review of the environmental dimension of national sustainable
development strategies currently under preparation will provide a first analytical tool to assess
approaches, with a view to highlighting and fostering exchange of good practice. Measures to
strengthen existing networks of environmental integration and sustainable development
practitioners and to simplify and speed up the exchange of information between practitioners
should be explored. For example, the development of an interactive Internet portal to
support access to and updates of information on relevant national, regional and local
experience could be considered. Continued political commitment to the use of such approaches at EU and national level is
needed to enable the process of environmental integration to bring further results on the
ground. 32
33
Directive 85337EEC, amended by Directive 9711EC. The EIA directive requires the environmental
impacts of range of projects from different sectors to be taken into account before a decision is taken for
the project to proceed
Directive 200142EC. A SEA allows the environmental consequences of certain plans and programmes
to be identified and assessed during the programme or plan preparation, before their adoption
EN
36
EN
6. CONCLUSION
While this stocktaking has shown the positive results of the Cardiff process, both in terms of
raising the profile of environmental integration and in terms of concrete improvements in
some sectors, it also points to a number of weaknesses in implementation. Amongst other
issues, it emphasises the need to improve the consistency of strategies across Council
formations and for greater emphasis on good practice in terms of content and implementation. It also points to a set of measures at Community and national levels to support sectoral
Councils in their efforts under the Cardiff Process to integrate environmental concerns into
their policies and to help maximise the benefits of these efforts in terms of concrete
environmental improvements. Further efforts are also needed at national level to fully
implement the decisions taken at Community level. While sustainable development involves dealing with economic, social and environmental
policies in a mutually reinforcing way, environmental integration needs increased visibility
and political support at the highest level. It should become a regular item on the agenda of the
Spring European Council. In this respect and in line with the Presidency Conclusions to the
March 2003 European Council, the European Commission will carry out an annual
stocktaking of environmental integration as a complement to the Environment Policy
Review, which will feed into the Commissions Spring Report and the Spring European
Council debate. Forthcoming opportunities to further promote environmental integration should also be
seized
The Review of the Sustainable Development Strategy planned for 2004- 2005 will
examine progress made since 2001 and identify priority actions to ensure delivery. This
exercise will enable the EU to pinpoint where environmental integration gaps lie at EU
level, hampering the EUs efforts to curb unsustainable environmental trends, and to make
concrete proposals to address them. The mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 offers an additional opportunity to
examine how environmental integration and economic and employment growth could
increasingly be mutually supportive. The Commissions emphasis on sustainable development in its Communication on the
Unions next financial perspectives 2007 onwards34 will give an additional boost to
further environmental integration, in particular in the agricultural and regional policy. | 84e2ea09-1d7f-46b5-b066-7956ace9a8aa | 27 |
047f115d-1d24-4540-b605-8df7e47f864d | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2021/heat-and-buildings-strategy_02fc3928ede4b3542ff4749b01d7ecf3.pdf | 2,021 | [
"Buildings",
"Energy",
"Energy Efficiency",
"Hydrogen",
"Jobs",
"Heat",
"heat",
"energy",
"buildings",
"heating",
"beis"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | This means that there is a far more uneven distribution of energy use across the stock. Only 5% of the total commercial and industrial building stock are over 1,000m2 in floor area.235 However, these buildings are responsible for over one-half of the energy used by commercial and industrial buildings (excluding process heat).236 At the other end of the spectrum are ‘dwelling-like’ buildings (less than 150m2), which make up around 15% of the commercial and industrial building stock by count.237 Because these buildings are likely to possess the same heating systems and building fabrics as domestic homes, they may benefit from similar interventions made in the domestic market. Proximity, density and location A building’s location and proximity to others may affect which heat source is most suitable. For example, it may be more cost-effective to convert the heating source of an entire block of flats, rather than addressing each dwelling individually – whereas a detached house in a rural area might be best considered in isolation. Some heat solutions, such as heat networks, may be better suited to higher density areas. This density of demand ensures that high capital costs can be recouped and means that less heat is lost on route to buildings that are far apart from one another. Therefore, heat networks can play a significant role in towns and cities, and new-build projects such as business parks, garden towns and villages. If heat networks are in close proximity to sources of waste heat, they can use and distribute this heat to buildings in their network. A cost-effective hydrogen system may be dependent to some extent on local geography. This may include how close it is to production plants, available storage options (e.g. in salt caverns), suitability of existing networks to transport hydrogen, availability of new dedicated hydrogen networks, and routes to store the carbon dioxide if hydrogen is produced using methane reformation with carbon capture. 235 BEIS analysis of BEIS (2016), ‘Building Energy Efficiency Survey (BEES)’ ( 236 BEIS analysis of BEIS (2016), ‘Building Energy Efficiency Survey (BEES)’ ( 237 BEIS (2016), ‘Building Energy Efficiency Survey (BEES)’
Electric heat pumps may be easier to install in communities that are fully electrified, with reinforced distribution networks, electric vehicle charge points, and smart energy storage already built into the local area or individual premises. We recognise that there are different levels of fuel poverty and building efficiency in different areas. Therefore, we need to ensure that measures to decarbonise buildings in a given area are appropriate to that location. Where we are heat sources and energy efficiency Natural gas boilers are still the dominant domestic heating system in the UK (with 86% of homes using natural gas in England).238 However, a smaller proportion of commercial and industrial buildings are dependent on natural gas (heating 63% of the floor area), with about 29% using direct heating.239 Whether a building is connected to the gas grid is a significant consideration in terms of whether, when and which heat source changes would be most heating is used to heat 86% of homes in England.240 238 DLUHC (2021), ‘English Housing Survey 2019 to 2020: energy’ 239 BEIS (2016), ‘Building Energy Efficiency Survey (BEES)’ 240 DLUHC (2021), ‘English Housing Survey 2019 to 2020: energy’
Across the UK, in addition to homes using natural gas, 9% of the energy consumed to heat homes is provided by other fossil fuels, such as oil and coal.241 However, this 9% accounts for 13% of all domestic heat emissions.242 Bioenergy sources of heat provide a more similar fuel source to some traditional fossil fuel boilers and are likely to be an appropriate low-carbon alternative to methane for a small Therefore, the building’s current source of heat needs to be considered alongside their current and possible level of thermal efficiency to help determine which low-carbon source of heat would be most suitable to install. There is no single perfect level of energy performance that is appropriate for all buildings, and there are various ways to measure energy performance and use. For example, we published a consultation on a performance-based energy rating scheme for buildings larger than 1,000m2 (detailed in the section on Improving commercial and industrial places of work).243 However, we typically use Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) levels to indicate a building’s energy performance. In England in 2019, approximately 15 million (60%) of homes were below EPC band C,244 most or all of which will need to be upgraded between now and 2050. We recognise that this may be more challenging in some properties where it is not feasible, affordable, or cost-effective. The current heat source and energy performance of a building will affect the degree and urgency of changes and improvements needed. For example, some buildings will already be connected to a low-carbon heat network and may not need to change their heat source but could still benefit from improvements to energy efficiency. New buildings should be made fit for the future – fitted with low-carbon heat sources and high standards of energy efficiency (compliant with the Future Homes Standard and the Future Buildings Standard for England). This will remove any later need for retrofitting. Given the breadth of the buildings landscape, we need to tailor action so that it minimises the challenges and maximises the opportunities presented to different types of buildings. In section 5.2 How to improve our buildings, we set out our proposed approach to improving different 241 BEIS analysis based on BEIS (2020), 'Energy Consumption in the UK 2020' ( 242 National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory ( National Statistics (2020), ‘Final UK greenhouse gas emissions national 1990 to 2018’ ( 243 BEIS (2021), ‘Introducing a performance-based policy framework in large commercial and industrial buildings’ ( commercial-and-industrial-buildings). (
number of owner-occupied and private-rented homes with lower energy efficiency rating.245 Potential impacts to different types of building This section provides illustrative examples and real-world case studies to demonstrate the types of changes that may need to be made to different buildings. | b8329f55-e910-4cba-837e-a676c43b4822 | 30 |
047f5f1a-82c6-4016-8a36-887140033ed6 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-report-br-br-4_3ed9930a9ceb3d956a389f73b35d0ba4.pdf | 2,021 | [
"climate",
"energy",
"committed",
"emissions",
"grant"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | In addition, the legislation foresees the possible recognition of units from new market mechanisms. Under the EU ETS the limit does not exceed 50% of the required reduction below 2005 levels. | 025a518f-ffd4-4f95-b5a2-b6052b167c0d | 48 |
047fbadd-2dd5-4bb3-8a31-e58fd5afcdf9 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-report-br-br-4_3ed9930a9ceb3d956a389f73b35d0ba4.pdf | 2,021 | [
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Results Based Financing for Low 0.01 0.01 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation Energy generation, To increase access to clean energy through the creation of an expanding market of green mini-grid installations in Africa serving rural villages unconnected to the main grid. This is expected to benefit around 1.3m people by 2018, while reducing carbon emissions by around 260,000 Tonnes of carbon dioxide, through supported private investment in the installation and operation of over 110 renewably-powered mini-grids (figures to be updated after Business Case completion). Electricity access for lighting, communications and productive uses creates jobs, enables studying at night and enhances public services (such as clinics) and public safety (eg through streetlighting). This project also addresses the post-2015 High Level Panel’s recommendation on a development goal entitled Secure Sustainable Energy, which includes energy access and renewable energyThe Results-Based Financing for Low Carbon Energy Access Programme aims to accelerate access to sustainable energy services in developing countries. The funding generates and tests different forms of Results-Based Financing (RBF) mechanism, which aim to stimulate decentralised energy markets and to leverage private investment to increase access to clean energy products and services. 0.01 0.02 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation General Environment a regional partnership in South Asia among the research community, its funders, and users foster a more coordinated and interactive climate research environment that supports good decision making Support to the multilateral Climate – 0 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation General Environment To support development and poverty reduction through environmental protection, and help developing countries respond Support to the multilateral Climate – 0 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation General Environment To support development and poverty reduction through environmental protection, and help developing countries respond Support for Energy Sector Analysis – 0 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Energy Policy Develping countries have adopted pro-poor low carbon development pathways in line with trajectories for a 2 degree Support for Energy Sector Analysis – 0 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation Energy Policy Develping countries have adopted pro-poor low carbon development pathways in line with trajectories for a 2 degree – 0 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Energy distribution Greater access to clean energy services achieved through fast tracking of renewable energy project demonstration and deployment, including through technology learning, donor coordination and private sector investment – 0 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation Energy distribution Greater access to clean energy services achieved through fast tracking of renewable energy project demonstration and deployment, including through technology learning, donor coordination and private sector investment Negative ODA flow -1.70 -2.18 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Health, General A number of projects have returned ODA, until this money is respent is counts as negative ODA which we have recorded against the appropriate themes
Annex 1: Common Tabular Format Tables supporting the UK’s fourth biennial report to the UNFCCC 155 Recipient country/region/project/ Financial instrument Type of support Sector Additional Information Negative ODA flow -4.00 -5.15 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation Health, General Negative ODA flow -0.03 -0.04 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation Energy Policy Negative ODA flow -0.26 -0.33 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation General Environment Negative ODA flow -0.26 -0.33 Committed ODA Grant Adaptation General Environment Negative ODA flow -0.46 -0.6 Committed ODA Grant Cross-cutting Agriculture Negative ODA flow -2.63 -3.39 Committed ODA Grant Cross-cutting Agriculture Blue Forests Programme 1.21 1.55 Committed ODA Grant Cross-cutting Forestry Working to reduce deforestation of mangrove habitat, create new sustainable livelihoods, support community health and women’s empowerment and increase climate resilience in coastal communities. This project will initially be executed in Madagascar, expanding to Indonesia and an additional country in south-east Asia. Programme is projected to protect 20,000 hectares of mangrove forests; deliver 13.9 million tonnes of carbon dioxide savings and benefit over 100,000 UK Climate Investments 7.80 10.04 Committed ODA Equity Mitigation Energy generation, Joint venture with the UK Green Investment Bank to make equity investments in private sector renewable and energy efficiency projects in developing countries Administrative and due diligence 2.10 2.7 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Environmental policy ODA eligible costs associated with the management and delivery of climate programmes, including expenditure on external legal advice, evaluation and auditing services to support ODA spend. 2.80 3.6 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Energy generation, Supporting private sector investment in small to medium scale renewable energy projects, primarily in Africa Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 40.00 51.48 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation General Environment The Facility supports developing countries that show strong leadership on tackling climate change and who want to implement transformational Nationally Appropriate Mitigating Actions. 52.00 66.92 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Multisector Aid UK-branded private finance flagship programme provides concessional financing and technical assistance for sustainable infrastructure in Latin America. 0.03 0.04 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Energy research Working directly with 10 developing country governments to help them build their own version of the UK's 2050 calculator. The calculator will explore global scenarios, illustrating the impacts of these scenarios on climate change. Global Climate Partnership Fund – 4.00 5.15 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Energy conservation Finances energy efficiency and small scale renewable energy projects in developing countries whilst giving Technical Assistance to build the green lending capacity of local banks and reducing investment risk. NDC Partnership 0.50 0.64 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation General Environment The NDC Partnership is a new international partnership aiming to help turn countries’ climate targets under the Paris Agreement, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), into specific strategies and measures. degradation – REDD+ early movers 42.90 55.21 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Forestry Tackles emissions from deforestation, catalysing action on the ground through results based payments for verified and ambitious emission reductions. 5.00 6.44 Committed ODA Grant Mitigation Energy generation, Supports developing and emerging economies to develop both the technical and institutional knowledge necessary to enable CCUS technology deployment. Climate Public Private Partnership – 4.70 6.05 Committed ODA Equity Mitigation Energy generation, An equity investment in a fund that seeks to demonstrate to private sector investors that climate friendly investments in developing countries are financially viable. | 025a518f-ffd4-4f95-b5a2-b6052b167c0d | 147 |
04890c69-af44-4017-a675-ba6d7a6ecca5 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | A 3.3.7.7 Design, development, acceptance, verification and validation of the UK The UK agriculture inventory model is bespoke in design, tailored to UK-specific data availability and resolution, the latest scientific understanding that reflects UK circumstances (e.g. soils, climate), production systems and farming practices. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 288 |
0489c30e-9fe3-4254-8fc5-c8cf3fdda05c | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6116353fe90e07054eb85d8b/england-peat-action-plan.pdf | 2,021 | [
"plan",
"additional",
"page",
"england"
] | www.gov.uk | ● We will continue to explore expanding the UK Emissions Trading Scheme to the two-thirds of uncovered emissions, including the role it could play in reducing the degradation of agricultural peat. In addition, we will consider ways to support and
incentivise nature-based sequestration in the deployment of greenhouse gas removal ● We will continue to collaborate with water companies to encourage investment in peatland restoration as a solution to water quality issues, and to meet the industry’s ● We will work with the green finance sector to determine key barriers and further opportunities for peatlands and private finance, including the development of water Restoration should not be regarded as a one-off event. Programmes of restoration have sometimes proceeded alongside less than optimal habitat management. Changes in burning practices and grazing regimes are often required to support ecological resilience and to safeguard the integrity of new structures and investment. Maintenance costs need to be included in peatland restoration plans to safeguard benefits. The Environment Bill introduces a new legal tool that could be used to safeguard these investments through long term Conservation Covenants. These are private agreements entered into voluntarily which become legally binding once agreed. They are made between a landowner and responsible body, such as a conservation charity, public body or for-profit body. They conserve (protect, restore or enhance) the natural or heritage features of the land for the public good. Conservation organisations and landowners have engaged with the development of this approach and we are exploring how conservation covenants may be used for the management of peatlands and to safeguard investment. ● We will introduce Conservation Covenants as part of the Environment Bill; ● We will develop trajectories to hydrological restoration as part of the Natural England implementation plan, in recognition that restoration is an ongoing process, ● We will embed measures to phase out some of the most damaging practices such as ● We will promote the benefits of peatland as carbon sinks and carbon stores to the
Chapter 3: The plan to reduce degradation Most restoration work to date has focussed on blanket and raised bog. However, we need to broaden our approach given that the majority of greenhouse gas emissions from our peatlands come The Great Fen Project has shown that full conversion to wetland nature management is possible under the right circumstances in the lowlands. But full restoration is not feasible in all lowland or afforested settings. Measures to stabilise and reduce the degradation of our peatland through responsible management will be necessary to meet Net Zero by 2050. Conventional agricultural production on drained peatland is inherently unsustainable. However, it may often not be desirable or appropriate to fully restore these lowland peatlands. Factors water management schemes to reduce flood risk in our towns and cities; the opportunity cost of taking this land out of production and any associated displacement of emissions, and; the maintenance of food security. Therefore, we envisage a mixed approach to the management of our lowland peatlands. Lowland agricultural peatland and a drainage ditch, Somerset. © Defra
Restoration will certainly be part of this vision and we expect at least 15% by area of the Nature for Climate Fund to fund lowland projects. This proportion may rise over time, but we also need to develop a new sustainable agricultural model, where restoration to a full peatland habitat might not be possible. This model will aim to ensure that the land remains productive whilst reducing greenhouse gas emissions and retaining the peat topsoil for as For example, many of these peat soils only support crops for a very short period of time to slow soil loss and reduce carbon release. Wet agriculture, or paludiculture, also offers a potential way forward for these sites. A recent Defra funded review of the practical, social, economic and environmental constraints on the large-scale adoption of paludiculture in 15 found it has the potential to make a valuable contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation in England, whilst also maintaining the economic output and extending the lifetime of agriculturally productive lowland peat regions. It is timely to seek a new future for lowland agricultural peatlands, which promotes environmental enhancement, supports profitable food production, and contributes to a healthier society. We are also at the point where many of those farming lowland peatlands are recognising that their peat soils have a finite farming life ahead of them and that there is a need for change. We want to support land managers to make the best decisions for their farm business and for the environment, making use of incentives, education and • We launched a new Lowland Agricultural Peat Task Force in January 2021. Force has 18 months to develop recommendations to extend the useable life of our agricultural lowland peat soils, both to preserve the carbon stored in them and to ensure that profitable agriculture can continue for decades to come. It is chaired by drawing on the advice of its subgroups, ● Explore necessary changes to landscape-scale water management; ● Explore innovative approaches such as paludiculture and new machinery; and ● Identify economically viable farming systems that are compatible with our environmental and climate goals. ● Where the environmental benefits are clear, these systems may benefit from better regulation and the new schemes that reward farmers and land managers for producing public goods ● The Sustainable Farming Incentive beginning in mid-2022 and expanding over ● Local Nature Recovery from 2024; or ● The Landscape Recovery from 2024. 15 Mulholland, B., Abdel-Aziz, I., Lindsay, R., McNamara, N., Keith, A., Page, S., Clough, J., Freeman, B., and Evans, C. (to be published). An assessment of the potential for paludiculture in England and Wales. Report to Defra Project SP1218, pp. 97. 16
● We will continue to fund research into management practices to assess effects on production and environmental impacts. | 3b76722f-1c27-466a-8c72-f340bfc9424c | 4 |
048bbcdf-675f-4069-8661-97ccd0c7bc6c | 2,025 | [
"greatest emissions reduction potential",
"term climate policy plan",
"transport sector",
"european union",
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] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | The Medium-Term Climate Policy plan was updated to meet the increasingly stringent EU obligations for 2030 and the Government's target to achieve carbon neutrality by 2035. The plan sets a target for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 50 per cent in the effort sharing sector by 2030 compared to the 2005 level. It also determines the measures for achieving the target. The target is based on the European Union's (EU) 2030 target of reducing emissions by at least 55 per cent compared with 1990 levels and is in line with Finland's long-term climate goal. As the existing measures are insufficient to achieve the 2030 EU target and the national target to be climate neutral by 2035, the plan identifies a range of additional measures. The greatest emissions reduction potential is identified in the transport sector. The plan also includes measures to reduce emissions in the agriculture, waste, and machinery sectors, as well as emissions from buildingspecific heating and F gas emissions. | 0eb33507-5171-4803-92f1-025b2b13526e | 0 | |
048ca329-978b-472f-a0a0-849a8db6ab19 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 2.3. Provisions for electronic system security
2.3.1. Any vehicle with an emission control computer shall include features to prevent modification, except as autho-
rised by the manufacturer. The manufacturer shall authorise modifications if these modifications are necessary for
the diagnosis, servicing, inspection, retrofitting or repair of the vehicle. Any reprogrammable computer codes or
operating parameters shall be resistant to tampering and use the provisions in ISO 15031-7 dated 15 March 2001
SAE J2186 dated October 1996 provided that the security exchange is conducted using the protocols and diag-
nostic connector as prescribed in Appendix 1 to Annex XI. Any removable calibration memory chips shall be pot-
ted, encased in a sealed container or protected by electronic algorithms and shall not be changeable without the
use of specialised tools and procedures. Only features directly associated with emissions calibration or prevention
of vehicle theft may be so protected. 2.3.2. Computer-coded engine operating parameters shall not be changeable without the use of specialized tools and pro-
cedures e. g. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 43 |
048d82ea-b19b-4e5d-a444-4c862044d17e | http://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.01398v1 | 2,019 | [
"economy",
"business",
"world",
"people",
"social"
] | arxiv.org | It is a for-profit subsidiary that sells books and serves coffee in order to give all of its profits to Housing Works Group, its NFP owner. Housing Works Group's mission is "to end the dual crises of homelessness and AIDS through relentless advocacy, the provision of lifesaving services, and entrepreneurial businesses that sustain our efforts". 126 Housing Works Group also owns many thrift shop subsidiaries that likewise give all profits to the foundation. One of the most successful examples of this model in the U.S. is the 35-year social enterprise partnership between FEI Behavioral Health, a for-profit workforce resilience and crisis management company, and its single shareholder (i.e. -sole owner), the Alliance for Strong Families and Communities, an NFP family services organization. Since beginning this social enterprise structure in 1979, FEI has provided more than $30 million of financial support to the Alliance, its members, and the communities they serve. 127 A Better Way Ministries in Newnan, Georgia, is a drug rehabilitation and gospel outreach program that employs the men in its care in a number of small, profitable subsidiary companies, including an auto detailing business, a bakery and a moving company. The money generated by these satellite companies allows the parent organization to earn income while helping the program recipients earn a living through engagement in the program. A study by the Yale School of Management and the Goldman Sachs Foundation on enterprising nonprofits, found that having a subsidiary business to fund its social mission has a positive effect on the overall reputation and mindset of the NFP, improving its "reputation, mission, service and program delivery, entrepreneurial culture, self-sufficiency, and its ability to attract and retain donors and staff." 128 A very early example of this is Greyston Bakery, which is a for-profit subsidiary of the Greyston Foundation, in New York City. Greyston's mission is to employ and train people who are commonly perceived as 'unemployable', including former drug addicts, prisoners, and recovering alcoholics. Greyston is widely known for its open hiring policy; that they will hire 'anyone who walks through the door'. Selling 4 million pounds of baked goods to 2,500 customers annually, they have been helping the 'unemployable' earn a living wage through dignified work since 1982 and are still going strong. 129,130 For-profit subsidiaries also serve a very practical function in some countries, as they can keep NFPs from losing their tax exemptions for doing 'unrelated business' -business considered to be disconnected from their mission. For instance, under U.S. law, Housing Works might have a difficult time explaining how selling coffee is related to their mission to help people suffering from AIDS and homelessness. To avoid any problems, they started a subsidiary and, as a for-profit, their subsidiary doesn't have to have a social mission at all. The only risk with for-profit subsidiaries is that they can legally be sold to for-profit companies, so they can technically go from being extensions of NFPs to being extensions of for-profit companies overnight. Many people were outraged when this happened with National Geographic magazine. For all 127 years of the magazine's history, National Geographic Media was a for-profit subsidiary of the National Geographic Society, a well-known nonprofit. In September of 2015, the National Geographic Society sold 73 percent of their ownership of National Geographic Media to 21 st Century Fox, one of the largest for-profit media corporations in the world. 131 Readers far and wide took to social media to protest the buy-out, worried about how it would affect the content of the magazine. Perhaps it would have been better if National Geographic Media were registered as an NFP subsidiary from the start, rather than a for-profit subsidiary, to ensure that a for-profit company could never own it. After all, educating people through the magazine's content is a perfectly acceptable social mission for an NFP to have. As the example of National Geographic illustrates, it is wise for an NFP to start a not-forprofit subsidiary with a different social mission, rather than a for-profit subsidiary, when possible. This enables an NFP to enjoy the advantages that a for-profit subsidiary would offer, without the risk of it one day being privately-owned and operated for private profit. A great example of an NFP subsidiary is Tender Funerals, in New South Wales, Australia. Tender Funerals itself is a not-for-profit, and it is owned and run by another NFP called Our Community Project. 132 It's wonderful to know that nobody is making a financial gain from Tender's funeral services. Instead the company uses any surplus to provide better services to the community. This begs the question: shouldn't every funeral service provider be not-forprofit? 133
Although an NFP has no owners, it must have a board (also called 'committee' in some countries) that holds the business accountable for using its resources to accomplish its mission. For-profit companies often have boards, too, but there are some crucial differences between for-profit and NFP boards. First of all, the mission of for-profits is to maximize profit, so boards hold the company accountable for maximizing profit, or in the case of triple bottom line businesses, balancing profit as a goal with social and environmental concerns. In fact, most corporate boards are primarily tasked with protecting the shareholders' interests. 134,135 An NFP board protects the interests of the community and holds the company accountable for working towards its stated social and environmental goals. It serves as a light house for the organization, helping it steer clear of trouble. Secondly, for-profit board members are usually paid, as part of the for-profit mentality is to reward everything monetarily, while most NFP board members are not paid. 136 The board is a vital part of any NFP, as it helps the organization maintain integrity, accountability and transparency. With the purpose motive driving board participation and decision-making, as opposed to the profit motive, NFP boards are likely to take multiple perspectives into account. | 7aa7f968-38f8-4177-8669-ac6d65db7e5a | 17 |
048f0643-b24c-4f46-ada8-74a35e02a342 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-biennial-reports-br-br-3-national-communication-nc-nc-7_dabcc5bcde8c5a69cb06295558ac6b22.pdf | 2,017 | [
"climate",
"energy",
"emissions",
"change",
"government"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | 3.5.8 The UK Green Investment Bank The UK Green Investment Bank (GIB) started operating in October 2012, as a 100% government owned company, following state aid approval. Its role was to provide finance on commercial terms, alongside private sector partners, to mobilise additional capital into UK green infrastructure and help the UK achieve its environmental policy targets. By the end of 31 March 2017 , GIB had committed over £3 billion into 100 UK green infrastructure projects with a total value of over £12 billion, mainly in the offshore wind, waste to energy and non-domestic energy efficiency sectors. Its work in the offshore wind sector included establishing the world’s first dedicated offshore wind fund and Europe’s largest dedicated renewable energy fund. The fund passed its initial £1 billion target in January 2017 . Previously, in March 2016, the UK government launched a sale process for GIB. It had proved itself a successful commercial enterprise but it needed a greater volume of private capital, and freedom from the constraints of public sector ownership, to grow and increase its green impact. In August 2017 , the government completed the sale of GIB to Macquarie Group Limited in a £2.3bn deal, which ensured that all taxpayer funding invested in GIB since its creation was returned with a gain of approximately £186 million. 105 106
108 7th National Communication The deal secured the future of GIB with an ambitious new owner committed to growing the business. GIB, now known as the Green Investment Group to enable it to expand outside the UK, has become Macquarie’s primary vehicle for renewable energy investment in the UK and Europe, and will target at least £3bn of new investment into the green economy over the next 3 years. Macquarie has also committed to maintain GIB’s green purpose and green objectives, in line with the special share arrangements to safeguard GIB’s green purposes which will be held The UK is also targeting increased domestic green finance action in order to mobilise additional private investment into sustainable and environmental projects and infrastructure. The UK has an established reputation in green finance innovation and leadership, and is considered to be a thought leader on green finance. The City of London Corporation’s Green Finance Initiative (GFI) was established in 2016 at the request of Government. The Initiative acts as a hub for private sector-led innovation, and promotes London and the UK as the global centre of green finance. The UK also partnered with China to co-chair the G20 Green Finance Study Group, making the links between climate risks and opportunities and global financial stability. The UK has established a UK Green Finance Taskforce consisting of senior leaders from across the financial sector and academia. This Taskforce will work with their industry peers to provide Government with recommendations on how accelerate the growth of green finance; deliver the investment required to meet the UK’s domestic carbon reduction targets; and to consolidate the UK’s leadership in financing international clean investment. The UK government has formally endorsed the recommendations of the Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosure. These recommendations establish a new voluntary reporting framework that helps align climate-related risk management with wider financial The UK government is working with the British Standards Institute (BSI) to develop a set of voluntary green and sustainable management standards to promote responsible investment practices globally. The BSI will be working with industry to identify a suitable scope for these standards, and will have the first standard in production by the first half of 2018. In order to support the commercialisation of innovative clean technologies, the UK Government will also be providing up to £20 million to support a new clean technology investment fund. The UK Government is working with mortgage lenders to promote the development of green lending products that reflect the lower risk associated with more efficient energy use, and the associated reduction in bills. 3.5.10 Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) It is important that economic growth and the housing and wider infrastructure needed to support that growth is low carbon. To support them in this the Government has provided support to the development of Local Energy Strategies in each of the LEP areas. These will identify and prioritise the opportunities both for low carbon energy industries across the area but also the decarbonisation of heat power and transport to allow wider economic growth to be clean. The National Government are also providing support for a range of national tools to reduce costs and investing in developing expert project development support locally to unlock existing opportunity in local areas. Chapter 3 – Policies and Measures 109 3.5.11.1 Business carbon reduction support Business Wales is the Welsh Government Business support scheme supporting individuals to start a business and established businesses to grow107. The service provides resource efficiency support through specialist advisers and has a close working relationship with the Carbon Trust in respect of their energy efficiency loan scheme. Welsh Government officials meet with the Carbon Trust on a quarterly basis to review the operation of the loan scheme in Wales and to ensure that Business Wales are working with For the agriculture industry in Wales, the Welsh Government will integrate the delivery of energy efficiency and renewable energy advice through the existing Knowledge Transfer, Innovation and Advice provision, Farming Connect. The aim of the Farming Connect Advisory service is to provide independent, bespoke advice to improve the sustainable management and the economic and environmental performance of farming and forestry SME’s operating in rural areas. Advice will be available on a one-to-one or group basis. | c6207828-d0f1-4adb-9ed1-c6b8e81a528f | 36 |
04901fce-5f3a-4724-9f18-3dcd9b860fd2 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2019/2023-green-finance-strategy_651b4e423dc8548fe0e34f723b5983dc.pdf | 2,019 | [
"Other",
"Finance",
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"finance",
"financial",
"climate",
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] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | The UK has a proud record in tackling climate change and protecting the environment. Transforming our financial system for a greener future is important for us to continue to lead We were the first country in the world to set long- term, legally binding emissions reduction targets, through the Climate Change Act 2008. We have led the G20 in decarbonising our economy. And, through our 25 Year Environment Plan, we are delivering our commitment to leave the environment in better condition than we found it. But tackling climate change and environmental degradation is only just beginning. By legislating for net zero emissions by 2050, we are responding to the latest science by raising our ambition. Meeting our objectives will require unprecedented levels of investment in green and low carbon technologies, services and infrastructure. Green finance will be central to providing the flows of capital we need. The challenges in creating a sustainable and resilient economy are great – but the opportunities are greater still. With a leading financial services sector, the UK is ideally placed to seize the commercial potential arising from this transition, which is why green finance is at the heart of the Government’s approach, and a pillar of both our Clean Growth Strategy and Industrial Strategy. It will also help ensure our financial system is robust and agile enough to respond to the profound challenges that climate change and the transition to a clean and resilient economy Building on the important work of the Green Finance Taskforce, this first Green Finance Strategy sets out how we will achieve this ambition and accelerate the growth of green finance, from greening the global financial system and catalysing the investment we need, to driving innovation in financial products and building skills This Strategy is also a call for collective action, setting out how we will work with industry, regulators, academia and the newly launched Green Finance Institute to deliver the urgent and far reaching change that is needed for a greener, more sustainable and prosperous future. There is no doubt about the scale of the environmental challenge that we face. To tackle that challenge effectively and sustainably requires us to harness the delivery capacity of the market economy – and in particular to mobilise the enormous resources of our capital markets through Green Finance. This Strategy represents our commitment to taking the steps that will ensure that the UK’s Green Finance sector is turbo-charged to play a crucial role in protecting the future of our planet for generations to come. The UK has a proud record in tackling climate change and protecting the environment. Transforming our financial system for a greener future is important for us to continue to lead the We were the first country in the world to set long-term, legally binding emissions reduction targets, through the Climate Change Act 2008. We have led the G20 in decarbonising our economy. And, through our 25 Year Environment Plan, we are delivering our commitment to leave the environment in better condition than we found it. But tackling climate change and environmental degradation is only just beginning. By legislating for net zero emissions by 2050, we are responding to the latest science by raising our ambition. Meeting our objectives will require unprecedented levels of investment in green and low carbon technologies, services and infrastructure. Green finance will be central to providing the flows of The challenges in creating a sustainable and resilient economy are great - but the opportunities are greater still. With a leading financial services sector, the UK is ideally placed to seize the commercial potential arising from this transition, which is why green finance is at the heart of the Government’s approach, and a pillar of both our Clean Growth Strategy and Industrial Strategy. It will also help ensure our financial system is robust and agile enough to respond to the profound challenges that climate change and the transition to a clean and resilient economy bring with them. Building on the important work of the Green Finance Taskforce, this first Green Finance Strategy sets out how we will achieve this ambition and accelerate the growth of green finance, from greening the global financial system and catalysing the investment we need, to driving innovation in financial products and building skills across the financial sector. This Strategy is also a call for collective action, setting out how we will work with industry, regulators, academia and the newly launched Green Finance Institute to deliver the urgent and far reaching change that is needed for a greener, more sustainable and prosperous future. There is no doubt about the scale of the environmental challenge that we face. To tackle that challenge effectively and sustainably requires us to harness the delivery capacity of the market economy – and in particular to mobilise the enormous resources of our capital markets through Green Finance. This Strategy represents our commitment to taking the steps that will ensure that the UK’s Green Finance sector is turbo-charged to play a crucial role in protecting the future of our planet for generations to come. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
financial and strategic imperative • Establishing a shared understanding • Clarifying roles and responsibilities embedding a long-term approach • Building robust and consistent The UK’s Green Finance Strategy • Aligning private sector financial flows with clean, environmentally sustainable • Strengthening the competitiveness of the UK financial services sector. • Establishing robust, long-term policy frameworks • Improving access to finance for green • Addressing market barriers and • Consolidating the UK’s position as a • Positioning the UK at the forefront of green financial innovation and
Climate change and the degradation of the world’s natural capital assets are defining issues of our time. The world is getting warmer, sea levels are rising, pollution is costing lives and biodiversity is collapsing. | f6b04de0-644e-4bf0-9aec-19cfd9ecc6a0 | 0 |
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] | legislation.gov.uk | 2 E+W+S In section 6(9) of the Electricity Act 1989 (definition of "electricity distributor" and "electricity supplier"), at the appropriate place insert- " " electricity generator " means any person who is authorised by a generation licence to generate electricity except where that person is acting otherwise than for purposes connected with the carrying on of activities authorised by the licence; " . | 56046573-7c16-401f-b025-6eab805ada1e | 0 |
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] | HF-national-climate-targets-dataset | 49 Forecast estimates of the level of emissions in the with additional measures>> (energy efficient) scenario are based on taking into account the effect of the planned measures, including the increase in energy efficiency through the transition to the best available technologies (BAT) and on achieving the targets of the State Program Energy Efficiency and Energy Development 45 and the draft Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2035. In the energy efficient scenario, as well as in the inertial one, the level of primary energy consumption by 2030 will not exceed the values of 2011-2012. The energy intensity of GDP is reduced by 2030 by 27% from the level of 2007. | acbbd45e-78cd-4292-a5b4-405eb12ffa28 | 0 | |
0498b183-47ad-474f-91b4-3bf049b5ee43 | https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/01shortsea.pdf | 2,001 | [
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SHIPPING IN
EUROPE
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OECD, 2001. Software 1987-1996, Acrobat is a trademark of ADOBE. All rights reserved. OECD grants you the right to use one copy of this Program for your personal use only. Unauthorised reproduction,
lending, hiring, transmission or distribution of any data or software is prohibited. You must treat the Program and associated materials
and any elements thereof like any other copyrighted material. | 0efe3d52-645b-46f1-9661-6cfad3222525 | 0 |
049e12c8-ab25-494c-a3ec-ebf73c826202 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1011283/UK-Hydrogen-Strategy_web.pdf | 2,021 | [
"hydrogen",
"carbon",
"energy",
"production",
"support"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | The Hy4Heat programme has also developed a framework for skills accreditation for heating engineers working with hydrogen. As set out in the Ten Point Plan, we are supporting industry to conduct first-of-a-kind hydrogen heating trials, including a neighbourhood trial by 2023 and a village scale trial by 2025. The village trial will look to build on learning from the neighbourhood trial, involving a larger and more diverse range of consumers, and conversion of existing local area gas infrastructure to 100 per cent hydrogen. Chapter 2: Scaling up the hydrogen economy The trials will provide evidence on the practical, logistical and technical issues involved in converting buildings and appliances. In particular, they will test and demonstrate how consumers experience the installation and use of hydrogen for heating in their homes and workplaces; the conversion, operation and performance of gas networks using hydrogen; and the skills and training required to deliver a conversion. By 2025 we will also develop plans for a possible hydrogen heated town before the end of the decade. This planning work will also contribute important evidence on the feasibility and costs of converting from natural gas to hydrogen heating. We anticipate that if the case is made for wide scale conversion of the gas grid to full hydrogen, it would begin with converting a pilot town in the late 2020s and accelerate from the early 2030s, taking into account the practical implementation experience gained through the pilot. The local trials and planning work, together with the results of our wider research and development and testing programme, will enable strategic decisions by 2026 on the role of hydrogen for heat and whether to proceed with the hydrogen town. Case hydrogen for heat in homes H100 Fife Neighbourhood This Levenmouth, Fife-based project will deliver the world’s first hydrogen-to-homes gas network in 2023. The trial will provide hydrogen to 300 homes for heating and cooking on an opt-in basis, switching from natural gas. The hydrogen used in these trials will be produced locally from offshore wind power. This ground-breaking project led by gas network SGN is collaboratively funded by SGN and its GDN partners Cadent, NGN and WWU, Ofgem and the Scottish Government. The H100 project will also provide evidence to assess consumers’ experience of using hydrogen in the home and provide key learning on gas networks, such as constructing and operating a hydrogen network, that can be applied to future We will continue to support research and innovation on hydrogen heating. Our new Net Zero Innovation Portfolio will allow further support to be directed towards innovation for end-users of hydrogen heating as needed, following on from Hy4Heat endpoints. We are also accelerating work to consider how a market for hydrogen heating could operate, recognising the need to start adapting legislative and regulatory frameworks in advance of any strategic decisions being made on the role of hydrogen in heat. We are working with key regulators, including HSE and Ofgem, to ensure that we understand the regulatory changes, including timelines, that may be needed to roll out any future scenario Alongside wider market policy, we are actively considering the value of specific interventions to support the commercialisation of hydrogen heating products. We aim to consult later this year on the case for enabling, or requiring, new natural gas boilers to be easily convertible to use hydrogen (‘hydrogen-ready’) by 2026. We will also use this consultation to test proposals on the future of broader boiler and heating system efficiency and explore the best ways to reduce carbon emissions from our gas heating
Hydrogen has the potential to play a key role in decarbonising heat in buildings in the UK. We are rapidly delivering major studies and testing work to understand the feasibility of using hydrogen for heating, to inform broader strategic decisions in 2026 on heat 2.4.4 Use of hydrogen in transport Hydrogen is likely to be fundamental to achieving net zero in transport, potentially complementing electrification across modes of transport such as buses, trains and heavy goods vehicles (HGVs). It is also likely to provide solutions for sectors that will not be able to fully decarbonise otherwise, including aviation and shipping. Low carbon hydrogen can provide an alternative to petrol, diesel and kerosene as it can be used directly in combustion engines, fuel cells and turbines or as feedstock for production of transport fuels, including ammonia and sustainable aviation fuels. We expect low carbon hydrogen to play a key role in decarbonising the sector, which is the largest single contributor to UK domestic GHG emissions and was responsible for 27 per cent of Transport is also a crucial early market for hydrogen, driving some of the earliest low carbon production in the UK. There are over 300 hydrogen vehicles on UK roads, mostly passenger cars and buses, and the government is supporting hydrogen use in transport with a £23 million Hydrogen for Transport Programme.57 Our latest analysis places transport as one of the biggest components of the hydrogen economy in future, with 2050 demand potentially reaching up to 140TWh.58
Chapter 2: Scaling up the hydrogen economy How will we develop and scale up hydrogen in transport over the 2020s? We expect that the role of hydrogen in transport will evolve over the course of the 2020s and beyond. To date, road transport has been a leading early market for hydrogen in the UK. Going forward, we expect hydrogen vehicles, particularly depot-based transport including buses, to constitute the bulk of 2020s hydrogen demand from the mobility sector. Fuel cell hydrogen buses have a range similar to their diesel counterparts. Back- to-depot operating means hydrogen refuelling infrastructure can be more centralised and is likely to be compatible with distributed hydrogen production expected in this period. Concurrently, we will undertake a range of research and innovation activity which will focus on difficult to decarbonise transport modes, such as heavy road freight. | 96babf55-7373-4dee-b481-d10889d10207 | 22 |
049f3947-3714-45fa-b4e2-cf37adcb153a | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0563 | 2,004 | [
"Transport",
"Buildings",
"Electricity and heat",
"Industry",
"Appliances",
"Coal",
"Gas",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | Member States may apply national definitions of environmentally-friendly (or high efficiency) cogeneration production until the Council, on the basis of a report and a proposal from the Commission, unanimously adopts a common definition;
new
(d)renewable fuels of non-biological origin, advanced sustainable biofuels, bioliquids, biogas and advanced sustainable products falling within CN codes 4401 and 4402;
(e)products falling within CN code 2705 used for heating purposes. 2003/96/EC
(e)energy products and electricity used for the carriage of goods and passengers by rail, metro, tram and trolley bus;
(f)energy products supplied for use as fuel for navigation on inland waterways (including fishing) other than in private pleasure craft, and electricity produced on board a craft;
(g)natural gas in Member States in which the share of natural gas in final energy consumption was less than 15 % in 2000;
The total or partial exemptions or reductions may apply for a maximum period of ten years after the entry into force of this Directive or until the national share of natural gas in final energy consumption reaches 25 %, whichever is the sooner. However, as soon as the national share of natural gas in final energy consumption reaches 20 %, the Member States concerned shall apply a strictly positive level of taxation, which shall increase on a yearly basis in order to reach at least the minimum rate at the end of the period referred to above. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland may apply the total or partial exemptions or reductions for natural gas separately for Northern Ireland;
(h)electricity, natural gas, coal and solid fuels used by households and/or by organisations recognised as charitable by the Member State concerned. In the case of such charitable organisations, Member States may confine the exemption or reduction to use for the purpose of non-business activities. Where mixed use takes place, taxation shall apply in proportion to each type of use. If a use is insignificant, it may be treated as nil;
(i)natural gas and LPG used as propellants;
(j)motor fuels used in the field of the manufacture, development, testing and maintenance of aircraft and ships;
(k)motor fuels used for dredging operations in navigable waterways and in ports;
(l)products falling within CN code 2705 used for heating purposes. 2. Member States may also refund to the producer some or all of the amount of tax paid by the consumer on electricity produced from products specified in paragraph 1(b). 3. Member States may apply a level of taxation down to zero to energy products and electricity used for agricultural, horticultural or piscicultural works, and in forestry. On the basis of a proposal from the Commission, the Council shall before 1 January 2008 examine if the possibility of applying a level of taxation down to zero shall be repealed. Article 16
1. Member States may, without prejudice to paragraph 5, apply an exemption or a reduced rate of taxation under fiscal control on the taxable products referred to in Article 2 where such products are made up of, or contain, one or more of the following products:
products falling within CN codes 1507 to 1518;
products falling within CN codes 38249955 and 38249980, 38249985, 38249986, 38249992 (excluding anti-rust preparations containing amines as active constituents and inorganic composite solvents and thinners for varnishes and similar products), 38249993, 38249996 (excluding anti-rust preparations containing amines as active constituents and inorganic composite solvents and thinners for varnishes and similar products), 38260010 and 38260090 for their components produced from biomass;
products falling within CN codes 22072000 and 29051100 which are not of synthetic origin;
products produced from biomass, including products falling within CN codes 4401 and 4402. Member States may also apply a reduced rate of taxation under fiscal control on the taxable products referred to in Article 2 where such products contain water (CN codes 2201 and 28539010). Biomass shall mean the biodegradable fraction of products, waste and residues from agriculture (including vegetal and animal substances), forestry and related industries, as well as the biodegradable fraction of industrial and municipal waste. 2. | 8c300c97-5de2-4886-9295-1daf8a0942e3 | 38 |
04add4ee-b742-47ee-aa84-daf52f895ac9 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fbd810dd3bf7f5736c1a18f/NIS_final_web_single_page.pdf | 2,020 | [
"infrastructure",
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] | www.gov.uk | Over the remainder of Network Rail’s 5 year settlement – Control Period 6 – the government will invest £17.5 billion to renew and upgrade the railway system, improving passenger journeys across the UK. This will deliver on the NIC’s recommendations by progressing the East In 2017, the National Infrastructure Commission outlined the transformational economic potential of the Oxford-Cambridge Arc in its report ‘Partnering for Prosperity’. At Spending Review 2020 the government has reaffirmed its commitment to the area, including additional funding to support the Budget 2020 commitments to develop a Spatial Framework to plan for long-term economic and housing growth and to explore the case for up to four Development Corporations along the route of East West Rail. This will help to deliver sustainable economic and housing growth, supported by infrastructure, that meets the The government will also deliver on its manifesto commitment to spend £500 million to restore transport services previously lost in the Beeching cuts of the 1960s, including reopening the Ashington-Blyth line in Northumberland to passenger services, and restoring rail links to Okehampton in Devon. The government has also launched a New Ideas Fund to pay for feasibility work on proposals for new lines and stations. Feasibility funding for the first ten schemes has been announced, which will provide a basis for decisions on further re-opening Meir Station in Stoke-on-Trent; the Barrow Hill line between Sheffield and Chesterfield; the Ivanhoe line between Leicester and Burton on Trent; branch lines on the Isle of Wight (Shanklin-Ventnor and Wootton-Newport); the Abbey line between St Albans Abbey and Watford Junction; Reopening Wellington and Cullompton railway stations; Bury-Heywood-Rochdale lines; Clitheroe to Hellifield railway line; reinstatement of rail access to Devizes via a new railway station at Lydeway; and the Waterside line (Hythe-Totton).The government will provide further feasibility funding for an additional fifteen proposals to inform decisions on further reopening Beeston Castle and Tarporley station in Cheshire, St. Anne’s Park station in Bristol, and Ferryhill station in County Durham; reinstating links between Bolton, Radcliffe, and Bury; the Stratford- upon-Avon to Honeybourne/Worcester/Oxford line; new stations at Waverley in South Y orkshire and a station in the Langport/Somerton area of Somerset; improved services from Melton Mowbray and Falmouth; upgrading the South Fylde Line; the Maid Marian line between Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire; reinstating rail access to Cirencester; restoring services between Swanage and Wareham; the South Humber rail link; and a new link between Consett and Newcastle. The government is also expanding the third round of the New Stations Fund to £32 million. This will fund the opening of railway stations at Edginswell and Thanet Parkway in Kent; and St Clears in Carmarthenshire. It will also provide funding to further develop proposals for stations at Haxby in Y ork and Deeside in Flintshire. The government is fully committed to improving connectivity between northern cities. Over the course of this year, the government has been drawing up an Integrated Rail Plan for the Midlands and the North of England, which will be published shortly. In line with the terms of reference, the Plan will ensure that Phase 2b of HS2, Northern Powerhouse Rail and other planned rail investments in the North and Midlands are scoped and delivered in an integrated way. This will bring transformational rail improvements more quickly and to more places, and will be informed by the NIC’s assessment of the rail needs of the Midlands and
International connectivity is important for linking businesses to valuable markets, and to support trade and investment.21 The UK has the third largest aviation network in the world. Flights into UK hub airports connect the regions and nations of the UK to the world, enabling a more global Britain. Air connectivity also brings together the nations of the UK, and in 2019 over 19 million passengers flew on routes between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.22 The government last month launched the Global Travel Taskforce to consider how the international travel sector could be supported through the specific challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. It has since considered what steps we can take to facilitate business and tourist travel on a bilateral and global basis, through innovative testing models and other non-testing means, and more broadly what steps we can take to increase consumer confidence and reduce the barriers to a safe and sustainable recovery of international travel. This is alongside the already unprecedented package of measures announced by the Chancellor and available to the travel sector, including schemes to raise capital, flexibilities with tax bills and the extended furlough scheme. The UK’s freight system is one of the most efficient in the world, providing seamless transportation of goods into, out of and across the country, boosting economic growth. The government has announced that it will provide a full response to the NIC’s Better The Challenge for Freight report through the publication of a comprehensive cross-modal freight strategy in 2021. This will also consider the impacts on the freight system of the end of the transition period and the COVID-19 pandemic. In preparation for the end of the transition period, the government has provided critical support to key ports around the UK through their surrounding Local Resilience Forums to mitigate any potential disruption and ensure continued seamless transit of freight in and out of the county. This has included development and implementation of essential traffic management plans, particularly around the Port of Dover and the Channel Tunnel, as well as upstream intervention to support and improve haulier preparedness ahead of the end of the Transition Period. The government has also allocated £200 million towards the Port Infrastructure Fund to ensure that ports across the UK have the necessary infrastructure in place for freight to continue to flow smoothly in and out of the UK. The government is taking steps to reform how it invests in places, as well as what it invests in, to embed long-term change in policy making to level up and unleash the potential of the Union. Major policy interventions will be considered UK-wide. | 065e5061-603a-4613-810e-5fbe04701545 | 13 |
04af5f1c-d7bb-4189-ab4d-0f618be47856 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:31999L0094&qid=1448884429550&rid=1 | 2,000 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | \"model\" means the commercial description of the make, type, and, if available and appropriate, variant and version of a passenger car;12. \"type\", \"variant\" and \"version\" mean the differentiated vehicles of a given make that are declared by the manufacturer, as described in Annex II.B to Directive 70/156/EEC, and uniquely identified by type, variant and version alphanumeric characters.Article 3The Member States shall ensure that a label on fuel economy and CO2 emissions, which is in accordance with the requirements described in Annex I, is attached to or displayed, in a clearly visible manner, near each new passenger car model at the point of sale.Article 4Without prejudice to the establishment by the Commission of an Internet guide at Community level, the Member States shall ensure that a guide on fuel economy and CO2 emissions is produced in consultation with manufacturers on at least an annual basis in accordance with the requirements of Annex II. | 918d42bc-8bce-45e1-8a04-8686083f8f22 | 2 |
04b16d89-a0c4-461e-ad90-e45f31d4513e | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.09959v2 | 2,020 | [
"patents",
"energy",
"science",
"citations",
"scientific"
] | arxiv.org | Patents that do not cite scientific papers are removed from this second data subset. Step 4: Complementing with meta-information: This second data subset of LCET-science citations is complemented by meta-information about the scientific papers that are cited. The meta-information includes the year of publication, the WoS category, paper and patent title. Citations to papers that cannot be assigned to a scientific field are removed from the data set. Whenever available, the DOI, journal or conference name are added. The data also comprises information about the type of citation, i.e. whether the citation was added by the patent applicant or examiner, whether the citation was made on the front page or in the text body of the patent, and a confidence score about the reliability of the citation link. Note that the data by Marx and Fuegi [32] was generated by a probabilistic matching procedure. During the research for this article, some false-positive patent-to-paper links were discovered and removed manually. The final subset contains 396,504 citation links from 22,017 unique patent assigned to 10 different LCETs to 103,645 unique scientific papers belonging to 235 different scientific fields. To quantify similarity between LCETs, the network interpretation of relationships between technological classes, patents, scientific papers and scientific fields is used (Fig. 1). Consider technological classes which are assigned to 1 patents which cite scientific articles. Then the 1 × bipartite technology-patent network can be defined as = 1 if a technology class is assigned to patent . Similarly, the 2 × matrix with elements = 1 if the scientific field is assigned to paper , and zero otherwise, can be defined where 2 is the number of cited papers and the number of separate scientific fields. Patents are frequently classified with multiple CPC codes. In contrast, only one WoS field is attached to a paper. 7 Thus, every row in the paper-scientific field matrix contains only one non-zero element, whereas there can be multiple 1's per row in the patent-technological class matrix . The scientific and technological spaces are coupled via citations going from patents to papers, which is naturally represented by a binary 1 × 2 citation matrix . Note that a patent may cite multiple papers. The th row of the matrix ⊤ gives the number of citations from technology class to any paper . In the same manner, the th row of the projection ̃ = ⊤ gives the number of citations from technology class to any scientific field 8 . The share of all citations from technology going to scientific field is then given by the rowstochastic matrix with elements = ̃ ∕ ∑ =1 ̃ . Fig. 6 is constructed using the four largest values for every row in . A more detailed decomposition of LCETs' scientific knowledge is shown in Appendix, Fig. 9. Similarities between scientific knowledge bases of technologies are quantified by computing cosine similarities between LCETs' reliance on scientific fields. Since the shares of scientific fields in citations are embodied in the matrix , the pairwise cosine similarities of two technologies' scientific reliance can be computed as
, where * denotes the th row of matrix . By using citations to patents, similarities between LCETs based on their technological instead of their scientific knowledge bases can be quantified as well. Let us denote the patent-patent citation network by the 1 × 1 matrix where the element = 1 if patent cites patent and zero otherwise. In contrast to the bipartite patent-science citation network , the patent citation network is square, since rows and columns are both populated by patents. Nevertheless, the algebra above for constructing technology networks can be easily extended. In a similar way as before, the total number of citations from one technology to other technologies can be obtained by the projection ̃ = ⊤
. The row-normalization
gives the distribution of a technology's citation over all other technological classes. Taking pairwise cosine similarities of all rows of matrix yields a measure of similarity between LCETs' technological knowledge base (instead of to the scientific knowledge base considered above). To check robustness, more fine-grained bibliographic networks are computed as alternative measures of knowledge base similarities. Here, two LCETs are similar if they cite the same papers (instead of scientific fields) or if they cite the same patents (instead of technological classes). Details on the derivation of bibliographic coupling networks, as well as results, are presented in Appendix F.
The focus of this analysis is on LCETs, including Nuclear fission and fusion and non-fossil fuels, which, as will be shown, differ not only by their scientific base but also by their technological history. First, a description of LCET innovation dynamics over the past two centuries measured by relative and quantitative accounts of LCET patents and their reliance on science is provided. In a subsequent step, the qualitative nature of the scientific and technological knowledge base of LCETs is explored and its evolution over time illustrated. Finally, cross-technology interactions revealed by the network structure of the patent-science citation data are studied. Exponential growth in science and patenting Fig. 2(a) shows the evolution of the number of patents and papers in the two full data sets, on semi-log axis, suggesting exponential growth in the number of patents and papers, although at different rates. In this figure, the data covers only US patents, but all available papers in the MAG database. The drop during the most recent years can be explained by a (yet) incomplete coverage of most recent papers and patents. A drop in patenting and scientific activity during World War II, and in scientific activity during World War I, is observed. 7 WoS fields are originally assigned to journals in the original WoS indices [38]. However, in the RoS data, MAG field IDs have been used to classify individual papers by field of research which were then mapped to WoS fields. This allows us to retrieve scientific fields for papers that are not listed in WoS. | 88003841-86dc-4cf8-8f5a-a9e1b41682dc | 3 |
04b87d5e-1da1-4731-9b0e-45296e115e0a | http://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.01804v1 | 2,025 | [
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] | arxiv.org | Results
3.1. The meta-emulator
Figure 5 shows the results of the quantile regression of the social cost of carbon on the pure rate of time preference. Table A1 has the numerical results. Greater impatience implies a lower social cost of carbon—this has been previously documented many times and follows immediately from first principles. At the median, an increase of the pure rate of time preference by 1% leads to a drop in the social cost of carbon of $66/tC. This is $11/tC at the 5th %ile, and $329/tC at the 95th %ile. The right tail fattens as the discount rate falls because the further future is more uncertain. Figure 6 shows the estimated parameters for the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. See also Table A1. A stronger curvature of the utility function is associated with a lower social cost of carbon. An increase by 1 reduces the social cost of carbon by $76/tC at the median, by $20/tC at the 20th %ile, and by $109/tC at the 85th %ile. The coefficients are not statistically significant at the 5% level further in the tails. Figure 7 shows the effects of the assumed economic impact at 2.5℃ global warming. | b02f7ba6-a079-4a47-9fa0-46b24185a401 | 6 |
04b9cc3b-49bf-44ef-921a-1e011a02761b | https://www.drivingelectric.com/your-questions-answered/90/london-congestion-charge-and-electric-cars | 2,017 | [
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10 May 2024
10 May 2024
In February 2003, the London Congestion Charging Scheme was introduced in order to address traffic and local air pollution in the Capital. Initially the Congestion Charge area only covered 22 square kilometres but in February 2007 the area doubled in size to the current 'Congestion Charge Zone', or CCZ for short. Advertisement - Article continues below
This is not to be confused with the
introduced in 2019, which has since expanded and is set to expand again in 2023. When you come to London it will be clear when you are entering the CCZ, you will spot a sign showing a white 'C' on a red circle and the words 'Congestion Charge'. The zone currently covers an area bordered roughly by the A501 inner ring road to the north, Hyde Park and Victoria to the west, Vauxhall Bridge at its southern tip, and Tower Bridge to the east. While the ULEZ is set to grow, there are currently no public plans to expand the Congestion Charge zone. 2020’s Covid pandemic lockdown saw the zone temporarily suspended, but the charge was brought back at a higher rate of £15 a day and with expanded operating hours from June 2020. Since February 2022, the Congestion Charge has applied from 7am to 6pm on weekdays and from midday to 6pm on Saturdays, Sundays and Bank Holidays but there is no charge between Christmas Day and New Year's Day bank holiday. Advertisement - Article continues below
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While low-emission vehicles previously escaped the Congestion Charge, these days only fully zero-emissions cars are exempt. But that won't be the case forever, as current plans see that exemption expire in December 2025. Note that exempt cars do not automatically escape the charge – they have to be registered as such beforehand with Transport for London (TfL). Until the 25th of December 2025, all purely electric cars, vans and other vehicles are Congestion Charge-exempt, because they have zero tailpipe emissions. This means if you drive a fully electric vehicle and register it with Transport for London (TfL) you won’t have to pay the Congestion Charge. vehicles – even
capable of running on pure-electric power for some distance – are not exempt. After December 2025, these drivers will incur the same £15 daily charge as all other drivers. Advertisement - Article continues below
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Blue Badge holders don't have to pay the Congestion Charge at all. However, as with all the other exemptions, it’s vital that the vehicles used by a Blue Badge holder – a maximum of two per badge – are first registered with TfL in order to qualify for exemption. The Blue Badge discount too still costs £10 and must be renewed in line with the Blue Badge expiry date, though if you renew within 90 days of the expiry date, no further charge is due. Other vehicles facing no charge are those with nine or more seats, breakdown and recovery vehicles, and two-wheeled motorcycles or mopeds. You only have to pay the charge once a day. That means you can drive in and out of the Congestion Charge Zone (CCZ) many times on the same day without facing further penalties. You pay the charge online, on Transport for London's website. Advertisement - Article continues below
This fee has gone up recently to £180, though if you pay within 14 days, this is discounted to £90 – still a hefty sum, so if you think you’ll be entering the CCZ, it’s wise to pay as soon as possible. It is possible to appeal a PCN under certain conditions; for example, if you’ve already paid the charge, or your car is exempt and the PCN was served in error. A full list of conditions can be found on the TfL website. Paying to enter the Congestion Charge Zone (CCZ) is simple and can be done in advance of your travel date. Just visit the Transport for London (TFL) website, head to the
’ section, click 'Pay', and follow the prompts to input your vehicle details and desired travel date. It's a simple process. Plus, you can conveniently settle the fee for the Ultra Low Emission Zone simultaneously. The London
(ULEZ) was introduced in April 2019, operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week (except no charge between Christmas Day and New Year's Day bank holiday) in the same boundaries as the Congestion Charge Zone at the time. It’s completely separate to the Congestion Charge and drivers who enter the ULEZ zone and the Congestion Charge in a non-compliant vehicle have to pay both charges. Advertisement - Article continues below
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Petrol cars and vans that don't meet at least the Euro 4 emissions standard (and motorcycles that don’t meet Euro 3) have to pay £12.50 to enter the ULEZ area, while diesel cars and vans that don't meet at least the Euro 6 standard are liable for the charge. This means that while Euro 4 and 5 petrol cars get away with not paying the ULEZ charge, Euro 5 diesels and earlier have to pay it. As a rough guide, diesel cars and vans registered before September 2016 aren't Euro 6 compliant. If in doubt, use
to see if you need to pay. The ULEZ expanded on 25 October 2021 to encompass the entire 'inner London area' (i.e. the zone bounded by the North and South Circular Roads), and was expanded again on 29 August 2023. The new zone is considerably larger than before, covering all London Boroughs, extending out as far as the M25 in some places. | 5d405850-0676-48ea-9eb2-1e182b552b04 | 0 |
04bda1fd-3138-4864-993c-5ecdd0f98ffa | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2025/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2025_3d22864cf237013c86452d4c6455250a.pdf | 2,025 | [
"emissions",
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"used"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | Fire protection 247.00 208.59 -38.40 -15.55% Update to EEA GDP proxy dataset. 2.F.4. Aerosols 908.94 908.94 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations 2.F.5. Solvents 16.35 12.83 -3.53 -21.57% Corrected an issue in proxy calculation 2.F.6. Other applications 27.30 27.30 0.00 -0.01% no significant recalculations Explanation for recalculations 2. Industrial processes and product use 2.B.9. Flurochemical production 104.34 104.34 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations 2.C.3. Aluminium production 299.84 299.84 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 513 Explanation for recalculations 2.F.3. Fire protection 0.46 0.46 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations 2.G.2. SF6 and PFCs from other product use 128.63 128.63 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations Explanation for recalculations 2. Industrial processes and product use 2.B.9. Flurochemical production 84.95 84.95 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations 2.C.3. Aluminium production 2.78 2.78 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations 2.G.2. SF6 and PFCs from other product use 63.94 63.94 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations Explanation for recalculations 2. Industrial processes and product use 2.E.1. Integrated circuit or semiconductor 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations Explanation for recalculations 2. Industrial processes and product use 2.E.1. Integrated circuit or semiconductor 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00% no significant recalculations
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 514 A. Fuel Combustion (sectoral approach) Y Y Chapter 3 1. Energy industries Y Y Chapter 3 2. Manufacturing industries and construction Y Y Chapter 3 B. Fugitive emissions from fuels Y Y Chapter 3 2. Oil and natural gas and other emissions from energy C. CO2 transport and storage N N 2. Industrial processes and product use Y Y Chapter 4 A. Mineral industry Y Y Chapter 4 B. Chemical industry Y Y Chapter 4
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 515 C. Metal industry Y Y Chapter 4 D. Non-energy products from fuels and solvent use Y Y Chapter 4 E. Electronic industry Y Y Chapter 4 F. Product uses as substitutes for ODS Y Y Chapter 4 G. Other product manufacture and use Y Y Chapter 4 A. Enteric fermentation Y Y Chapter 5 B. Manure management Y Y Chapter 5 D. Agricultural soils Y Y Chapter 5 E. Prescribed burning of savannahs N N F. Field burning of agricultural residues N N Chapter 5 H. Urea application Y Y Chapter 5 I. Other carbon containing fertilisers Y Y Chapter 5
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 516 4. Land use, land-use change and forestry Y Y Chapter 6 G. Harvested wood products Y Y Chapter 6 A. Solid waste disposal Y Y Chapter 7 B. Biological treatment of solid waste Y Y Chapter 7 C. Incineration and open burning of waste Y Y Chapter 7 D. Wastewater treatment and discharge Y Y Chapter 7
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 517 6. Other (as specified in Summary 1.A) N N
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 518 all recalculations is a decrease of 1.6 Mt CO 2 equivalent in 1990, and a decrease of 1.4 Mt in the current and the previous NID, according to IPCC source sector. Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 519 changes in total net GWP emissions, between the inventory presented in the current and the previous NID. There has been a very minor change in the reported trend in emissions. The reported trend from 1990 to 2022 in the 2024 inventory submission was a decrease of 49.7%. The recalculated trend from 1990 to 2022, as presented in the 2025 submission is a decreas e of
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 520 All recalculations to the inventory, including those made in response to the review process and other recalculations e.g. due to data revisions are described in detail within Chapters 3 to 8, recommendations from the review process, including where these have led • changes in reporting in the NID; • changes in reporting in the CRT; and • planned improvements for future submissions. The UNFCCC conducted desk review of the 2022 UK greenhouse gas inventory submission from the 19th September to the 24th September 2022, in accordance with the Article 8 review guidelines of the Kyoto Protocol (adopted by decision 22/CMP.1 and revised by decision
Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 521 4/CMP.11). The final output of this review, the 2022 Annual Review Report, was published on the 10 th of February 2023.The expert review team (ERT) did not identify any issues that required a resubmission of the 2022 submission. Each review report reconsiders items raised during the previous review (in this case the 2021 UNFCCC review), updating the item as to whether it has been resolved or not resolved, or whether the item is being addressed. The 10.16 details updated responses to the last UNFCCC review, for legacy items that also those items new to the 2022 UNFCCC review. Recalculations and Improvements 10 UK NID 2025 (Issue 1) Ricardo Page 522 10.4.1 GHG Inventory Improvements CRT category/issue Recommendation made in previous review report Review report / paragraph Response Chapter / section in the NID National registry KP reporting Make information related to the correct link in the next annual Resolved. This was resolved in incorporated into the national totals for that subcategory. E.1 2022 ARR (E.1, 2021 ARR) A3.6 explaining that where the data is available, activity data subcategory level is included for Crown Dependency. Section 1.1.2.1 and Annex 1.A Fuel combustion – sectoral biogas is blended with natural gas, consider ways of reporting not affect the accuracy of the 3.2.5) and the relevant method statements accordingly. | 95866fde-5b53-4214-b279-97a1078c466c | 397 |
04c4d098-ebd4-4672-930f-3c797c1fab18 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2015/infrastructure-act-2015_fb5ac70eeceb97277b5a2dd914ba86ed.pdf | 2,015 | [
"Energy",
"Transport",
"Cycling",
"Infrastructure",
"Walking",
"section",
"highways",
"strategic",
"company",
"insert"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | (5) In subsection (4) “specified” means specified, or of a description specified, (6) The Secretary of State may by development order make provision for a person to apply for planning permission for the development of land without complying with a condition imposed on the grant of planning permission by
Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7) SCHEDULE 4 – Mayoral development orders Document 2023-04-26 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (7) A development order under subsection (6) may, in particular make provision similar to that made by section 73, subject to such modifications as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate. (8) So far as the context requires, in relation to— (a) an application for the consent, agreement or approval of the Mayor of London to a matter specified in a condition imposed by a Mayoral (b) the determination of such an application, any reference in an enactment to a local planning authority (however expressed) includes a reference to the Mayor. (9) For the purposes of this Act a local planning authority is a relevant local planning authority in relation to a Mayoral development order or proposed Mayoral development order if a site or part of a site to which the order or proposed order relates is within the authority’s area. 61DC Preparation and making of Mayoral development order (1) The Secretary of State may by development order make provision about the procedure for the preparation and making of a Mayoral development order. (2) A development order under subsection (1) may in particular make provision (a) notice, publicity and inspection by the public; (b) consultation with and consideration of views of such persons and for such purposes as are specified in the order; (c) the making and consideration of representations. (3) A Mayoral development order may be made only in response to an application to the Mayor of London by each relevant local planning (4) A proposed Mayoral development order may be consulted on only with the consent of each relevant local planning authority. (5) A Mayoral development order may not be made unless the order has been approved, in the form in which it is made, by each relevant local planning (6) If the Mayor of London makes a Mayoral development order, the Mayor must send a copy to the Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practicable 61DD Revision or revocation of Mayoral development order (1) The Mayor of London may at any time revise or revoke a Mayoral development order with the approval of each relevant local planning (2) The Mayor of London must revise a Mayoral development order if the Secretary of State directs the Mayor to do so (and the requirement for the approval of each relevant local planning authority does not apply in those
104 Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7) SCHEDULE 4 – Mayoral development orders Document 2023-04-26 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (3) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a Mayoral development order if the Secretary of State thinks it is expedient to do so. (4) The power under subsection (3) is to be exercised by order made by the (5) If the Secretary of State revokes a Mayoral development order the Secretary of State must state the reasons for doing so. (6) The Secretary of State may by development order make provision about— (a) the steps to be taken by the Secretary of State before giving a direction or making an order under this section; (b) the procedure for the revision or revocation of a Mayoral (7) A development order under subsection (6) may in particular make provision (a) notice, publicity and inspection by the public; (b) consultation with and consideration of views of such persons and for such purposes as are specified in the order; (c) the making and consideration of representations. 61DE Effect of revision or revocation on incomplete development (1) This section applies if planning permission for development granted by a Mayoral development order is withdrawn at a time when the development has been started but not completed. (2) For this purpose planning permission for development granted by a Mayoral development order is withdrawn— (a) if the order is revoked under section 61DD, or (b) if the order is revised under that section so that it ceases to grant planning permission for the development or materially changes any condition or limitation to which the grant of permission is subject. (3) The development may, despite the withdrawal of the permission, be completed, subject as follows. (4) If the permission is withdrawn because the Mayoral development order is revoked by the Mayor of London, the Mayor may make a determination that subsection (3) is not to apply in relation to development specified in the (5) A determination under subsection (4) must be published in such manner as the Mayor of London thinks appropriate. (6) If the permission is withdrawn because the Mayoral development order is revoked by an order made by the Secretary of State under section 61DD, the order under that section may provide that subsection (3) is not to apply in relation to development specified in that order. (7) If the permission is withdrawn because the order is revised as mentioned in subsection (2)(b), the revised order may provide that subsection (3) is not to apply in relation to development specified in the order. Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7) SCHEDULE 4 – Mayoral development orders Document 2023-04-26 This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). (8) The power under this section to include provision in an order under section 61DD or a Mayoral development order may be exercised differently 2 The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is amended as follows. 3 In section 56(5)(a) (time when development begun where planning permission granted by general or local development order) for “or a local development order” substitute “, a local development order or a Mayoral development order”. | 079fda04-5438-4ec9-9c30-a7a0396093f2 | 39 |
04cbda9e-72ea-43c6-a550-a31b66768973 | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/TXT/?uri=CELEX:51999PC0296 | 2,000 | [
"Buildings",
"Appliances",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | On the contrary the proposed minimum efficiency requirements have an acceptable payback period for all users, and as already indicated, the impact on industry is acceptable. (23) In the next 5 to 8 years the prices of electronic ballasts may decrease substantially, reducing the price differences to 10 to 15 ? between wire-wound and electronic ballasts. Even so the payback period for domestic users would still exceed 10 years and could be over 15 years. | 32052901-ad2a-47ed-b5cf-9f7be7d4370f | 31 |
04d05e26-3828-4a83-9a17-fb40739295e4 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/1900/united-kingdom-national-communication-nc-nc-8-biennial-reports-br-br-5_288d5f885869447df3e9910829b567a3.pdf | 2,022 | [
"climate",
"energy",
"support",
"emissions",
"carbon"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | And these industrial clusters, our potential SuperPlaces, foster and lead internationally on the development and roll out of Industrial CCUS is fundamental to decarbonising of industries such as chemicals, oil refining, and cement. This is because options for decarbonising industry are limited, and fuel switching is sometimes only a partial solution. CCUS is not currently investable for most industrial sectors as deployment costs are higher than the current carbon price can support, and businesses are unable to pass these through to consumers. Additionally, businesses may face challenges raising capital finance to invest in CCUS until it has been more widely deployed in the UK. The IETF aims to reduce this risk for first movers by providing grant funding towards the capital costs of CCUS projects, but the Fund alone will not help industry to overcome this barrier. Therefore, an investable business model is needed, alongside clear commitments to provide certainty to industry. The IDS set out the ambition to capture 3MtCO2 per year by 2030. Our delivery pathway for Carbon Budget 6 requires an increased ambition of 6MtCO2 per year by 2030 and 9MtCO2 per year by 2035. We envisage these emissions to be captured from industries in clusters as well as from more dispersed sites, where non-pipeline transport solutions such as the shipping of CO2 may be required. Revenue support for industrial carbon capture and hydrogen production CCUS and hydrogen deployment will play a central role in our green industrial revolution and ensuring that the UK’s businesses are competitive in a net zero future. We have been working with industry to develop business models for industrial carbon capture and hydrogen production to give investors the long-term revenue certainty they require. We are now setting up the IDHRS scheme to fund these business models and enable the first commercial scale deployment of low carbon hydrogen and industrial carbon capture. This will unlock by 2030 up to £6bn private sector capital, create thousands of jobs in key levelling up regions, grow the UK supply chain and achieve cost reductions, and deliver carbon savings to allow us to stay on track for our carbon budgets. The IDHRS scheme will initially commit to providing up to £100 million to support initial electrolytic hydrogen projects. We will also be announcing a funding envelope in 2022 that will enable us to award the first contacts to industrial carbon capture facilities and CCUS- enabled hydrogen production projects from 2023 through the Cluster Sequencing process, to deliver up to 3MtCO2/yr of industrial carbon capture and up to 1GW of CCUS-enabled Subject to costs falling, we are also committing to further allocation rounds for all types of eligible low carbon hydrogen production and industrial carbon capture from 2025. We will announce further allocation rounds in due course which will enable us to meet our 2030 deployment ambitions of 6MtCO2/year of industrial carbon capture, 10GW hydrogen production capacity, and four CCUS clusters, while continuing to grow the UK supply chain and achieve cost reductions. Once established, this framework could also be used in the future for other critical decarbonisation technologies. Moreover, the British Energy Security Strategy sets out an ambition to run annual allocation rounds for electrolytic hydrogen, moving to price competitive allocation by 2025 as soon as legislation and market conditions allow, so that up to 1GW of electrolytic hydrogen is in construction or operational by 2025. 172 8th National Communication From 2025 at the latest, all revenue support for hydrogen production will be levy funded, subject to consultation and legislation being in place. Further details on this can be found in the Government’s response to the Hydrogen Business Model consultation56. This includes parallel work to ensure fairness and affordability, such as exemptions for energy intensive industries at risk of carbon leakage. Electrification has the potential to abate between 5 MtCO2e and 12MtCO2e of industry emissions per year by 2050. Electrification will play a more significant role (12MtCO2e) if hydrogen is unavailable in dispersed sites. This equates to an increase demand of electricity by 15-44TWh. Additional electricity demand is consistent under our delivery pathway for the Sixth Carbon Budget, albeit the demand comes at a faster pace due to the possible adoption of electrification in the iron and steel sector. Electrification technologies for low temperature processes are technologically mature and could be applied to less energy intensive sites today. However, industry faces barriers to adoption such as high electricity costs. We have seen the impact of overreliance on gas pushing up prices for hardworking people but our plan to expand our domestic renewables will push down electricity prices. Applications for higher temperature processes are currently limited due to the low maturity of technologies. Some initial grant funding support will be available via Phase 2 of the IETF. Application rounds will run from Autumn 2021 to January 2023. We are also working with Ofgem, network operators, and stakeholders on the approach to delivering low carbon electricity networks with the capacity to meet increased demand from industry. Initial support for sustainable use of biomass fuel switching and BECCS is available via Phase 2 of IETF. As set out in the IDS, current evidence strongly suggests that given limited sustainable biomass supply, we may need to prioritise the use of biomass where it can be combined with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), resulting in negative emissions. The Biomass Strategy, due to be published in 2022 will review the amount of sustainable biomass available to the UK, how this could be best used across the economy, and establish a role for BECCS in reducing carbon emissions across the economy. Industrial non-road mobile machinery (NRMM) NRMM covers a wide variety of machinery across the economy (e.g. diggers, combine harvesters, generators, cranes), with total emissions of around 12 MtCO2e per year. Industrial NRMM accounts for around 6 MtCO2e,57 coming from construction, mining, and manufacturing, with the remaining emissions largely attributed to agriculture , and some to buildings and transport. | e6994b55-18ee-49c8-92db-2261135aea96 | 62 |
04d16654-b6cb-4e4e-96af-5aba3a811af7 | http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:199:0001:0136:EN:PDF | 2,008 | [
"Transport",
"Light-duty vehicles",
"Energy efficiency"
] | eur-lex.europa.eu | 28.7.2008
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 19997
4.4. References to contracting parties shall be understood as references to member states. 4.5. References to approval granted under Regulation 83 shall be understood as references to type-approval granted under
this Regulation and Council Directive 70220EEC 1. 4.6. UNECE type-approval shall be understood as EC type-approval. 1 OJ L 76, 6.4.1971, p. 1. L 19998
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
28.7.2008
Appendix 1
FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF ON-BOARD DIAGNOSTIC OBD SYSTEMS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. | d3fc6859-41cb-4ee2-997b-90ebc4f9b481 | 324 |
04d1d291-5773-48e4-b009-79e9d051ae02 | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2020/energy-white-paper_0cd02a608db5fd9fbe071391540a23a7.pdf | 2,020 | [
"Energy",
"Fossil Fuels Curbing Measures",
"Fossil Fuel Phase Out",
"energy",
"electricity",
"system",
"support",
"emissions"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | `We will build world-leading digital infrastructure for our energy system, based on the vision set out by the independent Energy Data Taskforce, publishing the UK’s first Energy Data Strategy in spring 2021, in partnership Data will help us to discover cheaper ways of delivering the energy we need by making information available to those who can provide solutions to reduce costs and improve services to consumers. For example, better data can help local authorities make the best decisions about where to install chargepoints for EVs. Open and secure data is also essential to the efficient integration of low-carbon technologies, such as solar panels, heat pumps and batteries, into our electricity networks. Information about the scale and nature of demand, the capability of networks, or the location and size of generation and storage capacity will enable markets to optimise the use of assets across the system. This information can be combined with data from transport, homes and commercial buildings to enable whole-system strategic planning and investment decisions. Smart meter data can help DNOs to identify system constraints and enable them to direct investment more efficiently, including where network reinforcement is required to support an increase in heat pumps or EVs. In all such activities, we will ensure that new technologies are introduced in a way that empowers consumers and protects their data at all times. Batteries and Machine Learning Habitat Energy are using artificial intelligence and machine learning to provide optimisation and trading services to owners of battery storage and other flexible energy assets. Habitat uses algorithms to process data from individual assets and trading platforms to optimise the batteries across multiple markets. This data-driven approach maximises the revenue that can be achieved while also carefully managing the degradation of the battery to preserve asset life. Improved co-ordination between markets and better quality data about network condition and performance enable innovators like Habitat to optimise assets to meet system needs, thereby reducing costs for consumers. In 2018, the government and Ofgem launched the independent Energy Data Taskforce. The Taskforce’s final report in 2019 highlighted how the move towards a modern, digital energy system is being hindered by poor quality or missing data, while data which is valuable can be hard to find or subject to restricted access.115 The report set out a strategy to fill data gaps, improve the quality of We are implementing all of the Taskforce’s recommendations through ‘Modernising Energy Data’, a joint programme with Ofgem and Innovate UK. We will publish an energy data and digitalisation strategy jointly with Ofgem in spring 2021. The strategy will set out the progress that we have made against specific recommendations and show how better use of data is realising our objective of a fully digital and clean energy system. Our approach will be aligned with the overarching principles set out in the National Data Strategy and aims to help establish the energy sector’s role in growing the UK’s data economy.116 The Taskforce showed that a lack of access to energy data creates a barrier to innovation in the new technologies and services required to achieve net zero emissions. We are therefore creating a national energy data catalogue to make data more visible and reduce the costs of accessing this information. A prototype of the service will be launched by summer 2021. Market participants will be able to use this data to identify opportunities for creative new solutions, such as supplying more efficiently groups of customers who have similar needs. Data owners often default to not sharing the information they create. We will develop a ‘data triage’ process which provides practical support to energy companies for making data more readily available, while ensuring cyber-security and data privacy. It will represent a clear guide for market participants on how to share data appropriately. Ofgem will consult on this guidance and associated licence conditions by summer 2021. It will complement the digitalisation strategies of the network companies which have recently been published to set out operators’ plans for improving the use of data. We will also develop the tools and processes which allow innovators to make full use of the data once they have access to it. The Modernising Energy Data innovation competitions will enable providers of new services to link energy data with information from other sectors such as transport, heat and buildings, integrating the UK’s different infrastructure.117 For example, the £2 million Modernising Energy Data Access competition will help develop the digital structures needed for innovators to build new apps and products that are compatible across different systems and sectors. The early outputs from these competitions are expected to be available by autumn 2021. As the energy system becomes increasingly reliant on digital technologies, cyber security will be ever more important for the stability and security of the energy system. Our smart metering system has already been developed with security experts from government and industry and we will continue to ensure cyber security plays a key role in the actions we are taking to facilitate a smart, digital and secure energy system. Gas currently represents almost consumption and 40 per cent of We will continue to rely on natural gas for some years, even as we work to largely eliminate carbon emissions from the entire energy system including those from gas. `We will consult on updates to the Gas Act to ensure we decarbonise gas supplies while continuing to provide the right price signals to market We will therefore make sure the natural gas markets and networks evolve in a way which enables continued investment and ensure secure supplies but also promotes the use of low-carbon options, wherever possible. This will reduce emissions now and help build the networks of the future which will need to accommodate technologies such as hydrogen and Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage. We will need investment in the gas network to support the ambition set out in the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for a potential Hydrogen Town before the end of the decade. | 7ddb340e-1bee-46f8-b3fb-be45b01d49ae | 21 |
04d4e59b-75a8-49d5-a201-1bada73c5751 | https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20Kingdom%20of%20Great%20Britain%20and%20Northern%20Ireland%20First/UK%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution.pdf
https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker/united-kingdom/ | 2,020 | [
"pv",
"tariff",
"appliance",
"cooperation",
"programme",
"photovoltaic",
"installation",
"receive",
"ldcs",
"decade"
] | unfccc.int | The UK's NDC covers all sectors and gases. For CO2, CH4 and N2O the reference year is 1990 and for F-gases the reference year is 1995. The UK’s overall absolute target is to reduce GHG emissions at least by 68% (including LULUCF) by 2030 compared with reference levels. Emissions from International Aviation and Shipping are not included. The UK has a policy framework in force establishing the binding commitment of net zero emissions by 2050, and Scotland sets bolder goals to reach net-zero in 2045 and 75% below 1990 by 2030. | b20c1106-e9a5-44d2-85fe-64bf43a3f3c3 | 0 |
04e1f504-f662-433d-92e6-a81d4c2e1703 | https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/987432/england-trees-action-plan.pdf | 2,021 | [
"trees",
"woodlands",
"woodland",
"tree",
"england"
] | assets.publishing.service.gov.uk | Putting the right tree in the right place Improving regulatory processes to make tree planting simpler for land managers while retaining strong environmental and biosecurity safeguards will be important to deliver high- quality woodlands at the scale needed to meet our tree planting targets. We will build on the current evidence and feedback available to ensure regulation is fit for purpose. 1.20. Review the regulatory requirements for woodland creation to streamline the process while strengthening environmental protections. Better informed targeting maps will be critical to delivering the right trees in the right places and help identify where planting and establishment can provide particular natural capital benefits whilst being sensitive to environmental and social constraints. Work is already underway to develop Local Nature Recovery Strategies, which help to recognise the wide range of benefits provided by habitats such as woodlands, encouraging the establishment of new woodlands and the expansion of existing woodlands to increase habitat connectivity. Local Nature Recovery Strategies can help channel investment into woodland creation and management sources including through Biodiversity Net Gain. 1.21. Improve the Forestry Commission’s woodland creation map to better show low-risk areas for woodland creation incorporating additional sensitivities as new information 1.22. Develop new mapping products and spatial datasets so land managers have more clarity on site sensitivities and opportunities for woodland establishment and The interaction of trees and peatland Woodlands and peatlands are two of our largest natural climate regulating ecosystem types; our climate change and biodiversity obligations require us to manage them both sustainably. Plans to expand woodland cover and to restore peatland need to work hand in hand which is why we have aligned the England Trees Action Plan with the England Peat Action Plan to deliver a more joined up approach to land use management. We should only plant or naturally establish trees where doing so provides a net benefit to the
environment. This means working with partners and the land-owner to make the best evidence-based decision for sites with peaty soils. We want all interested parties involved in making the most appropriate decisions for each site, working together to consider natural capital value of the habitat types in discussion as well as the realistic prospects for restoration of the wider hydrological unit of an area of peat. 1.23. Develop new guidance for England that will help determine when afforested peat should be restored to bog, and to minimise impacts on peaty soils from tree planting. 1.24. Develop metrics that allow decision-makers to assess the realistic costs of forest to 1.25. Improve land use decision-making through the new peatland map data, once it is Putting more trees in our towns and cities Well sited tree planting, with appropriate management can make places where people live and work more climate resilient, healthy and attractive. We are committed to seeing all new streets lined with trees and have recently published a response to the recommendations of the Building Better, Building Beautiful Commission in early 2021. Developers should work with local authorities to plan, plant and manage these trees, and agree how they will be funded - including through developer contributions such as Biodiversity Net Gain. Obtaining the expert services of local tree officers is recommended to help ensure trees and woodlands are planted and managed effectively and in helping to create, implement and monitor local tree and woodland strategies. Projects such as the Green Infrastructure Standards Framework, being led by Natural England, also showcase the benefits trees can provide for health and wellbeing when 1.26. Extend the Urban Tree Challenge Fund to support the planting and establishment of trees in urban and peri-urban areas; 1.27. Propose new guidance through the National Model Design Code on how trees can be included in the built environment, including design parameters for the placement of 1.28. Propose changes to the National Planning Policy Framework, to make clear the expectation that trees, such as community orchards, should be incorporated in new developments and that streets should be tree lined. Demand for trees for planting is expected to increase dramatically, both in the UK and across Europe, over coming years. Ensuring availability of more trees sourced from the UK will give land managers greater certainty over supply and boost the UK green economy. This can include the production of non-UK provenance planting material in the UK, for example to meet objectives on planting for resilience to climate change. As well as enhancing the quantity of trees produced, we need to enhance their diversity in order to plant treescapes resilient to stresses such as pest and disease, and climate change. Stocking material should be of the highest possible quality to reduce planting losses and ensure the delivery of healthy trees thriving in the landscape. We know strategic stakeholder engagement with both the public and private forest nursery sector is crucial. We are setting out a roadmap for future engagement, building on what we already have in place. This will allow us to develop collaborative, committed and transparent relationships with the nursery sector that delivers better strategic alignment and enhances plant production further. 1.29. Provide funding to support UK public and private sector nurseries and seed suppliers to enhance quantity, quality, diversity and biosecurity of domestic tree production. This will include capital grants and support to augment investment and stimulate innovation; 1.30. Provide a Nursery Notification Scheme that will help better plan for supply and demand in the sector. This will support nurseries and seed suppliers to produce the right stock at the right time. Trees and woodlands as part of the green Planting and establishing more trees and woodlands will play an important role in supporting the green economy, levelling up rural areas and creating thousands of new jobs. It will encourage a growing demand for sustainably sourced timber to be provided domestically and it will unlock new streams of green finance. While the planting and establishment of trees and woodlands will have direct benefits for the forestry sector, it will also have vast benefits on the wider economy. | 73aa16f6-790c-4f59-a4ba-61e5a49b50f9 | 5 |
04e56741-1c4d-468d-86e0-bd051adc830a | https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/GBR/2023/united-kingdom-national-inventory-report-nir-2023_8122f7d823bf366105239091fb57ffd2.pdf | 2,023 | [
"data",
"energy",
"emissions",
"inventory",
"environment"
] | cdn.climatepolicyradar.org | If A and B are correlated, then if emissions are under or overestimated from A it would be expected to be over or underestimated The type and implementation of the correlations has been examined as part of a review (Abbott et al., 2007). The sensitivity analysis that we have completed on the Monte Carlo model suggest that the uncertainties are not sensitive to the correlations between emission factors for fuel used, In running this simulation, it was necessary to make assumptions about the degree of correlation between sources in 1990 and the latest reported year. | 9ce0b96e-2800-424e-bffb-cd8ba36e0902 | 30 |
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